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Abstract 
Misinformation can often have a lasting impact on the causal inferences 
people make about events even after it is unambiguously corrected. This is 
known as the continued influence effect of misinformation. Understanding the 
underlying cognitive processes involved in correcting misinformation is 
important for developing effective counter-misinformation strategies. A review 
of continued influence studies suggests that methodological factors, such as 
the scenario in which misinformation appears, can affect the strength of a 
correction independently of experimental manipulations. This thesis’ primary 
aim was to advance understanding the continued influence effect and the 
conditions that give rise to it, by addressing issues with the methodological 
approach. Experiments 1A-2B developed and validated a methodology for 
web-based testing of the continued influence effect in order to target larger 
and more diverse samples. Two key claims from the continued influence 
literature were replicated; and the introduction of a novel control condition 
showed that misinformation is referred to even if it is only mentioned as part of 
the correction. Experiments 3-5 re-examined the claim that corrections, which 
explain how misinformation occurred, reduce reliance on misinformation. 
Findings showed no evidence that explanatory corrections reduce 
misinformation reliance in multiple scenarios; and continued influence of 
misinformation was observed in some scenarios but not others. Experiments 
6-7 revisited the claim that misinformation, which implies a likely cause of an 
outcome is more impervious to correction than explicitly stated 
misinformation. Findings showed no evidence for this claim in three scenarios. 
I argue that the continued influence effect is a tenuous claim predicated on 
findings from a small set of scenarios that are unrepresentative of real-world 
situations in which misinformation is encountered. I propose that the 
conditions under which continued influence of misinformation occurs are 
poorly understood and recommend formally modelling the continued influence 
effect to gain a better understanding of this phenomenon. 
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“Man's memory shapes 
Its own Eden within” 
― Jorge Luis Borges, Dreamtigers 
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1 You can’t unring a bell 
1.1. Introduction 
Causal thinking is central to the ways in which the human cognitive 
system represents the external world and is critical for a broad range of 
cognitive operations (Oaksford & Chater, 2001; Sloman & Lagnado, 2014). 
Knowledge of causal relations plays a key role in how we represent unfolding 
events, construct coherent memory representations, create explanations, and 
reason in everyday life (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). The 
causal inferences we make about events also underpin how memory 
representations are updated when previously encountered information is 
corrected as erroneous. For example, we might initially learn that a train 
crashed because the driver was asleep but then later discover that this 
information was false and the true cause is unknown. As this Chapter’s title 
suggests, erroneous information that provides a causal explanation for an 
event or outcome is particularly difficult to correct (Johnson & Seifert, 1994). 
Misinformation – defined here as information that is initially thought to be 
true but which later turns out to be erroneous - can have serious and 
widespread repercussions for society. As such, misinformation has become 
an important issue for governments, media organisations, and citizens over 
recent years (see Lewandowsky, Ecker, & Cook, 2017). Concerns about the 
prevalence and impact of misinformation have been heightened by the 
increase in use of social media and user-driven content online (Del Vicario et 
al., 2016; World Economic Forum, 2018). Moreover, large networks that are 
facilitated by social media may serve to maintain and strengthen mistaken 
beliefs rather than improving and correcting them (Madsen, Bailey, & Pilditch, 
2018).  
Given the increase in the availability of misinformation, understanding 
the underlying cognitive processes involved in correcting misinformation is 
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important for developing effective counter-misinformation strategies. An 
obvious strategy is to issue clear and incontrovertible corrections to the 
misinformation. However, cognitive psychology research suggests that this 
strategy may not be as effective as assumed. An accumulating body of 
experimental evidence indicates that misinformation often continues to 
influence thinking despite clear and credible corrections (see Chan, Jones, 
Hall Jamieson, & Albarracín, 2017; Cook et al., 2015; Lewandowsky, Ecker, 
Schwarz, & Cook, 2012; Walter & Murphy, 2018, for reviews).   
One real-world example of the continuing influence of misinformation is 
the widespread belief that there is a causal link between the measles mumps 
and rubella (MMR) vaccination and autism, despite scientific evidence refuting 
the myth (Horne, Powell, Hummel, & Holyoak, 2015). Decreased acceptance 
of the MMR vaccination has contributed to a 7% drop in vaccination rates in 
the UK and a 1.7-fold increase in refusal to vaccinate in the US (Smith, 
Ellenberg, Bell, & Rubin, 2008), and consequently, an increase in a vaccine-
preventable disease. Continued reliance on misinformation can also have 
consequences in the political domain. For instance, Vote Leave’s erroneous 
referendum pledge that the UK would recover £350 million after leaving the 
European Union was widely considered to have swayed the decision to leave 
(Ipsos MORI, 2016), despite being discredited by the UK statistics authority as 
a ‘clear misuse of statistics’ (Full Fact, 2017). 
There are several reasons people might continue to believe corrected 
misinformation. First, they may remember the misinformation (e.g. there is a 
causal link between the MMR vaccination and autism) but not its correction 
(e.g. no causal link between autism and MMR vaccination). Second, they may 
have a strong motivation to ignore the correction – either because it is 
inconsistent with their world-view or they distrust the correction’s source. 
Third, the correction may not carry as much weight or be as convincing as the 
original information.  
The issue appears to be more widespread than this, however. Many 
laboratory-based studies have shown that when people are asked, they often 
remember that a piece of information was corrected, but still use it to reason 
about scenarios describing unfolding events (Ecker, Lewandowsky, & Tang, 
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2010; Ecker, Lewandowsky, Swire, & Chang, 2011; Ecker, Lewandowsky, & 
Apai, 2011; Guillory & Geraci, 2013; Johnson & Seifert, 1994; Rich & 
Zaragoza, 2016). People also refer to misinformation in neutral scenarios in 
which there is no inherent motivation to believe the misinformation over the 
correction, and even when the correction is explicit and incontrovertible. This 
phenomenon is referred to as the continued influence effect (CIE) of 
misinformation (Johnson & Seifert, 1994).  
As discussed above, the CIE has potentially very serious implications 
for societal decisions in domains such as the media, law, and healthcare. For 
instance, members of a jury might incorporate invalid or inadmissible 
information into their verdict decisions despite instructions to disregard it 
(Fein, McCloskey, & Tomlinson, 1997). People might continue to believe 
scientific claims are true even though the scientific article, in which those 
claims were made, has been retracted (Greitemeyer, 2014). Belief of social 
stereotypes may persist even after evidence disconfirms it (Kunda & Oleson, 
1995), and false political beliefs about politics may remain after they have 
been explicitly corrected (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). 
Continued influence studies typically involve examining how people 
process corrections to constructed misinformation in fictional scenarios (e.g. a 
warehouse fire) rather than misinformation that has featured in real-world 
situations (e.g. weapons of mass destruction in Iraq). Studying corrections to 
constructed misinformation in fictional scenarios has methodological value. It 
allows for testing the effectiveness of corrections to misinformation in neutral 
scenarios in which participants have no reason to prefer one version of events 
over another, and it is easier to control for prior exposure, defensive 
processing, and guards against potential floor/ceiling effects (Thorson, 2016). 
The methodological approach used in CIE studies therefore allows for 
exploration of the individual-level cognitive and memory mechanisms involved 
in the continuing influence of misinformation, whilst providing the means to 
control for attitudinal or ideological factors.  
Although the CIE paradigm has several advantages for studying the 
ways in which people process corrections to misinformation, issues with the 
methodological approach could affect the ecological validity and 
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generalisability of findings. First, studies on the CIE have investigated the 
corrections to misinformation in a small number of scenarios (e.g. warehouse 
fire), that may not be representative of different types of situations in which 
people encounter misinformation in the real-world. Second, most studies have 
been laboratory-based which entails small samples of mainly university 
students, who may not behave like a more diverse group of participants. 
Third, although the CIE has been replicated across a range of studies, it is still 
not well understood why it occurs, and under which circumstances. This can 
pose significant challenges to understanding the prevalence of the CIE as a 
phenomenon in the world.  
In order to gain a better understanding the circumstances under which 
the CIE occurs, it is important to address methodological issues that could 
affect the validity and reliability of findings obtained using the CIE paradigm. 
The thesis’ primary aim was to advance our understanding of the continued 
influence effect, and the conditions under which it occurs, and to overcome 
existing methodological problems of validity and reliability allowing for more 
systematic testing of the CIE in the future. This was achieved through a series 
of methodological steps. The first step was to develop and validate a 
methodology that allows for web-based testing of the CIE in order to be able 
to collect data from larger and more representative samples. This 
methodology was then used to examine the prevalence of the CIE across 
different scenarios in more realistic settings (e.g. road accident), and with 
larger samples. This methodology was further used to investigate the 
robustness of two important claims from the CIE literature, and also examine 
whether continued reliance on misinformation occurs when misinformation is 
only mentioned in the correction. 
The first claim from the CIE literature examined, was that corrections 
which explain how misinformation occurred (e.g. from unintentional error or 
intentional lie) can help people understand the contradiction between 
misinformation and the correction, thereby reducing continued reliance on 
misinformation (as suggested by Bush, Johnson, & Seifert, 1994; Johnson & 
Seifert, 1994; Seifert, 2002). The second claim investigated was that 
misinformation, which implies a likely cause of an adverse outcome, is more 
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resistant to correction than misinformation explicitly stating a likely cause 
(Rich & Zaragoza, 2016). The robustness of these claims was examined to 
establish the circumstances under which the CIE is likely to occur. The key 
development that my research has made to this field is to show that the CIE 
does not occur under all circumstances and is likely moderated by the 
specifics of the scenario in which misinformation appears.   
The rest of this introductory chapter examines the current status of CIE 
research. First, I give a brief overview of approaches in cognitive psychology 
and memory research that have been used to study how people disregard 
prior information. In doing so, I make the case for why the CIE approach is 
ideal for studying the cognitive mechanisms involved in processing 
corrections to misinformation. I then describe the CIE and summarise its key 
findings, explain the experimental paradigm used to study the CIE, and 
discuss the potential advantages and limitations of this approach. Following 
this, I discuss the two cognitive mechanisms that have been proposed to 
explain the CIE, and the relative evidence for these two positions. Next, 
factors that have been shown to moderate the CIE are considered. Finally, I 
address the methodological approach used in CIE studies and examine 
whether methodological factors can potentially moderate the CIE.  
 
1.2. Disregarding Prior Information 
The CIE is perhaps the most researched paradigm for examining how 
people disregard prior information. However, there are several other areas of 
research that have similarly looked at how people disregard prior information 
that has been deemed irrelevant. In this section, I first describe three 
alternative approaches that have been used to examine how people disregard 
prior information with respect to social (belief perseverance), legal 
(disregarding invalid or inaccurate testimony), and memory (direct forgetting) 
judgments.   
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1.2.1. Belief perseverance  
Belief perseverance describes the human tendency to cling onto initial 
beliefs to an unwarranted extent (Anderson, New, & Speer, 1985; Ross & 
Anderson, 1982), particularly with regard to complex social judgments. 
Studies on belief perseverance use variants of a ‘debriefing’ paradigm 
attributed to Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard (1975). In the debriefing task, 
participants are misled to create a belief, which is subsequently discredited by 
explaining that the created belief was all part of the experimental 
manipulation. For example, Ross et al., (1975) showed participants cards 
containing real and fictional suicide notes; and then asked them to categorise 
the real from fictional notes, receiving feedback about their accuracy. After 
being ‘debriefed’ about the manipulation and told that their score was 
randomly allocated, participants’ post-debriefing ratings of their performance 
and abilities revealed a continuing impact of the discredited success-failure 
manipulation.  
The belief perseverance effect has been replicated with a range of 
belief systems (e.g. self-impressions, social theories) and subject matters 
(e.g. risk preference, firefighting ability, mathematical ability, political beliefs; 
Anderson, 1982; Anderson, 1983; Anderson & Kellam, 1992; Anderson, 
Lepper, & Ross, 1980; Anderson, 1983; Anderson & Barrios, 1961; Davies, 
1997; Wyer & Budesheim, 1987). These findings have led to the view that 
people are conceptually inflexible which may explain why people cling to 
mistaken beliefs in the face of clear counter-evidence.  
One possible mediator of belief perseverance is the availability of 
causal arguments (i.e. in favour of a social theory or impression). For 
instance, Anderson et al., (1985) gave participants data describing either a 
positive or negative relationship between risk-taking and firefighting ability, 
which was later explained as fictitious during debriefing. They found a classic 
perseverance effect in that debriefing participants clung to the data-induced 
theories despite knowing that they were fictitious. More interestingly, analysis 
of participants’ written explanations of why a positive or negative relationship 
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might exist, revealed that causal argument availability accounted for 
approximately half the observed belief perseverance effect.1 Anderson et al. 
argued that people start to think in causal terms as soon as they experience 
surprising or interesting events. The idea is that subsequently people engage 
in hypothesis-confirming information searches and biased processing of new 
information. If no new data disconfirming their initial belief are encountered, 
then the initial belief will be maintained by the relative availability of arguments 
supporting that belief.  
1.2.2. Disregarding invalid testimony 
A separate applied strand of research has looked at presentation of 
evidence and its correction, using courtroom scenarios to examine juror 
decision making. This approach requires participants to process complex 
stimuli about unfolding events. Unlike belief perseverance research, studies 
on discounting invalid information in courtroom settings have shown 
successful discounting of invalid information under specific conditions. The 
basic courtroom paradigm involves presenting a mock jury with several 
testimonies and targeting one testimony for later discounting. For example, 
target testimony may be ruled invalid because an eyewitness had poor vision 
and was not wearing glasses or because a piece of wiretap evidence was 
obtained illegally.  
Studies examining disregarding prior information that adopt a 
courtroom paradigm broadly fall into two categories. Target testimony can 
either be followed by an explicit instruction from the judge to disregard the 
invalid information (Thompson, Fong, & Rosenhan, 1981), or discredited 
under cross-examination (e.g. by getting the witness to acknowledge that they 
made a mistake; Hatvany & Strack, 1980), or else via the introduction of 
contradictory evidence (e.g. alibi is given but CCTV evidence is introduced 
placing the suspect at the crime scene; Lagnado et al., 2011). In the case of 
discrediting via cross-examination or introduction of contradictory evidence, 
                                            
1
 This was computed via a covariance analysis. The mean difference between 
debriefing conditions was subtracted from the original mean difference to partial out the 
unique relative effect of argument availability  
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the instruction to discount invalid information is implied, and individuals come 
to their own conclusion that target information is invalid and should therefore 
be discounted. 
Another factor that distinguishes between these two situations is that 
discrediting usually provides some reason to disbelieve or discount earlier 
information (e.g. the witness was drunk at the time of the incident and 
therefore her testimony is unreliable). Instructions to disregard inadmissible 
information (e.g. because information is hearsay or evidence violates due 
process) on the other hand, do not necessarily rule out the relevance or 
truthfulness of the target information. Instead, they ask the receiver to 
disregard the information because it may have a biasing effect on their 
judgment even though it may still be true. In fact, the instruction to disregard 
could be interpreted as an indication that the information is in fact true but 
should be discounted because of its potentially prejudicial effects. For 
example, a juror may infer that information ruled inadmissible – because it 
violates due process or is hearsay – would not have been mentioned if it was 
not relevant or true (cf. Grice, 1975). 
Studies on discounting invalid information in courtroom settings support 
the distinction that appeals to discount that offer a reason to disregard prior 
information (e.g. it is unreliable information) are more successful than 
requests to discount because of potential bias. For instance, Elliott, Farrington 
and Manheimer (1988; see also Weinberg & Baron, 1982 for a similar finding) 
conducted a study in which participants read about two armed-robbery cases. 
The cases included both direct and circumstantial evidence that were 
sufficient to evoke judgements of guilt. An eyewitness identifying the 
defendant was later discredited (the witness conceded under cross-
examination that he was near-sighted and his vision had been blurry). 
Discrediting the eyewitness testimony was fully effective at lowering 
judgments of guilt, irrespective of the strength of direct and circumstantial 
evidence, the standard of proof used, and whether participants made serial 
judgments after reading successive increments in the summaries.   
In contrast, people often do not disregard prior information when they 
are explicitly asked to ignore it because it is inadmissible (see Steblay, Hosch, 
  
 
23 
Culhane, & McWethy, 2006 for review of studies on disregarding inadmissible 
information). In fact, the main factor that has been shown to reduce the 
influence of inadmissible information is whether a rationale for the disregard 
instruction was offered. For example, Kassin and Sommers (1997) compared 
verdicts and guilt ratings in a case where evidence (wire-tap evidence from an 
unrelated trial) was ruled inadmissible because of due-process (it was illegally 
obtained) to one where it was ruled inadmissible because it was unreliable 
(the tape was inaudible). The proportion of guilty verdicts following the 
‘unreliable’ correction was equivalent to a control group who were not 
presented with the evidence. In fact, the ‘unreliable’ instruction halved guilty 
verdicts relative to the due-process instruction. This finding suggests that 
people might continue to rely on information they have been told to disregard, 
if they think it is still relevant to their judgment. It appears that people are 
unable to resist the urge to use information they have been asked to disregard 
in their judgment whether they are aware of its biasing effects or not.  
1.2.3. Directed forgetting 
Directed forgetting is another branch of research on disregarding prior 
information. Directed forgetting studies focus on the specific memory 
processes involved in goal-directed forgetting of simple stimuli, such as word 
lists. In a directed forgetting paradigm, participants learn a list of items, some 
of which are cued for later recall (R-cued) and others are cued to be forgotten 
(F-cued). Performance can either be assessed via explicit memory tests such 
as recall and recognition (Bjork & Woodward, 1973; Woodward & Bjork, 
1971), or by implicit tests (Basden, Basden, & Gargano, 1993; Macleod, 
1989), and F-cued information can either consist of individual items or entire 
lists of words (MacLeod, 1999). Successful forgetting is exhibited when 
participants produce more R than F-cued words (Johnson, 1994). 
Findings from directed forgetting studies contrast with some 
inadmissible information and belief perseverance findings because they 
usually find that people are able to suppress the to-be-forgotten information at 
test (Bjork, Bjork, & Anderson, 1998; Johnson, 1994). The proposed 
mechanism by which people are able to ‘forget’ the information they have 
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been instructed to is retrieval inhibition. More precisely, a process which 
inhibits subsequent retrieval of the to-be-forgotten information is initiated 
when participants are instructed to forget prior information and given new 
information to learn. Although the to-be-forgotten information is not directly 
retrievable, it remains at strength in memory and can be accessed by other 
measures such as recognition or word-fragment completion (Bjork & Bjork, 
1996).  
One prominent difference between the research paradigms described 
earlier in this section and directed forgetting studies, is the use of forgetting 
cues (Bjork et al., 1998). Participants in directed forgetting studies are told 
from the outset that they may receive an instruction to forget some of the 
material presented during the study, or told that some information had been 
incorrect and that they will now see the ‘correct’ materials for later study. This 
difference in the formulation of forget instructions may play a role in why some 
research areas find successful ‘forgetting’ of previously learned information 
and others do not. Most importantly, an instruction to disregard prior 
information in the context of a judgement experiment is not equivalent to an 
instruction to forget in the context of a memory experiment.  
1.2.4. Conclusions  
Methodologically, there are similarities between belief perseverance, 
disregarding invalid testimony, directed forgetting, and CIE approaches. 
Understanding the differences between these approaches and the variation in 
findings among these different approaches may help shed light on the 
conditions under which successful updating following a correction occurs. In 
belief perseverance and disregarding invalid testimony studies, the cue to 
forget, although clear, is usually implicit. Directed forgetting studies, by 
contrast, typically involve explicit cues to forget information. Such cues to 
forget usually do not imply ‘forgetting’ per se, but are instructions not to report 
the information at recall. Another important difference is the type of stimuli 
used. For example, belief perseverance and studies of disregarding invalid 
testimony use complex stimuli about social situations and events which 
necessarily invoke prior knowledge of causal relations. The word lists used in 
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directed forgetting studies are potentially less cognitively demanding, and 
easier to hold in working memory, than the complex social and event stimuli 
used in belief perseverance, invalid testimony, and CIE studies.  
There are three main advantages that the CIE paradigm has over the 
above approaches that make it ideal for exploring novel research questions 
on the cognitive processing of corrections to misinformation. First, unlike the 
directed forgetting approach, the CIE task uses rich and complex descriptions 
of unfolding events that are more representative of the types of situations in 
which people might be asked to disregard information in the real-world. 
Second, rich and complex stimuli are formulated in a way that makes 
experimental manipulations more precise than in the courtroom approach. 
Third, unlike the belief perseverance approach, the CIE paradigm does not 
rely on the experimenter to discredit initially constructed beliefs. Instead, the 
correction is presented within the context of the scenario as it would be in a 
breaking news story. These factors make the CIE paradigm a promising 
method for studying how we reason about corrected information.  
1.3. The Continued Influence Effect  
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, the continued influence 
effect refers to the finding that causal misinformation is often influential 
beyond a clear and credible correction (see Ecker, Swire, & Lewandowksy, 
2014; Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Seifert, 2002, 2014, for reviews of CIE 
research).  
1.3.1. The continued influence paradigm 
Continued influence studies examine corrections to misinformation 
using variants of a laboratory paradigm first developed by Wilkes and 
Leatherbarrow (1988; but also see Johnson & Seifert, 1994). A typical CIE 
task involves reading between 10 and 15 sequentially presented statements 
describing an unfolding event (i.e. an event extending in time with a sequence 
of different elements). The way in which event information is presented 
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resembles that of breaking news coverage. Target (mis)information2 that 
allows inferences to be drawn about the outcome of the event is presented 
early in the sequence but then corrected later. Participants’ inferential 
reasoning and factual memory for the story are then assessed through a 
series of open-ended questions. 
The classic example of the CIE task is in Johnson and Seifert (1994), 
wherein participants were given an unfolding story about a warehouse fire. 
Target (mis)information which implies that carelessly stored flammable 
materials (oil paint and gas cylinders) are a likely cause of the fire is 
presented, and later corrected for some participants, but not others. 
Participants who received a correction learnt that no oil paint and gas 
cylinders had actually been stored in the warehouse, and therefore could not 
have caused the fire. After reading the report, participants answered causal 
inference questions (e.g. “what could have caused the explosions?”), and 
questions probing recall of the literal content of the story (e.g. “what was the 
cost of the damage done?”). Their responses were then categorized 
according to whether they were consistent with the explanation implied by the 
target (mis)information (e.g. “exploding gas cylinders”), or not (e.g. “electrical 
short circuit”). Participants were also asked to recount the correction (e.g. 
“what was the point of the second message from Police Investigator Lucas?”). 
The number of references to the corrected misinformation was then calculated 
in order to measure how much misinformation continued to influence 
participants’ inferential reasoning about the story.  
Continued influence experiments usually involve evaluating 
performance (i.e. the number of references to target (mis)information), on a 
misinformation-followed-by-correction condition to an upper or lower bound of 
comparison: either a condition in which the misinformation is presented but is 
not then retracted3 (no correction condition), or a condition in which the 
misinformation is never presented (no misinformation condition). The no 
correction condition allows for measurement of a correction’s effectiveness. 
                                            
2
 (Mis) is parenthesized because in some control conditions the information is not 
corrected, meaning it cannot be considered misinformation from the participants’ perspective. 
3
 The terms ‘retraction’ and ‘correction’ are used interchangeably throughout this 
thesis and in the continued influence effect literature. 
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By contrast, the no misinformation condition arguably shows whether post-
correction references to misinformation are reduced to a level comparable to 
never having seen the misinformation in the first place.  
1.3.2. Main findings from CIE studies 
The key finding from CIE studies is that corrections to misinformation 
are only partially effective. Some studies find no difference in the aggregate 
number of misinformation references between a condition featuring a 
correction and one in which a correction is presented (Johnson & Seifert, 
1994). Usually a correction has some impact but fails to fully eliminate the 
misinformation’s influence on subsequent causal inferences (Ecker et al., 
2010; Ecker et al., 2011a; Ecker et al., 2011b; Guillory & Geraci, 2013; Rich & 
Zaragoza, 2016). Misinformation can have a lasting impact on people’s 
reasoning even when people demonstrably remember that the information 
was corrected (Johnson & Seifert, 1994; Marsh, Meade, & Roediger, 2003), 
receive prior warnings about the persistence of misinformation (Ecker et al., 
2010), and when misinformation is corrected immediately after it is presented 
(Johnson & Seifert, 1994; Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 1988).  
1.3.3. Benefits and limitations of the CIE approach 
The CIE is a robust finding that has been demonstrated using different 
scenarios (e.g. warehouse fire, plane crash, armed robbery), and types of 
causal misinformation; for example, neutral and emotionally laden (plane 
crash caused by bad weather or terrorist attack; Ecker et al., 2011), negatively 
- but not positively - valenced information (a politician was caught giving a 
bribe versus a donation; Guillory & Geraci, 2016), attitude-congruent racial 
information (Ecker, Lewandowsky, Fenton, & Martin, 2014), and information 
that implies rather than  explicitly states the cause of an adverse outcome 
(Rich & Zaragoza, 2016).  
As mentioned in the introduction to this Chapter, CIE studies involve 
examining how people process corrections to constructed misinformation. 
Using constructed misinformation circumvents some of the problems faced by 
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studies that examine processing of corrections to real-world misinformation, 
such as controlling for prior exposure, defensive processing, and guarding 
against potential floor/ceiling effects (Thorson, 2016). The CIE approach 
enables a better understanding of the cognitive mechanisms involved in 
processing corrections to misinformation that allows causal inferences to be 
drawn about an event or outcome. Presenting statements sequentially also 
makes it easier to separate out the manipulated pieces of information from the 
other information included in the story.  
Despite the advantages of the CIE approach, inconsistencies in the 
approach and materials used could lead to variability in the effectiveness of a 
correction independently of the manipulated variables. For instance, the 
warehouse fire story often includes additional information that is congruent 
with the explanation that oil paint and gas cylinders caused the fire, such as 
the presence of ‘toxic fumes’, ‘explosions’, ‘oily smoke and sheets of flames’ 
and ‘an intense heat’. This may bias participants’ interpretation of the situation 
by making it appear that there is more evidence in favour of the explanation 
offered by the misinformation, than there is for the correction. Or in other 
words, if one starts with the hypothesis that carelessly stored oil paint and gas 
cylinders caused the fire, and learns about features of the incident supporting 
this hypothesis (e.g. there were toxic fumes), it might be reasonable to 
assume that the information provided makes the misinformation more likely 
than the correction.   
Other features of the typical experimental task such as the specific 
questions used to elicit inferences or the strictness of the coding criteria could 
also moderate the strength and presence of the CIE. For example, people 
may be more likely to refer to misinformation if asked very specific (e.g. what 
was the possible cause of the fumes?) than more general causal inference 
questions (e.g. is there evidence of careless management in relation to this 
fire?) about the scenario. A related issue is that researchers who adopt the 
CIE methodology provide no threshold for observing the CIE. There is 
currently no specification of how many post-correction references to 
misinformation are considered necessary for the CIE to be observed, or for 
that matter, what the different levels of continued reliance on misinformation 
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mean. If the average number of post-correction references to misinformation 
are zero, this indicates that the correction has effectively eliminated reliance 
on misinformation. However, the situation is more ambiguous when post-
correction references are low but still not zero (see, for example, Experiment  
2 in Ecker et al., 2011a).  
This is important because participants may refer to misinformation 
because of the pragmatic demand produced by certain types of questions, 
when they have no other information to rely on (Schwarz, 1996). A participant 
may ask themselves why the experimenter would ask about the corrected 
misinformation if it were not in some way relevant to the question. Such an 
interpretation could result in references to misinformation that are not strictly a 
consequence of continued reliance on outdated information, but rather, a 
willingness to provide the experimenter with the information they appear to be 
asking for. Such a demand effect may not arise simply from a desire to please 
the experimenter, but instead, because of the expectation that questions 
would only refer to relevant information presented in the scenario (cf. Grice, 
1975). If the only potential causal information in the scenario is the 
misinformation, then the pragmatic interpretation would suggest that it must 
be the answer to the question by the experimenter, even if they know it is 
erroneous (see Bless, Strack, & Schwarz, 1993; Schwarz, 2014 for discussion 
of pragmatic demand effects in cognitive psychology research).  
Studies adopting the CIE methodology have also tended to be 
restricted in terms of the experimental stimuli used and samples recruited. 
The limited number of scenarios used in CIE studies may not be generalisable 
to real-world situations in which misinformation is encountered. For example, 
apart from specific situations, it is rare that you would be told a piece of 
information is incorrect without any further explanation as to why it is 
incorrect, or any evidence to back up the claim that it is wrong. Furthermore, 
studies on the CIE have tended to examine different conditions of 
misinformation and its correction, in a single scenario (although see Johnson 
& Seifert; 1994; Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 1988; Wilkes & Reynolds, 1999), 
which may only be representative of a small number of situations in which 
misinformation can be encountered naturally. The limited number of scenarios 
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used, and focus on examining the CIE in a single scenario, has clear 
implications for the ecological validity of CIE findings; particularly, if scenario 
interacts with the specific manipulations to the presentation of misinformation 
or a correction.   
Another issue is that most CIE studies have been conducted in the lab 
with university students (although more recently researchers have moved to 
testing the CIE online: e.g. Guillory & Geraci, 2013; Rich & Zaragoza, 2016). 
University student sample demographics are not representative of the normal 
adult population because they are inherently biased in terms of age, 
experience, political beliefs, intellectual ability, ethnicity, and social class. 
Recruiting participants with biased demographics could result in misestimating 
the prevalence of the CIE and overlooking cognitive (or other) factors that 
might worsen the effect. For instance, age-related differences in memory for 
prose can be explained by differences in working memory capacity (Light & 
Anderson, 1985), and people with relatively low intelligence and poor 
perceptual abilities are more susceptible to the post-event misinformation 
effect (Zhu et al., 2010). 
Despite these issues, CIE research has the potential to inform the types 
of cognitive mechanisms involved in both successful and unsuccessful 
correction processing. Knowledge of these mechanisms can, in turn, inform 
strategies for successful correction of misinformation regarding a range of 
societal issues (e.g. media, law, healthcare). In the next section I describe the 
two main theoretical positions and cognitive mechanisms that have been 
discussed in the literature thus far, and consider the relative evidence for each 
of these accounts. 
1.4. Cognitive Mechanisms and Theoretical Accounts 
Two cognitive mechanisms and theories have been proposed to account 
for the continued influence effect to date: The mental-model updating ( 
Johnson & Seifert, 1994, 1999; Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 1988; Wilkes & 
Reynolds, 1999), and retrieval failure accounts (Ecker et al., 2010; Jacoby, 
1991). While the mental-model account postulates a failure to appropriately 
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update a causal mental model, the retrieval-failure account assumes a failure 
of strategic memory processes when retrieving misinformation. 
1.4.1. Mental-model updating  
As noted above, one account of the CIE assumes that people construct 
mental models of unfolding events. Mental models can be defined as 
representations of the world, or descriptions of the world, based on available 
semantic information and an individuals’ knowledge. They ‘represent distinct 
possibilities, that unfold in time in a kinematic sequence’ (Johnson-Laird, 
2010, p. 7), and are used to draw conclusions from available information.  
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According to the mental-model view, people construct meaning from 
descriptions of events by organizing incoming information into a coherent 
mental representation in which causal connections between events are 
necessary and sufficient (Trabasso & van den Broek, 1985), and temporal, 
spatial, and causal aspects of the described situation are continually tracked 
(Zwaan, Magliano, & Graesser, 1995). Prior causal knowledge relating to 
physical (e.g. space and time) and intentional (e.g. beliefs, goals, desires and 
motivations) causality is used to draw inferences where information is missing 
(Pennington & Hastie, 1986, 1988, 1992), facilitating development of a model 
which is comprehensible and does not contain inconsistencies.  
Figure 1 depicts a possible mental-model of the warehouse fire 
scenario in which corrected misinformation provides a causal explanation for 
the described outcome. The warehouse fire scenario could be represented 
such that factor A (e.g. negligence) resulted in factor B (e.g. inappropriate 
storage of flammable liquids), and the combination of factor B and factor C 
(e.g. an electrical short-circuit) caused outcome X (e.g. fire at the warehouse; 
example taken from Lewandowsky et al., 2012).  
Figure 1 Schematic diagram of causal mental model for warehouse fire 
scenario 
 
Figure 1 The continued influence effect task: Messages 1-5 provide general 
information about the event beginning with the fire being reported. Target 
(mis)information is presented at Message 6 and is then corrected for
correction and correction + alternative explanation groups at Message 13. The 
correction + alternative explanation group then receive information providing a 
substitute account of the fire to ‘fill the gap’ left by invalidating the 
misinformation. This condition usually leads to a robust reduction in reference
to misinformation.Figure 2 Schematic diagram of causal mental model for 
warehouse fire scenario 
 
Figure 3 The continued influence effe t task: Messages 1-5 provide general 
information about the event beginning with the fire being reported. Target 
(mis)information is presented at Message 6 and is then corrected for 
correction and correction + alternative explanation groups at Message 13. The 
correction + alternative explanation group th n receive information providi g a
substitute account of the fire to ‘fill the gap’ left by invalidating the 
misinformation. This condition usually leads to a robust reduction in reference 
to misinformation.  
 
 
Figure 4 Effect of correction information on the number of (A) references to 
target (mis)information in Experiment 1A (B) references to target 
misinformation in Experiment 1B (C) accurately recalled facts in Experiment 
1A (D) accurately recalled facts in Experiment 1B. Error bars represent 95% 
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One reason that corrections to misinformation may be poorly encoded - 
or retrieved - is because they threaten the mental model’s internal coherence 
(Johnson-Laird, 1980; Johnson & Seifert, 1994). For example, when reading 
the warehouse fire scenario described earlier, an individual might infer that a 
fire started by an electrical short circuit was a result of improper storage of 
flammable liquids. Correcting a key piece of causal information (i.e. stating 
that there were no oil paints or compressed gas present) that explains the 
outcome, results in an incoherent mental model of the described event. 
People therefore continue to rely on misinformation after a correction because 
they prefer to maintain a coherent but inaccurate model to an  
incoherent, incomplete, but more accurate one. When participants are 
explicitly probed about the correction, they are aware of the update to the 
specifics (i.e. admitting that information about gas cylinders and paint cans 
was corrected), but continue to rely on the misinformation more broadly to 
answer inference questions.  
1.4.1.1. Empirical evidence for the mental-model updating 
Perhaps the most widely cited argument in favour of the model 
updating account is the finding that combining a correction with an alternative 
causal explanation4 facilitates updating when correcting misinformation 
(Ecker, Hogan, & Lewandowsky, 2017; Ecker et al., 2011a; Ecker et al., 2010; 
Johnson & Seifert, 1994; Nyhan & Reifler, 2015; Rich & Zaragoza, 2016). 
Similar findings have also been obtained from courtroom analogue studies 
that examine guilt judgments after introduction of an alternative suspect 
(Tenney, Cleary, & Spellman, 2009). Providing an alternative explanation 
purportedly helps people ‘fill the gap’ in their model, facilitating or motivating 
global updating of the mental model of the event. This in turn reduces reliance 
on the original explanation offered by misinformation allowing people to 
disregard their initial model in favour of a new one.  
Recent neuroimaging evidence also provides tentative support for the 
idea mental-model updating failures underlie the CIE. Gordon et al. (2017) 
examined the underlying neural substrates of the CIE by comparing 
                                            
4
 Throughout the remainder of this thesis ‘alternative explanation’ will be used to 
specifically refer to ‘alternative causal explanations’.  
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differences in neural processing during encoding and retrieval of retraction 
and non-retraction information. This was examined by having participants 
listen to brief fictional news reports that either involved a retraction of initial 
information or not, whilst undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI). The authors argued that the mental-model account predicts difficulties 
with encoding retracting information (either because it violates assumptions or 
disrupts model coherence), whereas the retrieval failure account predicts 
difficulties substituting the correct (retraction) for the incorrect (contradicted 
information), and should produce problems at retrieval.  
These predictions were tested by examining brain activity in areas 
associated with violation of assumptions, shallower encoding of information, 
and memory suppression and/or substitution. Consistent with the mental-
model predictions, encoding identical pieces of information elicited different 
brain activity depending on whether the information was processed as a 
retraction or not. Retractions elicited less activity in brain regions that have 
been previously associated with integration of continuous pieces of verbal 
information into a mental-model. These findings suggest that the CIE may be 
driven by a breakdown of narrative-level integration and coherence-building 
mechanisms and that information is encoded differently depending on 
whether it is a correction or not. There was little evidence that both types of 
information engage different neural mechanisms at retrieval.  
Additional evidence for the mental-model accounts comes from the 
finding that working memory capacity – which plays a role in information 
integration and updating – predicts occurrence of the CIE (Brydges, Gignac, & 
Ecker, 2018). Furthermore, explicitly repeating misinformation during a 
correction can reduce reliance on misinformation by increasing its salience 
and highlighting the discrepancy between outdated and updated event 
interpretations (Ecker et al., 2017).  
1.4.2. Retrieval failure 
An alternative theory to explain the CIE is that it occurs because of a 
failure in controlled memory processes during retrieval. According to this view, 
both erroneous (i.e. misinformation) and correct (i.e. the correction) 
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information are stored in memory concurrently and the CIE arises when the 
erroneous information is activated but insufficiently suppressed (Ecker et al., 
2011b; Swire, Ecker, & Lewandowsky, 2017)5. This argument takes root in 
dual-process accounts which differentiate between retrieval based on 
automatic (familiarity) and (recollection) strategic memory processes (Hasher 
& Zacks, 1979, 1984; Jacoby, 1996; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; 
Smith & DeCoster, 2000). From a dual-process perspective, the type of 
memory process that is activated upon retrieval of information could impact a 
correction’s effectiveness. For instance, Ayers and Reder’s (1998) activation-
based framework proposes that valid and invalid information compete for 
automatic activation in memory but that strategic processes are required in 
order to retrieve contextual details of the information.  
Automatic memory processes are thought to be driven by familiarity 
and afford rapid and context-free recognition of previously encountered 
information, reflecting a more global measure of stimulus recency and 
memory strength. By contrast, strategic memory processes rely on the slower 
process of recollection which allows for retrieval of qualitative or contextual 
details, such as the information’s source, veracity, and spatiotemporal 
encoding context (see Yonelinas, 2002 for review). Strategic memory 
processes are easily compromised as they require more executive control and 
mental effort than automatic memory processes (Herron & Rugg, 2003; 
Jacoby, 1991). They are depleted with age (Craik & McDowd, 1987; 
McDermott & Chan, 2006; Swire et al., 2017), when attention is divided (Craik 
et al., 1996), and when there is a longer retention interval between study and 
test (Knowlton & Squire, 1995). 
Ecker et al. (2010; 2011b; see also Lewandowsky et al., 2012) have 
argued that misinformation could occur because of failures in strategic 
monitoring at retrieval. This view is based on the idea that misinformation 
needs a “negation tag” to be linked with the original statement when it is 
corrected. An example would be the statement “playing Mozart to your child 
will boost its IQ – NOT TRUE” (Gilbert, Krull, & Malone, 1990). Corrected 
                                            
5
 Note that both mental-model updating and retrieval failure mechanisms have been 
argued for by Ecker and colleagues.  
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statements may require strategic memory processes in order to successfully 
retrieve the veracity of the statement. The negation tag may be compromised 
if only automatic memory processes are employed at retrieval which results in 
misidentification of the misinformation as familiar. Another possibility is that 
the CIE arises from source confusion or misattribution (Johnson et al., 1993). 
For instance, participants given the warehouse fire scenario may remember 
the fire was thought to be caused by oil paint and gas cylinders, but 
incorrectly attribute this information to the second report.  
1.4.2.1. Empirical evidence for retrieval failure  
Assuming the dual-process perspective, activation of automatic 
retrieval processes could result in reliance on erroneous but familiar 
information. Evidence that the CIE is driven by a familiarity-based mechanism 
comes from Swire, Ecker, and Lewandowsky (2017). Swire et al. (2017) 
examined how factors known to affect strategic memory processes influence 
continued reliance on inaccurate information; namely age, detail in the 
correction, and time. They obtained pre-manipulation ratings of belief in 
statements of unclear veracity. Some statements were myths which were later 
corrected whilst others were facts that were affirmed. Swire et al. predicted 
that increasing the level of explanatory detail provided in the correction would 
support recollection of the correction and encourage detection of 
inconsistencies between inaccurate beliefs and the correction. They also 
predicted false acceptance of myths based on their familiarity would be more 
likely at longer retention intervals between encoding and retrieval and would 
be more apparent for older than for younger participants. Findings showed 
that providing a greater level of explanatory detail in the correction promoted 
more sustained belief change suggesting a boost in strategic memory 
processes at retrieval. Longer retention intervals between encoding and 
retrieval also resulted in more belief in corrected myths than shorter retention 
intervals. Acceptance of corrected myths was also higher for the older than 
the younger group. These findings suggest that the CIE may – in some cases 
- be familiarity-driven.  
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Further evidence that the CIE may be familiarity-driven comes from the 
finding that multiple repetitions of misinformation during encoding results in 
more of a CIE than a single repetition (Ecker et al., 2011b). Repeated 
statements are considered easier to process, and are also perceived as more 
truthful, than novel statements (Fazio, Brashier, Payne, & Marsh, 2015; 
Moons, Mackie, & Garcia-Marques, 2009), but only if statements are plausible 
(Pennycook, Cannon, & Rand, 2018). However, Ecker et al., (2011b) also 
found that multiple repetitions of a correction did not reduce the CIE below the 
level of a single presentation of misinformation and a correction. This is 
perhaps because corrections require strategic monitoring in order for their 
context to be recalled accurately and are therefore not enhanced by 
repetition. Consistent with this idea, Ecker et al. (2010) found that providing 
explicit warnings about the persistence of misinformation before exposure to 
misinformation reduced the CIE relative to providing general warnings, or no 
warnings. Ecker et al. argued that providing explicit warnings about the 
potential biasing effects of misinformation boosts strategic monitoring 
processes during retrieval of misinformation and its correction, therefore 
reducing the CIE.  
There is also counter-evidence to the claim that repeating 
misinformation increases its familiarity resulting in more of a CIE (cf. Ecker et 
al., 2011b). Ecker et al. (2017) compared several correction conditions varying 
the extent to which the correction served as a reminder of initial 
misinformation. Corrections that served as explicit reminders of initial 
misinformation were the most successful at reducing reliance on 
misinformation. The authors interpreted this finding as consistent with the 
mental-model updating account in that an explicit reminder made both the 
falsity of misinformation and conflict between outdated and updated event 
representations more salient. However, these findings could equally be 
interpreted as supporting a retrieval-based account of the CIE in that an 
explicit reminder made the correction more memorable and therefore more 
effective at the time of retrieval.   
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1.4.3. Conclusions on cognitive mechanisms 
To conclude, there is a lack of resolution regarding whether the CIE 
occurs because of a failure to update one’s mental-model, or because of 
strategic memory processes when retrieving misinformation. Mental-model 
updating and selective retrieval accounts are often postulated as competing 
mechanisms (e.g. Gordon et al., 2017), and findings interpreted as supporting 
one or the other mechanism. However, it is often difficult to establish the 
relative influence of each of these mechanisms to the CIE. It could be the 
case that the particular mechanism that elicits the CIE varies between, or 
within, individuals at different time points, or depending on the specifics of the 
experimental situation.  
1.5. Factors that Moderate the Continued Influence Effect 
A number of factors have been identified that moderate the CIE (see 
Lewandowsky et al., 2012 for discussion). The main factors that have been 
identified in the literature will be considered here and discussed in terms of 
the potential constraints they place on when the CIE is likely to occur. 
Practical implications are also discussed. 
1.5.1. Providing a causal alternative  
As noted above, Johnson and Seifert (1994; Exp 3A) first established 
that pairing a correction with a causal-alternative which fills the explanatory 
gap left by invalidating the correction mitigates – but does not eliminate - the 
CIE. Participants read the warehouse fire story, described earlier, and initially 
learned that oil paint and gas cylinders were a likely cause of the fire. After 
initial misinformation was corrected, some participants then learned that 
gasoline-soaked rags and empty steel drums were found on the premises (i.e. 
implying that the fire was started intentionally rather by careless storage of 
flammable liquids as was originally inferred).  
Studies including an alternative explanation condition have typically 
found that this halves the number of references to misinformation relative to a 
misinformation-correction condition (Ecker et al., 2011b; Ecker et al., 2010; 
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Johnson & Seifert, 1994; Nyhan & Reifler, 2015; Rapp & Kendeou, 2007), 
whilst others have found that alternative explanations almost eliminate the 
CIE completely (Ecker et al., 2011a). Differences in the capacity of an 
alternative explanation to reduce reliance on misinformation could suggest 
that alternative explanations are more effective in some scenarios than 
others.   
There are some boundary conditions that apply to the causal-
alternative strategy. For instance, the alternative explanation must also be 
instantiated within the context of the story rather than generated by 
participants themselves (Johnson & Seifert, 1994; Exp 2). It is also assumed 
that the alternative explanation must be plausible and account for the event 
features initially accounted for by the misinformation (Johnson & Seifert, 1994; 
Seifert, 2002). For example, the warehouse fire story included information 
about ‘toxic fumes’ and ‘oily smoke’ which could also be explained by 
someone intentionally dousing the warehouse in gasoline (i.e. the alternative 
explanation). Explaining that the fire was actually caused by a terrorist attack 
might be less plausible, given the other non-corrected details presented in the 
scenario. 
Similar findings have been obtained from studies examining how 
introduction of an alternative suspect (and story) influences judgments of a 
defendant’s guilt (e.g. Tenney, Cleary, & Spellman, 2009), and explanation-
based refutations of earlier story information (Rapp & Kendeou, 2007). 
Providing a causal alternative has also been shown to improve the 
effectiveness of corrections in the political domain. For instance, Nyhan and 
Reifler (2015) gave participants a story which initially insinuated that a senator 
had resigned from office because he had embezzled money and committed 
tax fraud. This information was either denied or replaced with the ‘causal 
alternative’ that the senator resigned for personal reasons and had a 
prosecutor’s letter confirming he had not been charged with any crimes. The 
innuendo was perceived as less likely to be true when a causal alternative 
was presented than when the innuendo was simply denied.  
There are other factors that might moderate whether an alternative 
explanation can reduce the CIE, however. People have strong preferences 
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about what constitutes a ‘good’ explanation (see Lombrozo, 2016, for review). 
These preferences may influence the type of alternative explanations that are 
acceptable means of filling the gap left by invalidating the misinformation. For 
instance, simpler explanations (i.e. explanations that involve a single rather 
multiple causes to explain an outcome) are widely regarded as better than 
more complex ones (Lombrozo, 2007). This effect is mitigated or eliminated 
when the simple explanation is less probable than the more complex one 
(Lagnado, 1994; Lombrozo, 2007). Furthermore, explanations that involve 
fewer assumptions and have greater explanatory ‘scope’ are also favoured 
over explanations that have less scope (Khemlani, Sussman, & Oppenheimer, 
2010; Read & Marcus-Newhall, 1993).  
These factors impose some possible constraints on the types of 
explanations that are likely to improve the effectiveness of corrections. 
Practically speaking, it is often rare to find a single, coherent, and plausible 
alternative explanation to fill the gap left by invalidating a piece of causal 
information. There are often several competing explanations that may vary in 
terms of complexity, coherence, and plausibility.  
1.5.2. Pre-exposure warnings 
As noted in the previous section, forewarning people about the 
persistence of misinformation after a correction has also been shown to 
moderate the CIE. Ecker et al., (2010) demonstrated this in a study in which 
they gave some participants a specific warning explaining that people often 
continue to rely on outdated information - jurors do not ignore inadmissible 
evidence - before reading a scenario containing misinformation. Another 
group was given a more general warning that the media often report 
inaccurate information. Findings showed that providing a specific warning 
halved the number of references to misinformation produced, to provision of 
an alternative explanation. Although fewer references to misinformation were 
produced when participants received a general warning than just a correction, 
the general warning was not as effective as a specific warning. Specific 
warnings were even more effective when paired with an alternative 
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explanation, although this combination of mitigating factors still did not fully 
eliminate the CIE.  
The benefits of warnings have also been observed for other judgment 
and memory biases. For instance, the imagination inflation effect – which 
occurs when people increase their confidence that an event occurred after 
imagining it – is attenuated when people are warned about the deleterious 
effects of imagining distant events (Landau & von Glahn, 2004); forewarnings 
also reduce false recognition of non-studied words (in the Dermot-Roediger-
McDermott paradigm; Gallo, Roediger, & McDermott, 2001). Furthermore, 
both pre- and post-experiment warnings reduce the post-event misinformation 
effect and the benefits continued a week after testing (Chambers & Zaragoza, 
2001).  
One explanation for why pre-exposure warnings mitigate the CIE is that 
warnings enhance strategic retrieval of correction information. This allows the 
misinformation to be ‘tagged’ during rather than after encoding (Ecker et al., 
2010). Tagging misinformation during encoding may make it possible focus on 
source monitoring, reducing the chance that the source of the memory is 
incorrectly attributed to another recollected experience (Johnson et al., 1993).  
In terms of the practical application of such a counter-misinformation 
strategy, the timing of the presentation of the pre-exposure warning is likely 
important for enhancing strategic memory processes during retrieval of 
misinformation. Warnings that are presented well in advance of 
misinformation exposure may not enhance strategic retrieval of correction 
information or suppression of misinformation; either because the warnings are 
not recalled or cannot be effectively paired with misinformation and its 
correction.  
1.5.3. Encoding strength 
Outside of the laboratory, people may be exposed to misinformation on 
a disproportionate number of occasions to the correction. For instance, during 
the ‘Vote Leave’ campaign in the lead up the European Union (EU) 
referendum, people may have been exposed to the claim that leaving the EU 
  
 
42 
would save the National Health Service (NHS) £350 million pounds, on more 
than a handful of occasions. This information was criticised as being 
misleading throughout the campaign and it was then promptly discredited 
when the outcome of the referendum was announced when several prominent 
Leave campaign officials reneged on their claim. Most people who 
encountered this claim would have been exposed to it on numerous 
occasions - meaning that this erroneous information had more scope to be 
well encoded into memory. However, refutations of this information may not 
have been as widely reported and therefore not as well encoded into memory. 
Such an imbalance in the repetition of misinformation, and its correction or 
refutation will necessarily affect how well these pieces of information are 
encoded in memory, and therefore, how easily they are later retrieved from 
memory. 
In line with this, empirical evidence indicates that encoding strength of 
misinformation and its correction impacts the CIE. The amount of effort 
employed by working memory – or cognitive load (Sweller, 1988) – during 
encoding of misinformation and its correction, can affect encoding strength. 
As noted previously, Ecker et al., (2011b) investigated how strength of 
encoding of misinformation and its correction affect the CIE by manipulating 
repetition of the misinformation and correction, and whether high (read aloud 
and memorise digits) or low (read aloud digits) load was imposed during 
encoding of misinformation and the correction. Stronger encoding (i.e. 
multiple repetitions or low cognitive load during encoding) of misinformation 
led to stronger continued influence of misinformation. Greater misinformation 
effects also required stronger retractions to be negated. Counter to 
expectations, however, the strength of the correction was inconsequential 
when misinformation was weakly encoded. That is if misinformation was only 
presented once then multiple corrections were no more effective than a single 
correction at reducing its influence. This finding has lead to recommendation 
that corrections should avoid repetition of misinformation in order to avoid 
increasing its impact (Lewandowsky et al., 2012). However, as noted 
previously, more recent evidence suggests that corrections which explicitly 
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repeat misinformation are more effective than those that avoid the 
misinformation altogether (Ecker et al., 2017).   
1.5.4. Source credibility  
Establishing a source’s credibility is critical when deciding whether to 
believe the information conveyed to us by other people and may moderate the 
CIE. For example, jurors must establish a degree of belief in a witness’ 
testimony in order to reach a verdict, and voters must place their confidence 
in the statements of politicians when deciding who to vote for. Source 
credibility typically refers to how believable a source of information is 
perceived to be (Birnbaum & Stegner, 1979), and is often orthogonally 
evaluated in terms of their trustworthiness and expertise (Birnbaum & 
Stegner, 1979; Birnbaum, Wong, & Wong, 1976; Harris, Hahn, Madsen, & 
Hsu, 2016; Hovland & Weiss, 1951; McGinnies & Ward, 1980; see 
Pornpitakpan, 2004 for review)6. Expertise refers to the source’s capacity to 
convey accurate information whereas trustworthiness reflects their willingness 
to provide accurate information.  
People may use a range of cues to evaluate the trustworthiness and 
expertise of a source. For example, studies in the legal domain have shown 
that witness calibration – the relationship between a witness’ confidence and 
accuracy – influences judgements of credibility. That is, the credibility of highly 
confident witnesses who are shown to be wrong is penalised more than low 
confidence witnesses (Tenney, MacCoun, Spellman, & Hastie, 2007; Tenney, 
Spellman, & MacCoun, 2008). People may also use cues such as whether a 
witness contradicts themselves or is contradicted by another witness in order 
to assess the credibility. For instance, Connor Desai, Reimers, and Lagnado  
(2016) found that a prosecution witness’ credibility was penalised when they 
claimed they had only drunk 4 pints but were contradicted by another 
prosecution witness who said they drank 8 pints. This penalisation of the key 
prosecution witness’ credibility undermined their testimony and resulted in 
                                            
6
 People also base credibility judgments on characteristics that seemingly have 
nothing to do with trustworthiness, such as attractiveness, listener, and situational 
characteristics (see Spellman & Tenney, 2010 for review) 
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lower ratings of the defendant’s guilt compared to the non-contradictory 
testimony case.   
The credibility of the misinformation’s source and its correction may 
play a pivotal role in drawing inferences about the reliability of these pieces of 
information7. Courtroom studies have shown that witnesses who are shown to 
be wrong about something – whether trivial or not – lose credibility as 
perceived by the jury (Borckardt, Sprohge, & Nash, 2003; Tenney et al., 2007, 
2008). Moreover, witnesses who contradict themselves are perceived as less 
credible than witnesses who do not contradict themselves (Berman & Cutler, 
1996; Berman, Narby, & Cutler, 1995).  
Contradiction is particularly relevant to CIE studies as misinformation 
and its correction are issued by the same source. A source who announces 
that they previously gave incorrect information may appear less credible than 
one who does not. Consistent with this, one CIE study found that distrust in 
the source of the correction was cited as a primary reason for disbelieving the 
correction (Guillory & Geraci, 2010). There is, however, a potential fallacy 
here in that someone who contradicts themselves should have both 
statements disbelieved, rather than just the latter statement. An initial source 
of information who later corrects themselves could result in that source being 
perceived as either unable or unwilling to provide accurate information. 
Alternatively, the later statement (correction) could increase credibility relative 
to the first statement (misinformation), given that the source now has access 
to new information (expertise) and has shown a willingness to contradict 
themselves (trustworthiness).  
Either way, source credibility likely plays a role in how people process 
corrections to misinformation. Confirming this, Guillory and Geraci (2013) 
showed that corrections issued by a source who is considered to be highly 
trustworthy (i.e. willing to provide accurate information) more effectively 
reduces the CIE than a correction issued by a source high in expertise (i.e. 
access to accurate information). Participants were given a fictional news story 
about a politician running for re-election, which included target 
                                            
7
 Reliability is used here to refer to the accuracy of a piece of information (Lagnado, 
Fenton, & Neil, 2013) 
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(mis)information about a politician receiving bribe money. The trustworthiness 
and expertise of the correction’s source were independently manipulated. 
Findings showed that source expertise alone (e.g. the politician’s campaign 
manager) was not sufficient to mitigate the CIE. However, source 
trustworthiness alone (e.g. politician’s political opponent) decreased reliance 
on initial misinformation.  
Taken together, these findings suggest that inferences about source 
credibility moderate how corrections to misinformation are processed. Source 
credibility may be used as a heuristic guide to establishing whether to accept 
or reject a given piece of information. Using source cues as a heuristic guide 
fits with Bayesian source credibility predictions (e.g. Hahn, Harris, & Corner, 
2009; Harris et al., 2016). Lewandowsky et al., (2012) have also argued that 
source credibility (both high and low) could facilitate ‘tagging’ of correct and 
incorrect information and facilitating strategic retrieval of information from 
memory when this information is made salient.  
1.5.5. Motivated reasoning 
Another factor that may affect the magnitude of the CIE is motivated 
reasoning. How we process incoming information arguably depends on our 
motivations (via our goals, beliefs, and desires). One view is that motivational 
factors affect reasoning via strategies for accessing, constructing, and 
evaluating beliefs (Kunda, 1990). The motivation to arrive at a conclusion that 
fits our pre-existing attitudes and beliefs can, therefore, shape reasoning 
processes.  
Ecker et al. (2014) provided evidence that motivated reasoning can 
influence how misinformation and its correction are initially encoded and later 
retrieved from memory. Participants in their study read a story about a robbery 
at a liquor store in which the suspects were described as Australian 
Aboriginal. Participants were divided into two groups: those who scored 
(relatively) high on a measure of racial prejudice towards Australian 
Aboriginals and those who scored low on the prejudice measure. When the 
story described the suspects as Australian Aboriginal, a correction failed to 
eliminate reliance on misinformation for both the high and low-prejudice 
  
 
46 
groups.  However, when the misinformation described a citizen involved in 
preventing the robbery as Australian Aboriginal (i.e. stereotype-incongruent) a 
retraction eliminated reliance on misinformation for the high-prejudice but not 
the low prejudice group.  
The fact that a retraction completely eliminated reliance on 
misinformation for the high-prejudice group when they received attitude-
incongruent information (i.e. that the citizen preventing the robbery was 
Australian Aboriginal) could suggest that high-prejudice participants engaged 
in motivated reasoning. Supporting this, Ecker et al. reported that some 
participants rationalised that the Aboriginal man might have been an 
accomplice of the robber.  The authors argued that, if the CIE can be 
assumed to arise from strategic memory failure, strategic monitoring could be 
improved when there is an attitude-based motivation to believe one version of 
events over another. More specifically, the high-prejudice group made certain 
to correct their initial attitude-incongruent interpretation of the event (i.e. that 
the citizen did not prevent the robbery).  
These findings indicate the biasing effects that pre-existing attitudes, 
beliefs, and motivations have on how we initially encode and later retrieve 
information. However, critics of the motivated reasoning approach have 
disputed the notion that human beings are poor judgment and decision 
makers who are prone to motivational distortions and inherently irrational. 
Hahn and Harris (2014) have argued that in order for ‘bias’ to exist there must 
be systematic deviations from accuracy assessed against the appropriate 
normative standard rather than from the experimenter’s intuition. Their 
argument is relevant for CIE which is often depicted as bias in that it reflects 
behaviour that systematically deviates from objective standard or norm (e.g. 
Lewandowsky et al., 2012).  
Whether the CIE demonstrates a systematic deviation from a 
normative standard is debatable because it presupposes the normatively 
appropriate thing to do is favour the correction over the misinformation. There 
may be situations in which a legitimate strategy might be to place more weight 
on the misinformation than the correction. For example, if you distrust the 
source of the correction (as noted above) or the correction is inconsistent with 
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the current evidence then you may place more weight on the misinformation 
than the correction. Furthermore, the scenarios used in CIE studies do not 
provide any objectively ‘true’ information because they are fictional. This 
underscores the need to compare CIE behaviour against an appropriate 
normative standard rather than the experimenter’s intuition (Harris & Hahn, 
2014). Modelling CIE situations formally would help establish the types of 
inferences that might be legitimately permitted in different circumstances.  
1.5.6. Communicative intentions  
An additional moderating factor in the CIE could be the inferences 
people draw about the communicative intentions of the misinformation and 
correction. The Gricean (Grice, 1975) perspective on communication holds 
that people not only assess the literal meaning of information that occurs 
within the communicative context but also assess its communicative intention. 
According to the Gricean cooperative principle of communication people 
expect speakers to provide information that is relevant (maxim of relation), 
true (maxim of quality), and unambiguous (maxim of manner).  
Conversational implications could affect which information appears 
relevant in the context of an experimental task. This has been shown in 
studies of judgmental biases (Krosnick, Li, & Lehman, 1990; Schwarz, Strack, 
Hilton, & Nadere, 1991). For example, Schwarz et al. (1991) found that people 
rely more on irrelevant (non-diagnostic) personality information when it is 
delivered by a human communicator than when it is presented as a random 
sample drawn from a computer database. This arguably occurs because 
people expect information from a human communicator to be truthful, 
relevant, and informative but do not hold the same assumptions for a 
computer. These findings suggest that participants might try to infer the 
experimenter’s communicative intention from the information provided in the 
study and that this could render irrelevant information relevant in the eyes of 
the participant. This could result in judgmental errors relative to normative 
models that consider only the literal meaning of statements but not the 
implications for the communicative context.  
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Conversational implications could also pose problems for how people 
comprehend contradictory information. Seifert (2002; see also Johnson & 
Seifert, 1994) has argued that corrections are problematic for comprehension 
because people expect information relayed in a communicative context to be 
relevant and truthful. This view holds that the process of correction involves 
more than simply identifying previous information in memory and then 
negating it, but rather, the correction must address conversational implications 
of the contradiction in order to be fully understood.  
Bush, Johnson, and Seifert (1994) tested this empirically by examining 
whether corrections that address the conversational implications of a 
contradiction are more effective than those that address only the literal 
implications of the contradiction. Participants read the warehouse fire 
scenario, described earlier in this chapter. One group of participants received 
an explanation that rendered the misinformation irrelevant (oil paints and gas 
cylinders were supposed to be delivered but were not), and a second group 
learned that misinformation was of poor informational quality (the closet 
actually contained non-flammable items). A third condition involved an 
‘enhanced negation’ which addressed the literal implications of the 
contradiction by stating that oil paint and gas cylinders had never been 
present anywhere on the premises. The goal here was to address a literal 
interpretation of the contradiction that paint and compressed gasses were on 
the premises, but that they were stored elsewhere, and could thus still have 
caused the fire. The ‘enhanced negation’ condition tried to prevent 
participants from making the ‘flammable liquids were elsewhere on the 
premises’ inference.  
Findings showed that explaining that misinformation was irrelevant or 
of poor informational quality attenuated the CIE relative a condition in which 
only a correction was presented but was not eliminated completely. 
Interestingly, the condition featuring enhanced negation (stating that oil paint 
and gas cylinders had never been present in the warehouse) actually 
increased references to misinformation! These findings suggest that 
correcting the literal content of misinformation is insufficient to produce an 
accurate understanding of the event. Addressing the conversational 
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implications of misinformation raised by a correction does mitigate – but does 
not eliminate - the continued influence and use of misinformation.  
Overall, these findings suggest that assumptions about communicative 
intentions could moderate the effectiveness of a correction either because 
they make irrelevant information appear relevant in the experimental context 
or because they pose problems for understanding contradictory information 
provided in the context of communication.  
1.5.7. Conclusions 
In this section, I have discussed the main moderating factors of the CIE 
that have been discussed in the literature. The story that has emerged from 
this review is that the precise circumstances that bring about the CIE are 
poorly understood. It is unclear whether the CIE is a necessary consequence 
of correcting causal misinformation or whether it only occurs under certain 
conditions. This review has also drawn attention to the variability in the 
effectiveness of corrections - and other moderating factors such as alternative 
explanation – in reducing reliance on misinformation across studies that use 
similar manipulations. This suggests that other methodological characteristics 
of the study, such as the scenario used, could be an additional moderator of 
the effectiveness of corrections to misinformation in CIE studies.  
1.6. Methodological Considerations 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, studies that have adopted the CIE 
experimental paradigm have found variance in the efficacy of corrections. 
Careful consideration of the experimental paradigm and methodological 
approach used in CIE studies is necessary to better understand how and why 
the CIE occurs. Factors such as the experimental stimuli (or scenario) used, 
sample size, and restricted demographics of the sample could moderate the 
presence and magnitude of the CIE, in addition to the variables that were 
manipulated in the study (e.g. pre-exposure warnings, valence of 
misinformation).  
In order to examine whether the effectiveness of correction information 
varies across studies, I compiled a review of CIE studies that compared a 
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condition in which initial misinformation is corrected to a control condition in 
which it remained uncorrected (see Table 1 below). Table 1 includes 
information about the following study characteristics: 1) details of the authors 
of the paper, 2) which experiment the results refer to, 3) the correction and/or 
misinformation variables that were manipulated, 4) the scenario in which 
misinformation and the correction appear, 5) and whether the experiment was 
conducted in the lab or online. Table 1 also includes information about the 
study results, specifically: 1) the percentage reduction from uncorrected to 
corrected conditions in the average number of references to misinformation, 
2) the effect size for the difference between corrected and uncorrected 
conditions, and 3) the sample size used in the experiment. It was not possible 
to include effect sizes if the appropriate descriptive information was not 
reported in the original paper.  
The comparison between no-correction and misinformation-correction 
conditions was made - rather than the comparison between no-misinformation 
and misinformation-correction conditions- because it assesses the 
effectiveness of a correction. This is also the reason that the no-correction 
condition is used as the upper-bound of comparison throughout this thesis, 
rather than the no- misinformation condition, which, arguably, shows whether 
a correction reduces reliance on misinformation to a level comparable to 
having never been exposed to misinformation. The table also only includes 
studies which have used responses to open-ended inference questions in 
order to compute a measure of the extent to which a correction reduces the 
number of references to misinformation. There were some studies that did not 
fit this criterion and were therefore not included in the review. For instance, 
Gordon et al. (2017) tested the CIE with a series of ‘comprehension probes’ 
which required participants to indicate their level of agreement with a 
misinformation consistent statement. (This approach was used because 
participants completed the task while undergoing an fMRI scan). Similarly, 
Nyhan and Reifler (2015) examined how providing an alternative causal 
explanation reduces the impact of corrected misinformation but measured 
reliance via Likert scale responses.  
  
 
51 
One function of this table is to show that reductions in the CIE vary 
widely between 4-90%. This suggests that there is a lot of scope for affecting 
the CIE over and above the specific manipulations employed in a given study. 
The table also highlights the limited number of scenarios that have been 
tested and that manipulations are rarely compared across scenarios. 
Furthermore, the table shows that the warehouse fire scenario (discussed 
throughout this chapter) has been used repeatedly. As noted previously, one 
factor that might moderate the CIE is the scenario used in the study. There 
were actually more studies that have used variants of the warehouse fire 
scenario that are not included because they did not involve a ‘no-correction’ 
control condition (e.g. Guillory & Geraci, 2010).  
Some experiments used different scenarios but could not be included 
because they did not include a no correction condition. For instance, Johnson 
and Seifert (1994; Exp 3B) examined reliance on misinformation for a 
scenario involving jewellery theft, and compared alternative explanation, 
negation (correction), and no misinformation conditions, but used the no-
correction control in the warehouse fire story. Similarly, Wilkes and 
Leatherbarrow (1988) examined corrections to misinformation for two 
scenarios (warehouse fire, accident), but included a no-misinformation control 
in both their experiments. Wilkes and Leatherbarrow’s results suggest some 
differences between scenarios. The proportion of spontaneous references to 
the ‘targeted’ information produced was higher for the accident report than the 
warehouse fire report. This suggests two things: First, that the explanations 
most easily brought to mind, without having been suggested by 
misinformation, differ depending on the specifics of the scenario. Second, that 
misinformation that is consistent with explanations that are more easily 
brought to mind, or more plausible, may be more difficult to correct than those 
that are not.  
These findings, and the variability of the effectiveness of a correction 
across studies suggest that the scenario used may interact with the 
misinformation and/or correction.  There may be a number of reasons for 
examining the CIE for a single scenario rather than comparing across 
scenarios. For instance, it may be time-consuming and difficult to construct 
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multiple scenarios that are comparable experimentally. There may also be a 
‘file drawer’ issue in that some scenarios do not elicit the CIE and are 
therefore not used. This can be problematic for understanding the CIE as a 
phenomenon because specifics of the scenario may moderate whether the 
CIE is observed and to what degree. Comparing manipulations across 
different scenarios is a worthy endeavour which would help develop a better 
understanding of the circumstances that give rise to the CIE. Considering the 
methodological characteristics of the experimental procedure and whether this 
can artificially inflate or minimize the effect of interest, is important because 
CIE research may be used for policy recommendations (e.g. Ecker et al., 
2014; Lewandowsky et al., 2012), but also because it hampers attempts to 
make scientific progress in the field.  
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Table 1 Characteristics, proportion reduction, and effect sizes of continued influence effect studies  
 
Authors 
Experiment 
# 
Correction 
Variable 
Misinformation 
Variable 
Scenario Online/Lab 
Reduction 
(%) 
Cohen's d N 
N p/cell 
Bush, Johnson 
& Seifert 1994) 
1 Just Correction 
 
Warehouse 
Fire 
Lab 46.67 
 
116 Approx. 29 
Bush, Johnson 
& Seifert 1994) 
1 
Enhanced 
Negation  
Warehouse 
Fire 
Lab 21.98 
 
116 Approx. 29 
Bush, Johnson 
& Seifert 1994) 
1 
Explanation 
(Quality)  
Warehouse 
Fire 
Lab 54.32 
 
116 Approx. 29 
Bush, Johnson 
& Seifert 1994) 
1 
Explanation 
(Relevance)  
Warehouse 
Fire 
Lab 57.04 
 
116 Approx. 29 
Johnson & 
Seifert (1994) 
3A 
Alternative 
Explanation  
Warehouse 
Fire 
Lab 39.81 0.88 81 Approx. 20 
Johnson & 
Seifert (1994) 
3A Just Correction 
 
Warehouse 
Fire 
Lab 4.17 0.08 81 Approx. 20 
Wilkes & 
Reynolds (1999) 
1 Just Correction 
 
Accident Lab 21.96 
 
36 Approx. 6 
Wilkes & 
Reynolds (1999) 
1 Just Correction 
 
Warehouse 
Fire 
Lab 27.34 
 
36 Approx. 6 
Ecker, 
Lewandowsky, & 
Tang (2010) 
1 
Alternative 
Explanation  
Minibus 
Accident 
Lab 56.12 
 
125 25 
Ecker, 
Lewandowsky, & 
Tang (2010) 
1 Just Correction 
 
Minibus 
Accident 
Lab 20.17 
 
125 25 
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Ecker, 
Lewandowsky, & 
Tang (2010) 
1 
General Pre-
Exposure 
Warning  
Minibus 
Accident 
Lab 33.6 
 
125 25 
Ecker, 
Lewandowsky, & 
Tang (2010) 
1 
Specific Pre-
Exposure 
Warning  
Minibus 
Accident 
Lab 58.1 
 
125 25 
Ecker, 
Lewandowsky, & 
Tang (2010) 
2 
Specific Pre-
Exposure 
Warning + 
Alternative 
 
Minibus 
Accident 
Lab 77.59 
 
67 
No 
Correction = 
25 
Warning + 
Alternative = 
42 
Ecker, 
Lewandowsky & 
Apai (2011) 
1 
Alternative 
Explanation 
Misinformation 
Emotionality 
(collapsed 
across) 
Plane Crash Lab 83.93 6.76 70 10 
Ecker, 
Lewandowsky & 
Apai (2011) 
1 Just Correction 
Misinformation 
Emotionality 
(collapsed 
across) 
Plane Crash Lab 15.15 1.35 70 10 
Ecker, 
Lewandowsky & 
Apai (2011) 
2 
Alternative 
Explanation 
Misinformation 
Emotionality 
(collapsed 
across) 
Plane Crash Lab 71.79 1.66 112 16 
Ecker, 
Lewandowsky & 
Apai (2011) 
2 Just Correction 
Misinformation 
Emotionality 
(collapsed 
across) 
Plane Crash Lab 68.5 1.38 112 16 
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Ecker, 
Lewandowsky & 
Apai (2011) 
3 
Alternative 
Explanation 
Misinformation 
Emotionality 
(collapsed 
across) 
Plane Crash Lab 88.85 3.29 200 20 
Ecker, 
Lewandowsky & 
Apai (2011) 
3 Just Correction 
Misinformation 
Emotionality 
(collapsed 
across) 
Plane Crash Lab 71.52 2.25 200 20 
Ecker, 
Lewandowsky, 
Swire, & Chang 
(2011) 
1 Repetition (1) Repetition (1) 
Warehouse 
Fire 
Lab 
 
0.89 161 23 
Ecker, 
Lewandowsky, 
Swire, & Chang 
(2011) 
1 Cognitive Load Cognitive Load 
Warehouse 
Fire 
Lab 
 
0.34 138 23 
Ecker, 
Lewandowsky, 
Swire, & Chang 
(2011) 
1 
No Cognitive 
Load 
No Cognitive 
Load 
Warehouse 
Fire 
Lab 
 
0.47 138 23 
Ecker, 
Lewandowsky, 
Swire, & Chang 
(2011) 
1 Repetition (3) Repetition (3) 
Warehouse 
Fire 
Lab 
 
1.33 161 23 
Guillory & 
Geraci (2013) 
1 
Source 
Credibility: High 
Expertise +High 
Trustworthiness 
 
Re-election Online 65.63 1.35 90 30 
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Guillory & 
Geraci (2013) 
1 
Source 
Credibility: Low 
Expertise & Low 
Trustworthiness 
 
Re-election Online 31.25 0.71 90 30 
Guillory & 
Geraci (2013) 
2 
Source 
Credibility: High 
Expertise  
Re-election Online 31.25 0.74 90 30 
Guillory & 
Geraci (2013) 
2 
Source 
Credibility: Low 
Expertise  
Re-election Online 43.75 0.97 90 30 
Guillory & 
Geraci (2013) 
3 
Source 
Credibility: High 
Trustworthiness  
Re-election Online 46.88 1.11 90 30 
Guillory & 
Geraci (2013) 
3 
Source 
Credibility: Low 
Trustworthiness  
Re-election Online 6.25 0.21 90 30 
Ecker, 
Lewandowsky, 
Fenton, & Martin 
(2014) 
1 
Low Racial 
Prejudice - 
Attitude 
Congruent 
Correction 
 
Liquor-store 
robbery 
Lab 
  
144 24 
Ecker, 
Lewandowsky, 
Fenton, & Martin 
(2014) 
1 
High Racial 
Prejudice - 
Attitude 
Incongruent 
Correction 
 
Liquor-store 
robbery 
Lab 
  
144 24 
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Ecker, 
Lewandowsky, 
Fenton, & Martin 
(2014) 
2 
Low Racial 
Prejudice - 
Attitude 
Incongruent 
Correction 
 
Liquor-store 
robbery 
Lab 
  
100 25 
Ecker, 
Lewandowsky, 
Fenton, & Martin 
(2014) 
2 
High Racial 
Prejudice - 
Attitude 
Congruent 
Correction 
 
Liquor-store 
robbery 
Lab 
  
100 25 
Guillory & 
Geraci (2016) 
1 Just Correction 
Valence: 
Neutral 
Re-election Lab 
  
58 
Within-
Subjects 
58 
Guillory & 
Geraci (2016) 
1 Just Correction 
Valence: 
Positive 
Re-election Lab 
  
58 
Within-
Subjects 
58 
Guillory & 
Geraci (2016) 
1 Just Correction 
Valence: 
Negative 
Re-election Lab 
  
58 
Within-
Subjects 
58 
Rich & Zaragoza 
(2016) 
1 Just Correction Implied Cause Jewellery theft Lab 
  
357 
Corrected 
Implied = 42 
Uncorrected 
Implied = 55 
Rich & Zaragoza 
(2016) 
1 Just Correction 
Explicitly 
Stated Cause 
Jewellery theft Lab 
  
357 
Corrected 
Explicit = 49 
Uncorrected 
Explicit = 59 
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Rich & Zaragoza 
(2016) 
2 
Alternative 
Explanation 
Implied Cause Jewellery theft Lab 
  
357 
Uncorrected 
Implied = 60 
Corrected 
Implied + 
Alternative = 
56 
Rich & Zaragoza 
(2016) 
2 
Alternative 
Explanation 
Explicitly 
Stated Cause 
Jewellery theft Lab 
  
357 
Uncorrected 
Explicit = 61 
Corrected 
Implied + 
Alternative = 
51 
Ecker, Hogan, & 
Lewandowsky 
(2017) 
1 
Reminder 
through 
Correction  
Multiple 
(aggregated 
across 
scenarios) 
Lab 32.76 
 
60 
Within-
Subjects 
60 
Ecker, Hogan, & 
Lewandowsky 
(2017) 
1 
Reminder 
through 
Correction  
Multiple 
(aggregated 
across 
scenarios 
Lab 41.38 
 
60 
Within-
Subjects 
60 
Ecker, Hogan, & 
Lewandowsky 
(2017) 
1 
Reminder 
through 
Correction  
Multiple 
(aggregated 
across 
scenarios 
Lab 53.45 
 
60 
Within-
Subjects 
60 
     
Mean 45.40 1.41 
 
 
 
Note: Only studies comparing ‘No Correction’ baseline to a form of correction are included here. Studies that do not measure 
  
 
59 
reliance on misinformation using the average number of references to misinformation on open-ended inference questions are 
excluded as well. Studies that did not include information about the condition means were also excluded because it was not 
possible to calculate the percentage reduction in average number of references to misinformation.  The N p/cell was approximated 
for studies that did not specify exactly how many participants were allocated to each experimental condition.    
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1.7. Summary and Thesis Outline 
Chapter 1 began by discussing the issue of misinformation in society and 
then discussed cognitive and memory approaches to studying how people 
disregard prior information (belief perseverance, disregarding invalid testimony, 
and directed forgetting). The CIE experimental paradigm was then proposed as 
the appropriate experimental methodology for studying how people process 
corrections to misinformation. This is because the CIE approach simultaneously 
uses rich scenarios whilst also carefully manipulating variables. Thus, the CIE 
approach makes it possible to study the cognitive processes involved in 
successful and unsuccessful corrections to misinformation for complex 
scenarios. After highlighting the benefits of this approach, I then discussed the 
limitations of this methodology. Studies on the CIE have also tended to use a 
limited number of scenarios and often do not compare effects across different 
scenarios. Furthermore, most CIE studies have mainly been conducted in the 
lab recruiting relatively small numbers of university students. It is important to 
address these limitations in order to be able to establish the precise set of 
circumstances that give rise to this phenomenon.  
After initial discussion of the CIE paradigm and its limitations, I described 
the two mechanisms by which CIE is thought to occur, and discussed the 
empirical evidence for these two positions. Next, I described the main factors 
that are thought to moderate the CIE in order to establish what the CIE is and 
when it occurs. Through this review of the literature, I identified that the CIE may 
be partially explained by a distrust of the correction (either via source credibility 
heuristics or pragmatic inferences about the relevance and truthfulness of 
conveyed information). This analysis also suggested that factors which highlight 
the discrepancy between initial misinformation and the correction might be 
useful for reducing the CIE, either because they make people more aware of the 
inconsistency between initial and updated models or because they enhance 
strategic memory processes during retrieval (cf. Ecker et al. 2017).  
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The literature review has established that the CIE can be observed under 
some circumstances but not whether it is always guaranteed to occur. 
Furthermore, examination of the CIE paradigm and methodology typically used 
in these studies suggests that the limited number of scenarios used, small 
sample sizes in some studies, and focus on student populations, could pose 
problems for the validity and reliability of CIE findings. The aim of this thesis was 
to gain a better understanding of the circumstances that give rise to the CIE by 
establishing whether some methodological factors moderate the effect. 
Establishing this will advance understanding of the underlying cognitive 
processes involved in the CIE.  
This thesis contains three empirical chapters that advance the CIE method 
through several steps. The overarching aim of Chapter 2 is to develop and 
validate a methodology for web-based testing of the CIE in order to collect data 
from larger samples who are more representative of the normal adult 
population. The specific goals are 1) to establish whether key CIE findings 
replicate, and 2) to explore the feasibility of converting open-ended questions to 
the type of closed-ended questions more typically seen online. The reason for 
converting open to closed-ended questions was to streamline the task for web-
based testing because open-ended questions may be off-putting for participants 
completing experiments online. Chapter 2 also argues that web-based 
experiments provide a medium through which to target larger and more diverse 
samples. Research comparing responses to open- and closed-ended questions 
is reviewed in order to examine the feasibility of converting the open-ended 
questions to the closed format typically seen online, and whether different 
cognitive mechanisms are involved in responses to open- and closed questions. 
Chapter 2 establishes whether the web-based method of data collection is a 
viable means to test the CIE as this is the primary method of data collection in 
the remainder of the experiments reported in this thesis8. Experiments 2A and 
2B reported in Chapter 2 also include a novel baseline condition in which 
                                            
8
 The only exception to this is Experiment 4. The experimental design used in 
Experiment 4 meant that it was not feasible to conduct this study online.  
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misinformation is presented for the first time during the correction. This control 
condition was included in order establish whether a CIE still occurs when the 
misinformation is only encoded for the first time as it is being corrected. The aim 
of including this condition was to establish whether people still refer to 
misinformation even it is does not form the basis of an initial causal 
interpretation of an event. This inclusion of this condition also helps to determine 
whether the CIE can be explained in terms of the availability of the causal 
explanation offered by misinformation when answering inference questions.   
Chapters 3 and 4 examine the effects of two potential moderators of the 
CIE across several scenarios that were designed specifically for this programme 
of research. Chapter 3 consists of three experiments: two of which are web-
based and one that is laboratory-based. It investigates the claim that corrections 
that explain how or why misinformation occurred (e.g. intentional deception or 
unintentional error) are more effective than corrections that negate 
misinformation (as suggested by Bush, Johnson & Seifert, 1994; Johnson & 
Seifert, 1994). Chapter 4 consists of two web-based experiments that was 
designed to re-examine the finding that misinformation, which implies a likely 
cause of an adverse outcome, is more resistant to correction than 
misinformation which explicitly states a cause (as found by Rich & Zaragoza, 
2016). In Chapter 5, the findings of this thesis are discussed in light of past 
research and theoretical implications for possible CIE mechanisms. Finally, 
practical implications are discussed.    
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2 Comparing the use of open and 
closed questions for web-based 
measures of the continued influence 
effect  
2.1. Chapter Overview 
Continued influence effect experiments have mainly been conducted in 
the laboratory (but see Guillory & Geraci, 2013; Hardwicke, 2016; Rich & 
Zaragoza, 2016, who have recently run CIE studies online). The CIE is also 
usually measured via responses to open-ended inference questions. Web-
based data collection is the preferred method of data collection for the 
experiments reported in this thesis because it allows for testing of larger and 
more representative samples, and streamlines the research process. Chapter 
2’s aims were, therefore, threefold: First, to establish the feasibility of running 
CIE experiments online. Second, to compare open- and closed-ended inference 
and factual memory measures. Third, to examine the CIE in a novel control 
condition in which misinformation is only mentioned in the correction.  
Chapter 2 consists of a paper that has been published in Behavior 
Research Methods. It is unchanged from the published version, except that the 
variable names have been changed to be more consistent with the remainder of 
this thesis. Some of the information included in the introductory section of this 
Chapter briefly repeats information included in Chapter 1 of this thesis but 
provides the immediate context for the work that follows. Chapter 2 reports the 
results of four experiments (Experiments 1A and 1B, 2A and 2B), that compare 
traditional open-ended responses to a closed-ended equivalent questionnaire. 
Experiments 1A and 1B aimed to replicate two key CIE findings: namely, that 1) 
a correction reduces but does not eliminate reliance on misinformation, and 2) 
  
 
64 
that an alternative explanation reduces reliance on misinformation beyond a 
simple correction.  
Experiments 1A and 1B’s results showed that a correction significantly 
reduced reliance on misinformation when open-ended measures were used 
(Experiment 1A), yet the difference was not significant with closed-ended 
measures (Experiment 1B). The second set of experiments were preregistered 
(https://osf.io/s39yr/) and examined whether differences between response 
measures were systematic or due to the small sample used in the first set of 
experiments. These experiments also included a novel baseline condition in 
which misinformation was presented for the first time during the correction. This 
control condition was included in order establish whether a CIE still occurs when 
the misinformation is encoded for the first time when its correction is presented.  
Experiments 2A and 2B’s results showed that misinformation which was 
only presented as part of a correction had as much of a CIE as misinformation 
presented early in a series of statements and only later corrected, for both open-
ended (Experiment 2A), and closed-ended measures (Experiment 2B). The 
results of these experiments also showed that a correction did not significantly 
reduce reliance on misinformation when open-ended measures were used 
(Experiment 2A) but did so for closed-ended measures (Experiment 2B). The 
experimental stimuli, questionnaires, and full response coding criteria can be 
found in Appendices A, B, and C.  
The results of the experiments reported in this chapter fit within the 
broader aims of the thesis for two main reasons: First, the results confirm that it 
is possible to perform complex memory-based experiments in which participants 
provide qualitative responses to questions online. Second, these results 
establish that the CIE can be partially explained by the availability of causal 
explanations when answering inference questions. The full implications of these 
results are discussed in Chapter 5 of this thesis.  
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2.2. Abstract 
Open-ended questions, in which participants write or type their 
responses, are used in many areas of the behavioural sciences. Although 
effective in the lab, they are relatively untested in online experiments, and the 
quality of responses is largely unexplored. Closed-ended questions are easier to 
use online because they generally require only single key- or mouse-press 
responses and are less cognitively demanding but can bias responses. We 
compared data quality obtained using open and closed response formats using 
the continued influence effect, in which participants read a series of statements 
about an unfolding event, one of which is unambiguously corrected later. 
Participants typically continue to refer to the corrected misinformation when 
making inferential statements about the event. We implemented this basic 
procedure online (Experiment 1A, n = 78), comparing standard open-ended 
responses to an alternative procedure using closed-ended responses 
(Experiment 1B, n = 75). Finally, we replicated these findings in a larger 
preregistered study (Experiments 2A and 2B, n = 323). We observed the CIE in 
all conditions: Participants continued to refer to the misinformation following a 
correction, and references to target misinformation were broadly similar in 
number across open- and closed-ended questions. We found that participants’ 
open-ended responses were relatively detailed (writing an average of 75 
characters for inference questions), and almost all responses attempted to 
address the question. Responses for closed-ended questions were, however, 
faster. Overall, we suggest that with caution it may be possible to use either 
method for gathering CIE data. 
2.3. Introduction 
Over the past decade, many areas of research which have traditionally 
been conducted in the lab have moved to using web-based data collection (e.g. 
Peer, Brandimarte, Samat, & Acquisti, 2017; Simcox & Fiez, 2014; Stewart, 
Chandler, & Paolacci, 2017; Wolfe, 2017). Collecting data online has many 
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advantages for researchers, including ease and speed of participant 
recruitment, and a broader demographic of participants relative to lab-based 
students.  
Part of the justification for this shift has been the finding that data quality 
from web-based studies is comparable to that obtained in the lab: The vast 
majority of web-based studies replicate existing findings (e.g. Crump, 
McDonnell, & Gureckis, 2013; Germine et al., 2012; Zwaan et al., 2017). 
However, the majority of these studies have been in areas where participants 
make single key- or mouse-press responses to stimuli. Less well explored are 
studies using more open-ended responses where participants write their 
answers to questions. These types of question are useful for assessing recall 
rather than recognition, and for examining spontaneous responses that are 
unbiased by experimenter expectations, and as such may be unavoidable for 
certain types of research.  
There are reasons to predict that typed open-ended responses might be 
of lower quality than closed-ended responses. Among the few studies that have 
failed to replicate online have been those that require high levels of attention 
and engagement (Crump et al., 2013), and typing is both time-consuming and 
more physically effortful than pointing and clicking. Relatedly, participants who 
respond on mobile devices might struggle to make meaningful typed responses 
without undue effort. 
Thus, researchers who typically run their studies with open-ended 
questions in the lab, and wish to move to running them online, have two options. 
They can either retain the open-ended question format or hope that online 
participants are at least as diligent as those in the lab, or they can use closed-
ended questions in place of open-ended questions, but with the risk that 
participants will respond differently or draw on different memory or reasoning 
processes to answer the questions. We examine the relative feasibility of these 
two options using the continued influence effect, a paradigm which (a) is a 
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relatively well-used memory task, (b) has traditionally always used open-ended 
questions, and (c) is one that we have experience of running in the lab.  
2.3.1. The continued influence effect 
The continued influence effect of misinformation refers to the consistent 
finding that misinformation continues to influence people’s beliefs and reasoning 
after it has been corrected (Chan, Jones, Hall Jamieson, & Albarracín, 2017; 
Ecker, Lewandowsky, & Apai, 2011; Ecker, Lewandowsky, Swire, & Chang, 
2011; Ecker, Lewandowsky, & Tang, 2010; Gordon, Brooks, Quadflieg, Ecker, & 
Lewandowsky, 2017; Guillory & Geraci, 2016; Johnson & Seifert, 1994; Rich & 
Zaragoza, 2016; Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 1988; for a review see Lewandowsky, 
Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, & Cook, 2012). Misinformation can have a lasting effect 
on people’s reasoning even when they demonstrably remember that the 
information was corrected (Johnson & Seifert, 1994), and are given prior 
warnings about the persistence of misinformation (Ecker et al., 2010).  
In the experimental task used to study the continued influence effect 
participants are presented with a series of 10-15 sequentially-presented 
statements describing an unfolding event. Target misinformation that allows 
inferences to be drawn about the cause of the event is presented early in the 
sequence and later corrected. Participants’ inferential reasoning and factual 
memory for the event report are then assessed through a series of open-ended 
questions.  
For example, in Johnson and Seifert (1994), participants read a story 
about a warehouse fire in which target information implies that carelessly stored 
flammable materials (oil paint and gas cylinders), are a likely cause of the fire. 
Later in the story, some participants learnt that no such materials had actually 
been stored in the warehouse and therefore could not have caused the fire. The 
ensuing questionnaire included indirect inference questions (e.g. “what could 
have caused the explosions?”), and direct questions probing recall of the literal 
content of the story (e.g. “what was the cost of the damage done?”). Responses 
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to inference questions are coded in order to measure whether the 
misinformation has been appropriately updated (no oil paint and gas cylinders 
were present in warehouse). Responses are categorized according to whether 
they are consistent with the explanation implied by the target (mis)information9 
(e.g. “exploding gas cylinders”), or not (e.g. “electrical short circuit”).  
In a typical CIE experiment, performance on a misinformation-followed-
by-correction condition is usually compared to one or more baselines: A 
condition in which the misinformation is presented but is not then retracted (no-
correction condition), or a condition in which the misinformation is never 
presented (no-misinformation condition). The former allows assessment of the 
retraction’s effectiveness; the latter arguably shows whether the correction 
reduces reference to misinformation to a level comparable to never having been 
exposed to the misinformation (but see below). 
The key finding from continued influence studies is that people continue 
to use the misinformation to answer inference questions even though it has 
been corrected. The most consistent pattern of findings is that references to 
previously corrected misinformation are elevated relative to a no-misinformation 
condition, and are either below, or in some cases indistinguishable from, 
references in the no-correction condition. 
2.3.2. Using open- and closed-ended questions online 
With a few recent exceptions (Guillory & Geraci, 2013, 2016; Rich & 
Zaragoza, 2016), research around reliance on misinformation has used open-
ended questions administered in the lab (see Capella, Ophir, & Sutton, 2018, for 
overview of approaches to measuring misinformation beliefs). There are several 
good reasons for using them, particularly on memory-based tasks that involve 
comprehension or recall of previously studied text. First, responses to open-
                                            
9
 We use the term (mis)information throughout to refer to the original statement 
presented early in a CIE study that is later corrected. We parenthesize the (mis) because in 
some control conditions the information is not corrected, meaning it cannot be considered 
misinformation from the participants’ perspective. 
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ended questions are constructed rather than suggested by response options, 
and so avoid bias introduced by suggesting responses to participants. Second, 
open-ended questions also allow participants to give detailed responses about 
complex stimuli and permit a wide range of possible responses. Open-ended 
questions also resemble cued-recall tasks which mostly depend on controlled 
retrieval processes (Jacoby, 1996), and provide limited retrieval cues (Graesser, 
Ozuru, & Sullins, 2010). These factors are particularly important for memory-
based tasks wherein answering questions requires active generation of 
previously studied text (Ozuru, Briner, Kurby, & McNamara, 2013). 
For web-based testing, these advantages are balanced against the 
potential reduction in data quality when participants have to type extensive 
responses. The evidence around written responses is mixed. Grysman (2015a) 
found that participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk wrote shorter self-report 
event narratives than college participants completing online surveys, typing in 
the presence of a researcher, or giving verbal reports. Conversely, Behrend, 
Sharek, Meade, and Wiebe (2011) found no difference in the amount written in 
free-text responses between university-based and Mechanical Turk 
respondents. 
A second potential effect is in missing data: Participants have anecdotally 
reported to us not enjoying typing open-ended responses. Open-ended 
questions could particularly discourage participants with lower levels of literacy 
or certain disabilities from expressing themselves in the written form, which 
could, in turn, increase selective dropout from some demographic groups 
(Berinsky, Margolis, & Sances, 2014). As well as losing whole participant 
datasets, open-ended questions in web surveys could also result in more 
individual missing data points than closed-ended questions (Reja, Manfreda, 
Hlebec, & Vehovar, 2003). 
The alternative to using open-ended questions online is using closed-
ended questions. These have many advantages, particularly in a context where 
there is less social pressure to perform diligently. Response options can also 
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inform participants about the researcher’s knowledge and expectations about 
the world and suggest a range of reasonable responses (Schwarz, Hippler, 
Deutsch, & Strack, 1985; Schwarz, Knauper, Hippler, Neumann, & Clark, 1991; 
Schwarz, Strack, Müller, & Chassein, 1988).  
There is also empirical evidence to suggest that open and closed 
responses are supported by different cognitive (Frew, Whynes, & 
Wolstenholme, 2003; Frew, Wolstenholme, & Whynes, 2004) or memory (Khoe, 
Kroll, Yonelinas, Dobbins, & Knight, 2000, see Yonelinas, 2002 for a review) 
processes. A straightforward conversion of open to closed-ended questions 
might, therefore, be impractical for testing novel scientific questions in a given 
domain.  
This may be particularly relevant for the CIE. Repeated statements are 
easier to process and are subsequently perceived as more truthful than new 
statements (U. Ecker, Lewandowsky, Swire, & Chang, 2011; Fazio, Brashier, 
Payne, & Marsh, 2015; Moons, Mackie, & Garcia-Marques, 2009). Therefore, 
repeating misinformation in the response options could activate automatic 
(familiarity-based) rather than strategic (recollection-based) retrieval of studied 
text, which may not reflect how people reason about misinformation in the real 
world. Conversely, presenting corrections that explicitly repeat misinformation is 
more effective at reducing misinformation effects than presenting corrections 
that avoid repetition (Ecker et al., 2017). As such, substituting closed-ended 
questions for open-ended questions may have unpredictable consequences. 
2.4. Overview of Experiments  
The overarching aim of the experiments reported here was to examine 
open and closed questions in web-based memory and inference research. The 
more specific goals were to 1) to establish whether a well-known experimental 
task that elicits responses with open-ended questions replicates online, and 2) 
to explore the feasibility of converting open-ended questions to the type of 
closed-ended questions more typically seen online. In order to achieve this, two 
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experiments were designed in order to replicate the continued influence effect. 
Experiments 1A and 1B used the same experimental stimuli and subset of 
questions used in Johnson and Seifert (1994; Exp 3A), wherein participants 
read a report about a warehouse fire and answered questions that assessed 
inferential reasoning about the story, factual accuracy, and the ability to recall 
the correction or control information (critical information). Experiments 1A and 
2A employed standard open-ended measures whereas a closed-ended 
analogue was used in Experiments 1B and 2B. Although reported as separate 
experiments, both Experiments 1A and 1B were run concurrently as one study, 
as were Experiments 2A and 2B, with participants randomly allocated to each 
experiment, as well as to experimental conditions within each experiment.  
2.5. Experiment 1A: Method 
2.5.1. Participants  
A power analysis using the effect size observed in previous research 
using the same stimuli and experimental design (Johnson & Seifert, 1994; effect 
size obtained from means in Experiment 3A) indicated that a minimum of 69 
participants were required (f = 0.39, 1-β = 0.80, α = 0.05). In total 78 US-based 
participants (28 females, aged between 19 and 62, M = 31.78, SD = 10.10) 
were recruited from AMT. Only participants with a Human Intelligence Task 
(HIT) approval rating greater than, or equal to, 99% were recruited for the 
experiment to ensure high-quality data without having to include attentional 
check questions (Peer, Vosgerau, & Acquisti, 2013). Participants were paid $2 
and median completion time was 11 minutes.  
2.5.2. Stimuli & Design  
The experiment was programmed in Adobe Flash (Reimers & Stewart, 
2007, 2015). Participants read one of 3 versions of a fictional news report about 
a warehouse fire that consisted of 15 discrete messages. The stimuli were 
identical to those used in Johnson and Seifert (1994, Experiment 3A). Fig. 2 
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illustrates how message content was varied across experimental conditions, as 
well as the message presentation format. The effect of correction information on 
reference to target (mis)information was assessed between groups; participants 
were randomly assigned to one of the 3 experimental groups: no correction (n = 
32), correction (n = 21), and alternative explanation (n = 25). 
Target (mis)information implying that carelessly stored oil paint and gas 
cylinders played a role in the fire, was presented at Message 6. This information 
was then corrected at Message 13 for the two conditions featuring a correction. 
Information implying that the fire was actually the result of arson (alternative 
explanation) was presented at Message 14; here the other two experimental 
groups learned that the storage hall contained stationery materials. The other 
messages provided further details of the incident and were identical in all 3 
experimental conditions.  
The questionnaire following the statements consisted of three question 
blocks: inference, factual, and critical information recall. Question order was 
randomized within inference and factual blocks, but not in the critical information 
recall block where questions were presented in a predefined order. Inference 
questions (e.g. “What was a possible cause of the fumes”) were presented first, 
followed by factual questions (e.g. “What business was the firm in?”), and after 
this the critical information recall questions (e.g. “What was the point of the 
second message from Police Investigator Lucas?”) were presented. 
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Figure 2 The continued influence effect task: Messages 1-5 provide general information about the event beginning 
with the fire being reported. Target (mis)information is presented at Message 6 and is then corrected for correction 
and correction + alternative explanation groups at Message 13. The correction + alternative explanation group then 
receive information providing a substitute account of the fire to ‘fill the gap’ left by invalidating the misinformation. 
This condition usually leads to a robust reduction in reference to misinformation.  
 
 
Figure 81 Effect of correction information on the number of (A) references to target (mis)information in Experiment 
1A (B) references to target misinformation in Experiment 1B (C) accurately recalled facts in Experiment 1A (D) 
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There were three dependent measures: (1) reference to the target 
(mis)information in the inference questions, (2) factual recall, and (3) critical 
information recall. The first dependent measure assessed the extent to which the 
misinformation influenced interpretation of the news report, whereas the second 
assessed memory for the literal content of the report. The final measure 
specifically assessed understanding and accurate recall of the critical information 
that appeared at Message 13 (see Fig. 2). Although not all groups received a 
correction, the participants in all experimental groups were asked these 
questions so that the questions would not differ between the conditions. The 
stimuli were piloted on a small group of participants to check their average 
completion time and obtain feedback about the questionnaire. Following the pilot, 
the number of questions included in the inference and factual blocks was 
reduced from ten to six, because participants felt some questions were repetitive.  
2.5.3. Procedure    
Participants clicked on a link in AMT to enter the experimental site. After 
seeing details about the experiment, giving consent and receiving detailed 
instructions, they were told they would not be able to backtrack and that each 
message would appear for a minimum of 10 seconds before they could move on 
to the next message.  
Immediately after reading the final statement participants were informed 
that they would see a series of inference-based questions. They were told to type 
their responses in the text box provided, giving as much detail as necessary 
writing in full sentences, writing at least 25 characters in order to be able to 
continue to the next question, and answering questions on the basis of their 
understanding about the report, and industrial fires in general. After this, they 
were informed that they would answer six factual question, which then followed. 
Next participants were instructed to answer the two critical information recall 
questions on the basis of what they remembered from the report. After 
completing the questionnaire participants were asked to provide their sex, age, 
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and highest level of education. 
2.6. Results  
2.6.1. Coding of responses  
The main dependent variable extracted from responses to inference 
questions was ‘reference to target (mis)information’. References that explicitly 
stated, or strongly implied, that oil paint and gas cylinders caused, or contributed, 
to the fire were scored a 1 or were otherwise scored as 0.  Table 2 shows an 
example of a response that was coded as a reference to target (mis)information 
and an example of a response that was not coded as such.  There were several 
examples of references to flammable items but did not count as references to the 
corrected information. For example, stating that the fire spread quickly “Because 
there were a lot of flammable things in the shop”, would not be counted as a 
reference to the corrected information, as there is no specific reference to gas, 
paint, liquids, substances or the fact that they were (allegedly) in the closet. The 
maximum individual score across the inference questions was 6. Responses to 
factual questions were scored for accuracy; correct or partially correct responses 
were scored 1 and incorrect responses were scored 0. Again, the maximum 
factual score was 6. We also examined critical information recall, to check 
participant awareness of the correction to the misinformation or the control 
message, computed using two questions that assessed recall accuracy for 
critical information that appeared at Message 13. This meant that there were two 
correct responses depending on correction information condition. For participants 
in the no correction group the correct response was that the injured firefighters 
had been released from hospital and for the two conditions featuring a correction 
this was a correction of target (mis)information. 
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Table 2 Example of response coding in Experiment 1A 
Inter-coder reliability. All participants’ responses to inference, factual, 
and critical information recall questions were independently coded by two trained 
coders. Inter-rater agreement was 0.88 and Cohen’s Κ = 0.76±0.02, indicating a 
high level of agreement between coders, both of which are higher than the 
benchmark values of 0.7 and 0.6 (Krippendorff, 2012; Landis & Koch, 1977), and 
there was no systematic bias between raters, χ2 = 0.29, p = 0.59.  
2.6.2. Inference scores  
The overall effect of correction information on reference to target 
(mis)information was significant, F (2, 75) = 10.73, p < .001,   
  = 0.22 [.07, .36]. 
Tukey corrected pairwise comparisons (shown in Panel A of Fig. 3) revealed that 
a correction, and a correction with an alternative explanation, significantly 
reduced reference to target (mis)information on inference questions.  
A Bayesian analysis using BayesFactor package in R and default priors 
(Morey & Rouder, 2015) was performed to examine the relative predictive 
success of the comparisons between conditions. The BF10 for the first 
comparison was 28.93 – indicating strong evidence (Lee & Wagenmakers, 2014) 
in favour of the alternative that there is a difference between no correction and 
correction only groups. The BF10 for the comparison between no correction and 
alternative explanation groups was 209.03, again indicating very strong evidence 
in favour of the alternative. The BF10 was 0.36 for the final comparison between 
correction only and alternative explanation groups indicating anecdotal evidence 
in favour of the null.  
Question 
Example of Response 
Scored 1 
Example of Response Scored 0 
Why did the 
fire spread so 
quickly? 
Fire spread quickly due to 
gas cylinder explosion. Gas 
cylinders were stored inside 
the closet 
The fire occurred in a stationery 
warehouse that housed 
envelopes and bales of paper 
that could easily ignite 
  
 
77 
The Bayes factor analysis was mostly consistent with p-values and effect 
sizes. Both conditions featuring a correction led to a decrease in references to 
target (mis)information but the data for the two conditions featuring a correction 
Figure 3 Effect of correction information on the number of (A) references to 
target (mis)information in Experiment 1A; (B) references to target 
misinformation in Experiment 1B; (C) accurately recalled facts in Experiment 
1A; (D) accurately recalled facts in Experiment 1B. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals of the mean. Brackets represent Dunnett’s multiple 
comparison tests (which account for unequal group sizes) for significant 
omnibus tests. Dashed lines represent means after excluding participants 
who did not recall the critical information (i.e. scored 0 on the first correction 
recall question).  
 
 
Figure 323 Screenshots of how inference (left) and factual (right) questions 
and response options were presented to participants. Participants used the 
red arrow features to allocate points to response alternatives to respond to 
inference questions. Factual questions were answered by selecting the 
‘correct’ option based on the information in the report.Figure 324 Effect of 
correction information on the number of (A) references to target 
(mis)information in Experiment 1A (B) references to target misinformation in 
Experiment 1B (C) accurately recalled facts in Experiment 1A (D) accurately 
recalled facts in Experiment 1B. Error bars represent 95% confidence 
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cannot distinguish between the null hypothesis and previous findings (i.e. that an 
alternative explanation substantially reduces reference to misinformation 
compared to a correction alone).  
2.6.3. Recall Accuracy Scores  
Factual responses were examined to establish whether differences in 
references to (mis)information could be explained by memory for the literal 
content of the report. Overall, participants accurately recalled a similar number of 
correct details across correction information conditions (Fig. 3, Panel C), and the 
omnibus test was not significant, F (2, 75) = 0.78, p =.46,   
   = 0.02.  
2.6.4. Response quality  
Participants were required to write a minimum of 25 characters in 
response to questions. The number of characters written was examined as a 
measure of response quality. Participants wrote between 36-64% more on 
average than the minimum required 25 characters in response to inference (M = 
69.45, SD = 40.49), factual (M = 39.09, SD = 15.85), and critical information 
recall questions (M = 66.72, SD = 42.76). There was - unsurprisingly - a positive 
correlation between time taken to complete the study and number of words 
characters written, r (76) = .31, p = .007. 
2.7. Experiment 1B: Method 
Experiment 1B examined the feasibility of converting open-ended 
questions to a comparable closed-ended form.  
2.7.1. Participants  
Seventy-five U.S. based (29 female, aged between 18 and 61, M = 34.31, 
SD = 10.54) participants were recruited from AMT. Participants were paid $2; the 
median completion time was 9 minutes.  
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2.7.2. Design, Stimuli and Procedure  
Experiment 1B used the same story/news feed stimuli and high-level 
design as Experiment 1; participants were randomly assigned to one of 3 
experimental conditions: no correction (n = 33), correction only (n = 22), or 
alternative explanation (n = 20). The only difference between experiments was 
that closed-ended questions were used in the subsequent questionnaire. Fig. 4 
shows how participants responded to inference and factual questions. For each 
question participants had 10 points which they could distribute across the 4 
inference question response options to indicate which option/s best fit their 
understanding of the story. Response alternatives corresponded to 4 possible 
explanations for the fire. For example, when answering the question ‘What could 
have caused the explosions?’ participants could allocate points to a 
misinformation consistent option (e.g. ‘Fire came in contact with compressed gas 
cylinders’), alternative explanation consistent option (e.g. ‘Steel drums filled with 
liquid accelerants’), an option that was plausible given the story details but was 
not explicitly stated (e.g. ‘Volatile compounds in photocopiers caught on fire’), or 
an option that was inconsistent with the story details (e.g. ‘Cooking equipment 
Figure 4 Screenshots of how inference (left) and factual (right) questions and 
response options were presented to participants in Experiment 1B. Participants 
used the red arrow features to allocate points to response alternatives to 
respond to inference questions. Factual questions were answered by selecting 
the ‘correct’ option based on the information in the report. 
 
Figure 565 Effect of correction information on the number of (A) references to 
target (mis)information in Experiment 2A (B) reference to target 
(mis)information in Experiment 2B (C) accurately recalled factual details in 
Experiment 2A (D) accurately recalled facts in Experiment 2B. Error bars 
r present 95% confidence interv l of the mean. Brackets r present Tukey 
multiple comparison tests when the omnibus test was significant. Dashed lines 
represent means for restricted sample of participants who did not recall the 
critical information.Figure 566 Screenshots of how inference (left) and factual 
(right) questions and response options were presented to participants. 
Participants used the red arrow featur s to allocate point  to response 
alternatives to respond to inference questions. Factual questions were 
answered by selecting the ‘correct’ option based on the information in the 
report. 
 
Figure 567 Effect of correction information on the number of (A) references to 
target (mis)information in Experiment 2A (B) reference to target 
(mis)information in Experiment 2B (C) accurately recalled factual details in 
Experiment 2A (D) accurately recalled facts in Experiment 2B. Error bars 
represent 95% confidence interval of the mean. Brackets represent Tukey 
multiple comparison tests when the omnibus test was significant. Dashed lines 
represent means for restricted sample of participants who did not recall the 
critical i formation.  
 
 
Figure 568 Schematic diagram depicting experimental design in Experiment 
3Figure 569 Effect of correction information on the number of (A) references to 
target (mis)information in Experiment 2A (B) reference to target 
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caught on fire’). The total number of points that could be allocated to a given 
explanatory theme was 60.  
Response options were chosen in this way in order to give participants the 
opportunity to provide more nuanced responses than would be possible using 
multiple-choice or true/false alternatives. This approach allowed participants who 
were presented with misinformation and then a correction to choose an 
explanation which was consistent with the story but did not make use of the 
corrected information. If the continued influence effect is observed in response to 
closed-ended questions then the number of points allocated to misinformation 
consistent options in the conditions featuring a correction should be non-zero. 
Accuracy on factual questions was measured using 4AFC multiple-choice 
questions and participants responded by choosing the correct answer from a set 
of 4 possible options, which corresponded to the explanatory themes used for 
inference question response alternatives. Order of presentation of response 
alternatives for inference and factual questions was randomized across 
participants. Correction recall questions were open-ended and participants gave 
free-text responses in the same manner as in Experiment 1A.   
2.8. Results 
Individual inference, factual, and critical information recall scores (an 
analysis of the critical information recall responses is shown in the additional 
analyses in the Appendix D) were calculated for each participant. Since the 
maximum number of points that could be allocated to a given option explanation 
theme for each question was 10, the maximum inference score for an individual 
participant was 60. The maximum factual score was 6, and the maximum critical 
information recall score was 2. Critical information recall questions were open-
ended, and responses were coded using the same criteria as in Experiment 1A. 
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2.8.1. Inference scores  
A one-way ANOVA on reference to target (mis)information revealed a 
significant effect of correction information, F (2, 72) = 9.39, p <.001,   
  = .21 [.05, 
.35]. Overall, the pattern of results for reference to target (mis)information in 
response to closed-ended questions was very similar to Experiment 1A (Fig. 3, 
Panel B). Although a correction with an alternative explanation significantly 
reduced reference to (mis)information, a correction on its own did not. The 
difference between the two conditions featuring a correction was also not 
significant.   
The BF10 was 1.02 for the first comparison between the no correction and 
correction groups, indicating ‘weak’ or ‘anecdotal’ evidence in favour of the 
alternative, or arbitrary evidence for either hypothesis (Jarosz & Wiley, 2014). 
The BF10 was 250.81 for the second comparison between the no correction and 
alternative explanation groups indicating strong evidence for the alternative. The 
BF10 was 4.22 for the final comparison indicating substantial evidence in favour 
of the alternative.  
The Bayes factor analysis was mostly consistent with p-values and effect 
sizes except that the Bayes factor for the comparison between correction and 
alternative explanation conditions suggested an effect whereas the p-value did 
not.  
2.8.2. Recall accuracy scores 
 Analysis of factual scores indicated a significant difference between 
correction information groups, F (2, 72) = 5.30, p =.007,   
  = .13 [.01, .26]. Fig. 3 
(Panel D) shows that the allocation of points to the factually correct answer 
recalled from the report was significantly lower in the correction only condition 
than the no correction group but not the alternative explanation group. Poorer 
overall performance on factual questions for the correction only group was mainly 
attributable to incorrect responses to two questions. The first question asked 
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about the contents of the closet that had reportedly contained flammable 
materials, before the fire; the second asked about the time the fire was put out. 
Only a third (23% in the correction only and 25% in the alternative explanation 
group) answered this question correctly (i.e. that the storeroom was empty before 
the fire), whereas 86% of the no correction group correctly responded that oil 
paint and gas cylinders were in the storeroom before the fire. This is perhaps 
unsurprising: The correct answer for the no-correction condition (“paint and gas 
cylinders”) was more salient and unambiguous than the correct answer for the 
other two conditions (“The storage closet was empty before the fire”). 
2.9. Discussion 
The results for Experiments 1A and 1B suggest that both open- and 
closed-ended questions can successfully be used in online experiments with 
Amazon Mechanical Turk to measure differences in references to misinformation 
in a standard continued influence experiment. There was a clear continued 
influence effect of misinformation in all conditions of both experiments - a 
correction reduced but did not go anywhere near to eliminating, reference to 
misinformation on inference questions. In both studies references to 
(mis)information were significantly lower in the correction + alternative than in the 
no-correction condition, with correction condition between those two extremes 
(see Figure 3, Panels A and B). Although the pattern of significant results was 
slightly different (correction condition was significantly below no correction in 
Experiment 1A but not in Experiment 1B), this is consistent with the variability 
seen across experiments using the CIE, some of which have found a reduction in 
references to (mis)information following a correction (Ecker et al., 2010; Ecker et 
al., 2011a), and others of which have found no significant reduction (Johnson & 
Seifert, 1994).  
With regard to motivation, we found that the vast majority of participants 
wrote reasonable responses to open-ended questions answers and were of a 
considerable length for the question, usually typing substantially more than the 
minimum number of characters required. We found that the absolute number of 
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references to the misinformation was comparable to that found in existing 
studies. That said, the open-ended questions had to be coded by hand, and for 
participants, the median completion time was 18% longer in Experiment 1A (11 
minutes) than in Experiment 1B (9 minutes). This disparity in completion times 
only serves to emphasize that using closed-ended questions streamlines the 
data collection process compared to open-ended questions.  
Taken as a whole, these findings show that reasonably complex 
experimental tasks that traditionally require participants to construct written 
responses can be implemented online either using the same type of open-ended 
questions or using comparable closed-ended questions. 
2.10. Overview of Experiments 2A and 2B 
The results of Experiments 1A and 1B are promising with regard to using 
open-ended questions in online research in general, and to examine phenomena 
such as the continued influence effect specifically. However, they had some 
limitations. The most salient limitation was in the sample size. Although the 
number of participants in each condition was comparable to those in many lab-
based studies of the continued influence effect, the samples sizes were small. 
One of the advantages of using web-based procedures is that it is relatively 
straightforward to recruit large numbers of participants, so in Experiments 2A and 
2B we replicated the key conditions of the previous studies with twice as many 
participants. We also pre-registered the method, directional hypotheses, and 
analysis plan (including planned analyses, data stopping rule, and exclusion 
criteria) prior to data collection; this information can be found at 
https://osf.io/cte3g/.  
We also used this opportunity to include a second baseline condition. 
Several continued influence effect experiments have included control conditions 
of some form that make it possible to see whether references to the cause 
suggested by the misinformation following its correction are not only greater than 
zero but greater than the references to the same cause if the misinformation is 
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never presented. In this study, we did not believe that such a condition would be 
very informative because the strictness of the coding criteria meant that it would 
be unlikely that participants would spontaneously suggest paint or gas cylinders 
as contributing to the fire.10   
Instead, Experiments 2A and 2B included a more directly comparable 
control group for whom a correction was presented without initial target 
misinformation. According to the mental-model-updating account of the continued 
influence effect, event information is integrated into a mental model that is 
updated when new information becomes available. Corrections may be poorly 
encoded or retrieved because they threaten the model’s internal coherence 
(Ecker et al., 2010; Johnson & Seifert, 1994a; Johnson-Laird, 1980). If the 
continued influence effect arises because of a mental-model updating failure then 
presenting the misinformation only as part of a correction should not result in a 
continued influence effect because there will not be an opportunity to develop a 
mental-model involving misinformation. However, if participants continue to refer 
to misinformation for more superficial reasons (e.g. the cause presented in the 
misinformation is available in memory and is recalled without the context of it 
being corrected) then presenting the misinformation as part of the correction 
should lead to a comparable CIE to other conditions. 
In these studies, we repeated the no-correction and correction conditions 
from Experiments 1A and 1B. In place of the correction + alternative explanation 
condition we had the no-mention condition, which was the same as the correction 
condition except we replaced the target (mis)information with a filler statement 
(“Message 6 - 4:30 a.m. Message received from Police Investigator Lucas saying 
that they have urged local residents to keep their windows and doors shut”). The 
wording of the correction message for this condition stated “a closet reportedly 
containing cans of oil paint and gas cylinders had actually been empty before the 
                                            
10
 There is also a conceptual issue about whether references to the cause presented in 
the misinformation should be compared across correction and no-mention condition. In the 
former, the correction rules out the cause; in the latter, the cause is still possible. 
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fire” rather than referring to “the closet” so that the participants did not think they 
had missed some earlier information. 
Beyond this, the general setup for Experiments 2A and 2B were the same 
as for Experiments 1A and 1B except for the following: We included an attention 
check (which appeared immediately after initial instructions and immediately 
before the warehouse fire report was presented) that tested participants’ 
comprehension of the instructions via three multiple-choice questions. 
Participants were not excluded but were not allowed to proceed to the main 
experiment until they answered all three questions correctly, consistent with 
Crump et al.’s (2013) recommendations. As Adobe Flash, which we used for 
Experiment 1A and 1B, is being deprecated and is increasingly hard to use for 
web-based research, we implemented Experiments 2A and 2B using Qualtrics, 
which led to some superficial changes to the implementation. Most notable was 
that the point-allocation method for closed-ended inference questions required 
participants to type numbers of points to allocate, rather than adjusting the values 
using buttons. The sample size was also doubled in the second set of 
experiments11.  
2.11. Experiment 2A: Method 
2.11.1. Participants  
One-hundred and fifty-seven U.S. and U.K. based (66 female, aged 
between 18 and 64, M = 33.98, SD = 10.57) were recruited from AMT12. 
                                            
11
 Experiments 2A and 2B were actually conducted after the remaining experiments 
reported in this thesis. This is why the instructional attention checks used in these experiments 
differ to those used in experiments reported subsequently.  
12
 Three of these participants were recruited from Prolific Academic. Data was collected 
from 159 participants but two participants were excluded because they gave nonsense answers 
to the questions (e.g. “because the wind is blow, love is fall, I think it is very interesting”).  
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Participants took 16 minutes on average to complete the experiment and were 
paid $1.2513.  
2.11.2. Design and Procedure  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of 3 experimental conditions: 
misinformation + no correction (n = 52), misinformation + correction (n = 52), or 
no misinformation + correction (n = 53).  
 
                                            
13
 The modal completion time in Experiments 1 and 2 was below 10 minutes so the fee 
was reduced so that participants were paid the equivalent of the federal minimum wage in the 
U.S. ($7.25).   
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Figure 5 Effect of correction information on the number of (A) references to 
target (mis)information in Experiment 2A; (B) reference to target 
(mis)information in Experiment 2B; (C) accurately recalled factual details in 
Experiment 2A; (D) accurately recalled facts in Experiment 2B. Error bars 
represent 95% confidence interval of the mean. Brackets represent Tukey 
multiple comparison tests when the omnibus test was significant. Dashed lines 
represent means for restricted sample of participants who did not recall the 
critical information.  
 
 
Figure 807 Schematic diagram depicting experimental design in Experiment 
3Figure 808 Effect of correction information on the number of (A) references to 
target (mis)information in Experiment 2A (B) reference to target (mis)information 
in Experiment 2B (C) accurately recalled factual details in Experiment 2A (D) 
accurately recalled facts in Experiment 2B. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence interval of the mean. Brackets represent Tukey multiple comparison 
tests when the omnibus test was significant. Dashed lines represent means for 
restricted sample of participants who did not recall the critical information.  
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2.12. Results  
Inter-coder reliability. Participants’ responses to inference, factual, and 
critical information recall questions and were coded by one trained coder and 
10% (N = 16) of responses were independently coded by a second trained 
coder. Inter-rater agreement was 1 and Cohen’s K = 1±0, indicating, 
surprisingly, perfect agreement between coders.   
2.12.1. Inference scores  
Participants produced a similar number of references to target 
(mis)information across correction information conditions (Fig. 5, Panel A), 
and the omnibus test was not significant, F (2, 154) = 0.62, p = 0.54,   
  = .01 
[.00, .05]. Unlike Experiment 1A, a correction did not significantly reduce the 
number of references to target (mis)information relative to a control group who 
did not receive a correction. Moreover, participants who were not presented 
with initial misinformation but did receive a correction message made a similar 
number of misinformation references as participants who were first exposed 
to misinformation.  
2.12.2. Recall accuracy scores 
Participants’ ability to accurately recall details from the report differed 
across correction information conditions (Fig. 5, Panel C), F (2, 154) = 8.12, p 
<.001,   
  = .10 [.02, .18]. Tukey’s test of multiple comparisons revealed that 
the group who received a correction without initial misinformation recalled 
significantly fewer details from the report than the group who saw uncorrected 
misinformation, while the other differences were non-significant, p’s > .05.  
2.12.3. Response quality  
Participants wrote between 48-69% more on average than the minimum 
required 25 characters in response to inference (M = 80.76, SD = 56.38), 
factual (M = 48.15, SD = 24.86), and correction recall questions (M = 75.56, 
SD = 47.05). There was a positive correlation between time taken to complete 
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the study and number of characters written, r (155) = .34, p < .0001, showing 
that participants who took longer wrote more.  
2.13. Experiment 2B: Method 
2.13.1. Participants  
One-hundred and sixty-six US and UK based (66 female, aged 
between 18 and 62, M = 35.04, SD = 10.36) participants were recruited from 
AMT14.  Participants were paid $1.25; the average completion time was 13 
minutes. 
2.13.2. Design and Procedure  
Experiment 2B used the same high-level design and procedure as 
Experiment 2A. Responses were closed-ended and responses were made in 
the same way as Experiment 1B. Participants were randomly assigned to one 
of 3 experimental conditions: misinformation + no correction (n = 54), 
misinformation + correction (n = 56), or no misinformation + correction (n = 
56). 
2.14. Results 
2.14.1. Inference scores  
There was a significant effect of correction information on references to 
target (mis)information for closed-ended measures (Fig. 5, Panel B), F (2, 
163) = 26.90, p < .001,   
   = .25 [.14, .35]. Tukey adjusted multiple 
comparisons further revealed that the group exposed to misinformation and its 
correction, and the group who saw only the correction without initial 
misinformation, resulted in significantly fewer references to target 
                                            
14
 The recruited number of participants differed from the stopping rule specified in the 
pre-registration. In total 168 participants were recruited for the closed-ended condition due to 
an error. Ultimately, we decided to include the extra participants in the analysis rather exclude 
this data. However, responses from two participants were excluded; one because their 
participant took the HIT twice and another because they provided nonsense answers to the 
open-ended questions at the end of the study.  
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(mis)information than the uncorrected misinformation condition. The two 
groups who received correction information did not significantly differ. 
2.14.2. Recall accuracy scores 
Participants’ responses to factual questions also showed a significant 
effect of condition (Fig. 5, Panel D), F (2, 163) = 4.70, p =.01,   
  = .05 [.00, 
.13. Tukey’s tests revealed that the factual responses from participants in the 
condition featuring a correction without initial misinformation were significantly 
lower than the group who saw uncorrected misinformation. The other 
differences were not significant (p’s > .1).  A closer inspection of the individual 
answers revealed that incorrect responses for the no misinformation + 
correction group were mainly attributable to the question asking about the 
contents of the closet before the fire. 
2.14.3. Dropout analysis  
Of the 375 people who started the study only 323 fully completed it 
(dropout rate 13%). Of those who completed the study 4 (1.23%) were 
excluded prior to analysis because they gave nonsense open-ended 
responses (e.g. “ 21st-century fox, the biggest movie in theatre”). The majority 
of participants who dropped out did so immediately after entering their worker 
ID and before being assigned to a condition (41%). Of the remaining dropout 
participants who were assigned to a condition 27% were assigned to one of 
the open-ended conditions and dropped out during the first question block. A 
further 16% were assigned to one of the closed-ended conditions and 
dropped out when asked to answer the open-ended critical information recall 
questions. The remaining 14% were assigned to a closed-ended condition 
and dropped out as soon as they reached the first question block. The 
dropout breakdown suggests that many people dropped out because they 
were unhappy about having to give open-ended responses. Some participants 
who were assigned to closed-ended conditions dropped out when faced with 
open-ended questions despite the fact that the progress bar showed that they 
had almost completed the study.  
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2.15. Discussion 
Experiments 2A and 2B again showed clear evidence of a continued 
influence effect. As in Experiments 1A and 1B, participants continued to refer 
to misinformation after it had been corrected. As with the previous two 
experiments, the effects of a correction differed slightly across conditions. 
This time the reduction in references to (mis)information was significant for 
the closed-ended questions, but not for the open-ended questions. As noted 
earlier, this is consistent with findings that a correction sometimes reduces 
references to misinformation relative to no correction, and sometimes does 
not (e.g. Ecker et al., 2010). 
Experiments 2A and 2B also included a novel control condition in which 
participants were not exposed to initial misinformation but were exposed to its 
correction. Contrary to expectations, the new condition resulted in a 
statistically equivalent number of references to target (mis)information as the 
group who were exposed to both misinformation and its correction. This 
finding suggests that the continued influence effect might not reflect a model-
updating failure, but rather, a decontextualized recall process.  
2.16. General Discussion 
Four experiments examined the feasibility of collecting data on the 
continued influence effect online, comparing the efficacy of using traditional 
open-ended questions versus adapting to use closed-ended questions. For 
both types of elicitation procedure, we observed clear continued influence 
effects: Following an unambiguous correction of earlier misinformation, 
participants continued to refer to the misinformation when answering 
inferential questions. As such, these studies provide clear evidence that both 
open-ended and closed-ended questions can be used in online experiments. 
2.16.1. The continued influence effect 
Across all four studies, we found that participants continued to use 
misinformation that had been subsequently corrected. This occurred even 
though a majority of participants recalled the correction. We found mixed 
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results when examining whether a correction had any effect at all in reducing 
references to misinformation. Experiments using similar designs have both 
found (Ecker, Lewandowsky, & Tang, 2010; Ecker, Lewandowsky, & Apai, 
2011) and failed to find (Johnson & Seifert, 1994), an effect of a correction. 
Overall, we found limited evidence for an effect of a correction for the open-
ended questions, but substantial evidence for an effect of a correction using 
closed-ended questions. For open-ended questions, it appears that any effect 
of a correction on reference to misinformation - at least using this scenario - is 
relatively small, and would be hard to detect consistently using the small 
sample sizes that have traditionally been used in this area. This may explain 
the variability in findings in the literature. 
A correction with an alternative explanation appeared (at least 
numerically) to be more effective in reducing reliance on misinformation than 
a correction alone. Furthermore, given that Experiment 1B’s results were 
actually more consistent with the original finding (Johnson & Seifert, 1994), 
the differences between past and present work are most likely unsystematic 
and therefore unrelated to the online testing environment or question type. 
Finally, with regard to the main results, in Experiments 2A and 2B we 
found using a novel condition, that misinformation which was only presented 
as part of a correction had as much of a continuing influence effect as 
misinformation presented early in a series of statements and only later 
corrected. This has both theoretical and practical implications. Theoretically, it 
suggests that - under some circumstances - the CIE may not be the result of 
participants’ unwillingness to give up an existing mental model without an 
alternative explanation (U. Ecker, Lewandowsky, & Apai, 2011; U. Ecker, 
Lewandowsky, Swire, et al., 2011; Johnson & Seifert, 1994). Instead, it might 
be that participants search their memory for possible causes when asked 
inferential questions, but fail to retrieve the information correcting the 
misinformation. 
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2.16.2. Open and closed questions and the CIE 
The pattern of results in response to inference questions was 
qualitatively very similar across both open and closed-ended questions. This 
finding is particularly interesting in light of the fact that responses to open and 
closed questions might be supported by different underlying retrieval 
processes (Fisher, Brewer, & Mitchell, 2009; Ozuru et al., 2013; Shapiro, 
2006). Crucially, the response options used in Experiments 1B and 2B 
required participants to make a more considered judgment than multiple-
choice or yes/no questions, which may have encouraged recall rather than a 
familiarity-based heuristic.  It is also interesting that participants still referred 
to the incorrect misinformation despite the fact there was another response 
option that was consistent with the report, although not explicitly stated.  
Another important observation was that there was an effect of 
correction information on responses to closed factual questions but not open 
questions. The difference between conditions is significant because it was 
partly attributable to a question which probed participants’ verbatim memory 
about the correction. Many participants in both conditions featuring a 
correction answered this question incorrectly despite the fact that options 
clearly distinguished between the correct and incorrect answers, given what 
participants had read. This question asked what the contents of the closet 
was before the fire so it not hard to see why participants who have continued 
to rely on corrected misinformation might answer this question incorrectly. The 
fact that there were differences between conditions highlights the importance 
of carefully wording questions and responses in order to avoid bias. 
It is also worth noting that floor effects were not observed (i.e. 
misinformation was still influential for both groups that received a correction) 
despite the fact the current study did not include a distractor task and 
participants answered inference questions directly after reading the news 
report (so theoretically should have better memory for the report details).  
A brief note on the use of closed-ended questions and response 
alternatives: there is the possibility that presenting a closed-list of options 
reminded participants of the arson materials explanation and inhibited 
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responses consistent with the oil paint and gas cylinders’ explanation. The 
closed-list of options which repeated the misinformation could have increased 
its familiarity and made it more likely to be accepted as true (e.g. Ecker et al., 
2011b). For the group that received a simple correction the other options had 
not been explicitly stated in the story. Participants may not have fully read or 
understood the question block instructions and therefore perceived the task 
as choosing the option that appeared in the story, irrespective of the 
correction. In contrast, participants in the alternative explanation group were 
able to better detect the discrepancy between the misinformation and its 
correction because of the option alluding to arson materials. Although the 
response alternatives provided a plausible response that was consistent with 
the details of the fire story, there were no options that made it possible to rule 
out that participants just do not consider the correction when responding. The 
response alternatives provided forced participants to choose from four 
explanations, which may have not reflected participants’ understanding of the 
event, but nonetheless was the option that was most consistent with what 
participants had read. This explanation is also consistent with previous 
studies showing that the response options chosen by the researcher can be 
used by the participants to infer which information the participant considers 
relevant (Schwarz et al., 1985, Schwarz et al., 1991).  
2.16.3. Open and closed-ended questions in web-based research 
As well as looking directly at the continued influence effect, we also 
examined the extent to which participants recruited via Amazon Mechanical 
Turk could provide high-quality data from open-ended questions. We found 
high levels of diligence - participants typed much more than required, in order 
to give full answers to the questions, spent more time reading statements than 
required, and - with a small number of exceptions - engaged well with the task 
and attempted to answer the questions set. 
We found that drop-out increased where participants had to give open-
ended responses. This may suggest that some participants dislike typing 
open-ended responses, to the extent that they choose not to participate. (It 
could be that participants find it too much effort, or that they do not feel 
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confident giving written answers, or that it feels more personal having to type 
an answer oneself.) Alternatively, it may be that some participants because of 
the device they are using would struggle to provide open-ended responses, 
and so drop out when faced with open-ended questions. Either way, it is 
striking that we had over 4% of participants in Experiment 2B who read all the 
statements, and gave answers for all the closed-ended questions, but 
dropped out in the final few questions when asked to type their response for 
the final two critical information awareness questions. There are ethical 
implications of having participants spend ten minutes on a task before 
dropping out, so the requirement for typed answers should be presented 
prominently before participants begin the experiment. 
We found that participants’ recall of the correction to the misinformation 
was worse than in previous lab-based studies. We found that only a little over 
half the participants across conditions in our studies correctly reported the 
correction when prompted. This figure is poor when compared to 95% 
(correction only) and 75% (alternative explanation) found in Johnson and 
Seifert’s (1994; Exp 3A) laboratory-based experiment. It is possible that this is 
the result of poor attention and recall of the correction, but we believe it is 
more likely that it is a response issue where participants had retained the 
information but did not realise that the questions was asking them to report it 
when asked about whether they were aware of any inconsistencies or 
corrections. (In other unpublished research, we have found that simply 
labelling the relevant statement “Correction:” greatly increased participants’ 
reference to it when asked about any corrections.) Although this did not affect 
the continued influence effect, in future research we would recommend 
making instructions around the correction-awareness question particularly 
clear and explicit. This advice would, we imagine, generalise to any questions 
which may be ambiguous, and which require a precise answer. 
In choosing whether to use open-ended questions or to adapt them to 
closed-ended questions for use online, there are several pros and cons to 
weigh up. Open-ended questions allow a consistency of methodology with 
traditional lab-based approaches - meaning there is no risk of participants 
switching to using different strategies or processes as they might with closed 
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questions. We have shown that participants generally engage well and give 
good responses to open-ended questions. It is also much easier to spot and 
exclude participants who respond with minimal effort, as their written answers 
tend to be nonsense or copied and pasted from elsewhere. For closed-ended 
responses, attention or consistency checks or other measures of participant 
engagement are more likely to be necessary. That said, closed-ended 
questions are, we have found, substantially faster to complete, meaning 
researchers on a budget could test more participants or ask more questions, 
they require no time to manually code, participants are less likely to drop out 
with them, and - at least in the area of research used here - they provide 
comparable results to open-ended questions. 
2.17. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the continued influence effect can be added to the existing 
list of psychological findings that have been successfully replicated online. 
Data obtained online are of sufficiently high quality to examine original 
research questions and are comparable to data collected in the laboratory. 
Furthermore, the influence of misinformation can be examined using closed-
ended questions with direct choices between options. Nevertheless, as with 
any methodological tools researchers should proceed with caution and ensure 
that sufficient piloting is conducted prior to extensive testing. More generally, 
the research reported here suggests that open-ended written responses can 
be collected via the web and Amazon Mechanical Turk.  
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3 Explanatory corrections to 
misinformation across multiple 
scenarios 
3.1. Chapter Overview 
As noted in the introductory chapter to this thesis, previous CIE research 
has found that two of the most effective strategies for reducing reliance on 
misinformation are to provide an explicit pre-exposure warning about the 
possibility of being misled, or provide a plausible alternative explanation for 
the corrected information (e.g. Lewandowsky et al., 2012). The combination of 
pre-exposure warnings and provision of an alternative explanation can further 
reduce the CIE but still fails to eliminate it completely15 (Ecker et al., 2010). 
This raises questions about the capacity for pre-exposure warnings and 
alternative explanations to be effective strategies for reducing the CIE in the 
real-world. An additional issue is that implementation of these strategies may 
not always be possible outside the lab. It is not often possible to provide a 
single, plausible alternative explanation to replace the misinformation. For 
instance, the claim that there is a causal link between autism and the MMR 
vaccination might have been more successfully corrected had the causes of 
autism been better understood and explained to the public (e.g. Ecker et al., 
2014). Likewise, it may be difficult to provide timely pre-exposure warnings 
about the possibility of being misled.  
Given that neither pre-exposure warnings nor alternative explanations 
fully eliminates the CIE, and that their implementation may only be possible 
on occasion, it is of practical importance to develop new strategies for 
                                            
1515
 Lewandowsky et al., (2012) also discuss a third factor – repetition of the 
correction. There is mixed evidence regarding the effectiveness of repeated corrections for 
reducing the impact of misinformation (Ecker et al., 2017; Ecker et al., 2011), so it is not 
included as a factor here.  
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reducing continued reliance on misinformation. Establishing novel strategies 
for enhancing the effectiveness of corrections to misinformation not only has 
clear implications for counter-misinformation campaigns, but also may help to 
distinguish between mental-model updating and retrieval failure accounts of 
the CIE (discussed in detail in Chapter 1 of this thesis).  
One potential strategy for reducing the CIE is to explain where or how 
misinformation initially occurred and is therefore no longer valid. There are 
three main reasons that this strategy may be effective at reducing or 
eliminating reliance on misinformation. First, experimental studies in the legal 
domain suggest that explaining why invalid information is unreliable can 
reduce its impact on later judgments (e.g. Kassin & Sommer, 1997). Second, 
there is evidence that corrections which address the conversational 
implications (i.e. that address assumptions about the intended meaning of the 
statement as opposed to the literal meaning) of contradictory statements are 
more effective than negations at reducing the CIE (Bush et al., 1994). Third, 
refutations that provide sufficient explanation to suggest updating is 
necessary increase the likelihood of text representation revisions (e.g. Rapp & 
Kendeou, 2007).  
The three experiments reported in this chapter examine whether 
explaining how misinformation occurred (e.g. unintentional error or an 
intentional lie) can enhance a correction’s effectiveness relative to a negation. 
The results of these experiments provide evidence that corrections which 
explain how misinformation occurred are no more effective at reducing the 
CIE than corrections which negate the misinformation.  These results 
demonstrate that the CIE is not a necessary consequence of the correction of 
misinformation, but instead, may be constrained to ambiguous scenarios in 
which corrections leave open the possibility that the explanation offered by 
misinformation is still valid. This finding has both practical and theoretical 
implications. Practically, it suggests that misinformation is more likely to have 
an impact when circumstances are ambiguous and corrections do not 
sufficiently invalidate misinformation explanation. Theoretically, the findings 
suggest two things: First, that corrections do not necessarily have to fill the 
explanatory gap left by invalidating misinformation with an alternative 
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explanation (see Chapter 1 for further discussion of alternative explanations 
and Chapter 2 for experimental evidence that alternative explanations do not 
eliminate the CIE); Second, that corrections which address the conversational 
or literal implications of contradictory information are equally effective. These 
findings also suggest that corrections that rule out the causal explanation 
offered by misinformation can substantially attenuate the CIE.   
3.2. Introduction 
The CIE has proved difficult to eliminate (Ecker et al., 2014; 
Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Seifert, 2002, 2014). Continued influence studies 
have invariably found that corrections to misinformation reduce but rarely 
eliminate the influence of misinformation completely (see also the results 
reported in Chapter 2). In a typical CIE experiment, participants read a 
description of an unfolding event and then answer a series of causal inference 
questions about the scenario. A common scenario presented to participants 
involves a fire at a stationery warehouse in which initial misinformation implies 
that carelessly stored oil paint and gas cylinders are a likely cause of the fire 
(Johnson & Seifert, 1994; Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 1988). Participants for 
whom misinformation is later corrected (i.e. there were no oil paints and gas 
cylinders present) often continue to use the corrected information to answer 
subsequent causal inference questions (e.g. what could have caused the 
explosions?).  
Previous CIE studies have identified that two of the most effective 
strategies for reducing the CIE are to provide pre-exposure warnings about 
the possibility of being misled or provide a plausible alternative explanation for 
the misinformation (e.g. Ecker et al., 2011a; Ecker et al., 2010; Johnson & 
Seifert, 1994), 2). The CIE can be further reduced – but not eliminated – by 
combining these strategies (Ecker et al., 2010). Given that it may not always 
be possible to provide a single plausible causal alternative explanation, and 
that it may be difficult to provide timely pre-exposure warnings, it is necessary 
to establish other means of reducing or eliminating the CIE.  
One reason that corrections do not eliminate reliance on 
misinformation in CIE studies could be that laboratory implementations of 
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corrections do not correspond with the types of corrections that people 
encounter in everyday life. Continued influence experiments are usually 
necessarily sparse in the information they present and participants intrinsically 
have the opportunity to construct their own interpretations from the 
information presented. One potential account of the CIE is that it occurs in 
lab-based scenarios because participants have no reason to place more 
weight in the correction than on misinformation. This is because they do not 
know why erroneous information was initially presented nor what led to its 
correction. For instance, the correction used in the warehouse fire story 
asserts that the closet reportedly containing flammable liquids was actually 
empty before the fire, but does not explain why someone thought flammable 
liquids were there in the first place, and then changed their mind (e.g. 
Johnson & Seifert, 1994). When people encounter corrections in the real-
world they are often presented with much richer information and usually 
receive an explanation for why misinformation is incorrect. Provided that the 
misinformation is not already congruous with a pre-existing world-view or 
attitude (e.g. belief in the causal link between the MMR vaccination and 
autism may be congruous with a distrust of big pharmaceutical companies), 
offering an explanation for why misinformation is wrong should allow them to 
place more weight on the correction than on misinformation. For instance, 
learning that a scientific article was retracted because the data were 
fabricated or that a news story is corrected because of a proof-reading error 
should help people to disregard prior incorrect information in favour of newer 
information.  
Accordingly, one of the reasons that corrections may be ineffective in 
CIE studies could be that they do not provide sufficient grounds to disregard 
earlier information. The introduction to this chapter provides an overview of 
research on how attempting to remove the influence of previously presented 
information functions when participants are a) told to ignore previously 
presented information in courtroom simulation studies, b) shown further 
information that discredits earlier misinformation, and c) received an explicit 
correction to misinformation. 
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3.2.1. Instructions to disregard prior information 
Applied research examining juror decision-making has yielded similar 
findings to CIE studies. These studies often show that inadmissible evidence 
(i.e. information that cannot be presented to the jury) has a reliable impact on 
judgments or guilt and verdicts despite corrective judicial admonition (Carretta 
& Moreland, 1983; Fein, McCloskey, & Tomlinson, 1997; Kassin & Sukel, 
1997; Steblay, Hosch, Culhane, & McWethy, 2006; Thompson, Fong, & 
Rosenhan, 1981). The main factor that is thought to increase juror compliance 
with instructions to disregard inadmissible evidence is whether the judge 
provides a rationale for the inadmissibility ruling (see Steblay et al., 2006 for 
review of studies on instructions to ignore inadmissible information). For 
example, Kassin and Sommers (1997) found that mock-jurors who learned 
that a key piece of incriminating (wire-tap) evidence was inadmissible 
because it would harm the defendant’s right to due process (e.g. a taped 
confession was secured without a warrant) were more likely to convict a 
defendant than mock-jurors who were told that the evidence was unreliable 
(e.g. the tape was inaudible). Later work by Sommers and Kassin (2001) also 
showed that participants who selectively complied with judicial instructions 
(i.e. disregarding inadmissible information when it was unreliable but not when 
it violated due process) also scored high on ‘need for cognition’ - a personality 
factor reflecting an inclination toward effortful cognitive activities (Cacioppo & 
Petty, 1982).  
One explanation for these findings could be that there is a stronger 
motivation to disregard earlier information when the reasons given state why 
the information is unreliable than when they leave some room for the 
information to still be true (see Schul & Mayo, 2014, for a similar argument). 
However, it is worth noting that the instruction to disregard information 
because of due process situation differs from the CIE, because due process 
conditions do not speak to the truth or otherwise of information. If anything, 
these situations may suggest the to-be-disregarded information is still relevant 
to the judgment or decision at hand. Therefore, providing a rationale for a 
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correction that renders the misinformation irrelevant should reduce its 
influence.  
3.2.2. Discrediting evidence 
Experimental studies with a legal flavour also suggest that people more 
readily revise their beliefs about witness testimony when the witness’ 
credibility is called into question (Hatvany & Strack, 1980; Lagnado & Harvey, 
2008; Schul & Manzury, 1990; Weinberg & Baron, 1982; see Whitley, 1987, 
for meta-analysis of discredited eyewitness testimony studies). For example, 
Lagnado and Harvey (2008) found that people relied less on eyewitness 
identification testimony when they were told the witness had a ‘longstanding 
grudge’ against the suspect.  
In a similar vein, Lagnado, Fenton, and Neil (2013) found that 
discrediting an ‘intentionally deceptive’ alibi had more of an impact on guilt 
ratings than a discredit which characterised the alibi as an ‘honest mistake’. 
They compared guilt ratings for a suspect whose grandmother had provided 
alibi evidence which was subsequently discredited as an honest mistake (the 
grandmother could not remember the night in question) or as deception (there 
was evidence that the grandmother was somewhere else on the night in 
question). Guilt ratings were measured at baseline, after the alibi information, 
and again after the alibi was discredited. Findings showed that guilt ratings 
were significantly reduced immediately after the alibi information but then 
increased again after the alibi was discredited. Participants also rated the 
‘honest mistake’ alibi as more believable than the ‘deception’ alibi.  
These findings demonstrate that people are sensitive to the manner in 
which information is discredited and are more likely to revise their initial belief 
when given reason to question the initial misinformation. The findings also 
suggest that people are more likely to discount earlier information if they 
discover that deception was involved. Compared to legal reasoning studies, 
Lagnado and Harvey (2008) and Lagnado et al.’s (2013) studies were sparse 
in information, which further indicates that people make intuitive judgments 
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about the reliability of information based on how credible they perceive the 
source of that information to be.  
3.2.3. Distrust 
One way that explanations can serve to enhance the effectiveness of a 
correction is that they elicit distrust in the misinformation. One CIE study 
found that more than a third of participants in their study thought the 
correction was a cover-up for the truth when asked to describe why they 
believed there had been a correction to earlier information (Guillory & Geraci, 
2010). This suggests that distrust in the correction to misinformation could 
contribute to the ineffectiveness of corrections. Distrust could either be 
generated endogenously within the scenario - causing the participant to 
question why the source of misinformation would contradict themselves – or 
exogenously, such that the participant questions why the experimenter 
provided information that they later said was irrelevant.   
Distrust in the source of the correction could also be a reason that 
negation of misinformation is insufficient to eliminate its influence (e.g. 
Johnson & Seifert, 1994). Guillory and Geraci (2013) tested this idea by 
varying the credibility of the source of the correction. They gave participants a 
scenario in which the misinformation alleged that a politician running for re-
election had accepted a bribe. This information was subsequently corrected 
by sources that varied in terms of their trustworthiness (i.e. willingness to 
convey accurate information) and expertise (i.e. capacity to convey accurate 
information). Unsurprisingly, findings showed that a correction was more 
effective if it was issued by a highly trustworthy source (e.g. a religious leader 
or the politician’s opponent) than when it came from a source low in 
trustworthiness (e.g. the politician’s wife). Source expertise was not sufficient 
to reduce reliance on initial misinformation.  
 Legal decision-making studies have also found that arousing 
suspicions about the reasons for introduction of misleading or inadmissible 
information can reduce its impact on later judgments. Fein, McCloskey, and 
Tomlinson (1997)  asked participants to play the role of jurors in a murder trial. 
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Prior to reading the trial transcript participants read a (fictional) newspaper 
article about the murder that provided evidence against the suspect. One 
group also read a newspaper article in which the defendant’s attorney called 
into question the press’ motives for printing incriminating information. All of the 
groups then indicated whether or not they would convict the defendant. 
Findings showed that participants who were led to be suspicious16 about the 
introduction of pre-trial publicity information were no more likely to convict the 
defendant, and substantially less confident in the defendant’s guilt, than 
participants who did not receive pre-trial publicity. These results were also 
replicated for a case in which a key witness’ testimony was ruled inadmissible. 
Together these findings suggest that the CIE could be reduced when the 
correction provides a reason to disbelieve the misinformation by calling into 
question its relevance and validity.  
3.2.4. Detailed refutations 
Research on detailed refutations in text comprehension is another 
strand of research that suggests explanations for why misinformation is wrong 
might reduce its continuing impact. In text comprehension research, refutation 
texts include statements that explicitly refute incorrect beliefs and explain 
correct principles. For instance, Rapp and Kendeou (2007) presented 
participants with short stories that included behavioural evidence for particular 
traits (e.g. that the protagonist was a messy person), which was either 
supported with an additional trait statement, refuted in a non-explanatory way 
as incorrect, or refuted with an explanation of why an incorrect interpretation 
of the behavioural evidence was possible. Findings showed that the 
explanation-based refutations resulted in more successful revision than the 
non-explanatory counterpart. In a similar vein, Swire, Ecker, and 
Lewandowsky (2017) found that level of explanatory detail facilitates belief 
change following exposure to myths. Participants read myths – such as “Liars 
sometimes give themselves away by physical ‘tells’ such as looking to the 
                                            
16
 The authors define suspicion as ‘actively entertaining multiple, plausible rival, 
hypotheses about the motives underlying behaviour and considering the notion that the 
person is trying to hide something that has the potential to discredit the apparent meaning of 
the behaviour’ (p. 1217). 
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right or not looking you in the eye” – as well as facts of unclear veracity. Myths 
were subsequently corrected whilst the facts were affirmed with varying 
degrees of explanatory detail provided in corrections. Findings showed that 
providing a greater amount of explanatory detail promoted more sustained 
belief change over a three-week period than non-explanatory corrective 
information. These findings collectively suggest that explanations for why 
misinformation is incorrect may reduce or eliminate the CIE by encouraging 
deeper and more elaborate processing of the correction which later enhances 
strategic retrieval of that information. 
3.2.5. Conversational implications 
Another way that corrections to misinformation can be improved is if 
they address the conversational implications of the contradiction between 
misinformation and a correction. The CIE may be understood by the 
pragmatic inferences people draw about the conversational implications of 
initial misinformation (Grice, 1975; Seifert, 2002, 2014). Grice’s (1975) 
account of conversational logic suggests that corrections ought to be 
challenging for our interpretation of human generated information. On this 
view, the contradiction may be poorly understood when the correction to 
misinformation only addresses the literal content of misinformation (e.g. there 
were no flammable liquids on the premises) and not the conversational 
implications of misinformation (i.e. why was the information conveyed in the 
first place). More specifically, the Gricean perspective asserts that 
conversational conventions are important for assessing the truth (maxim of 
quality) and relevance (maxim of relation) of statements. Therefore, 
corrections that do not address the maxims of relation and quality may be 
particularly difficult for people to understand. This is because people make 
inferences that consider pragmatic information as well as logic. Logically, 
when a statement is later corrected, the original statement is expected to be 
disregarded and replaced with an updated version of events. Pragmatically, 
the original statement and its correction usually have the same status – they 
are the reported beliefs of an individual.  
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Without a compelling justification for the original error, participants can 
come up with plausible explanations that give the original misinformation more 
weight. For instance, people might entertain the possibility that the person 
issuing the correction was paid off or that a superior told them to lie in issuing 
the correction because the misinformation made someone look bad. There 
may also be a meta-narrative issue, in which the participants question why the 
experimenter presented incorrect information given they know it is wrong 
which renders the information relevant in the eyes of the participant (Bless, 
Strack, & Schwarz, 1993; Schwarz, 2014). Corrections may therefore be 
problematic because they imply that the speaker believed that both the 
misinformation and its correction are true and accurate. Corrections which 
violate conversational principles and cause problems for interpretation thereby 
reinforce the validity of the misinformation. Several experimental studies have 
demonstrated the impact of conversational conventions on reasoning (Igou & 
Bless, 2003, 2005; Krosnick, Li, & Lehman, 1990; Schwarz, Strack, Hilton, & 
Naderer, 1991; Tetlock, Lerner, & Boettger, 1996). 
There is also evidence from studies adopting the CIE approach that 
addressing the conversational implications of a correction can reduce reliance 
on misinformation. Bush, Johnson, and Seifert (1994) examined whether 
corrections that addressed the conversational implications of the contradiction 
reduced reliance on misinformation more than a correction that addressed 
only the literal implications. Participants read the warehouse fire scenario 
(described earlier) and either received a correction that explained why 
misinformation was uninformative (“the storeroom had actually contained cans 
of coffee and soda canisters and not flammable liquids”) or no longer relevant 
(“a delivery of paint and gas cylinders was expected but never arrived)”17. 
Findings showed that both types of ‘explanatory corrections’ were more 
effective at reducing the impact of misinformation when compared to a simple 
negation. Interestingly, however, Bush et al., also found that ruling out the 
involvement of the misinformation (“there was clear evidence that no paint or 
gas were ever on the premises”), without providing an explanation, fared 
                                            
17
 It may be worth noting that both explanations could be classed as ‘poor quality 
information’. These explanations instead appear to contrast misinterpretation of the situation 
and a communicative error. 
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worse than a correction on its own (but see our results below). These findings 
further indicate that the person issuing the correction must explain why the 
original information should no longer be believed in order to increase the 
chances the correction is understood. 
3.3. Overview of Experiments 
The findings discussed in the introduction to this chapter suggest that 
providing an explanation for how the misinformation initially occurred could 
reduce its post-correction influence. The three experiments reported in this 
chapter were designed to examine whether corrections that explain why 
misinformation is incorrect are more effective at reducing the CIE than a 
correction which negates misinformation. Two types of explanatory 
corrections were used in the experiments reported here18. The first explained 
misinformation as an (unintentional) error and the second explained 
misinformation as an (intentional) lie. These explanations should address the 
conversational implications of the contradiction between misinformation and 
the correction and help participants to place more weight in the correction. 
The explanatory corrections used in the present set of experiments are 
modelled on situations in which testimony is discredited by showing that the 
witness is a liar or had made a misidentification. All three experiments used a 
variant of the CIE task in which information about a description of an unfolding 
event is presented as a series of discrete messages. The experiments were 
performed both online (see Chapter 2 introduction for discussion of 
conducting web-based CIE experiments) and in the laboratory.  
3.4. Experiment 3 
In light of the literature discussed in the introduction to this chapter, and 
the results of the experiments reported in Chapter 2 of this thesis, there were 
two main predictions. First, that a correction would reduce, but not eliminate, 
reference to target (mis)information compared to no correction. That is, the 
number of references to target (mis)information would be significantly lower in 
                                            
18
 The two types of explanations used in these experiments represent an 
infinitesimally small subset of the possible explanations one could reasonably provide.   
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corrected misinformation groups than the uncorrected group, but would still be 
greater than zero. Second, a correction would more effectively reduce 
reliance on misinformation when the correction compellingly explains where 
the target (mis)information originated. This means that the number of 
references to target (mis)information will be significantly lower in the 
explanatory correction groups than the non-explanatory correction group.  
There was also a tentative prediction that corrections in the two 
explanatory conditions would differ in terms of their scope for reducing the 
CIE. It was expected that people would be more sensitive to a correction 
explained as a lie than a correction explained as an error. This tentative 
prediction is made on the basis of work showing that human beings are social 
animals who are well prepared to detect deception (Schul, Mayo, & Burnstein, 
2004). Furthermore, as noted earlier, work on discrediting alibi testimony has 
shown that people find an intentionally deceptive alibi less believable than one 
that was an honest mistake (Lagnado et al., 2011). Moreover, some 
evolutionary psychologists have argued that the ability to detect dishonesty 
facilitates reasoning in social contexts (e.g. Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Hartwig 
& Bond, 2011). Following this line of reasoning, correcting a proven lie might 
be more effective than correcting an inadvertent error. 
3.5. Method 
3.5.1. Participants  
A power analysis indicated a minimum of 280 participants would be 
required to detect a medium-sized effect (f = 0.25, 1- β = 0.95, α = 0.05). In 
total 365 U.S. based (169 female, 196 male, Mage = 39.38, aged between 21 
and 72) participants were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk. Only 
participants with a human intelligence task (HIT) approval rating great than, or 
equal to 99%, were recruited for the experiment in order to further safeguard 
against poor quality data. More participants than required were initially 
recruited in anticipation that it would be necessary to exclude a substantial 
number of participants. Of this number, 126 (35%) participants failed an 
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attention check question included in the inference and recall question block19. 
The participants who failed the attention check question were ultimately not 
excluded because their exclusion did not change the results. Participants 
were paid $1.50 (approx. £1.07) and took an average of 18 minutes to 
complete the study.    
3.5.2. Design  
The effect of correction information on reference to target 
(mis)information was assessed between-groups; participants were randomly 
assigned to either the no correction (n = 95), correction (n = 95), correction + 
error explanation (n = 79), or correction + lie explanation (n = 96) groups.20 
3.5.3. Stimuli 
The stimuli were generated using Qualtrics (Qualtrics, Provo, UT). 
Figure 6 illustrates the content of the messages and demonstrates how they 
were presented to participants in Experiment 3. Participants read one of four 
versions of a fictional news report about a fire at a stationery warehouse 
consisting of 12 individually presented statements. The stimuli were modified 
from those used in previous research (Guillory & Geraci, 2010; Johnson & 
Seifert, 1994; Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 1988), and from the experiments 
reported in Chapter 2 (Experiments 1A and 1B, 2A and 2B), in the following 
ways. First, the number of messages was reduced from 15 to 12 to streamline 
the task for web-based testing. Reducing the number of messages may also 
increase the probability that participants would recall the correction and 
decrease the possibility that people use misinformation to answer the 
inference questions because they do not remember the correction but do 
remember the misinformation. Second, the report was presented in the style 
of a series ‘Tweets’ from the social media platform Twitter (as in Hardwicke, 
2016). The ‘Tweets’ originated from the same fictional news outlet, called 
                                            
19
 This question was randomly interspersed in the inference and factual recall 
question block. The question asked participants to indicate approximately how many Twitter 
messages they had just read and in parentheses prompted participants to choose the option 
‘more than 40’. Participants would then be excluded on the basis that they did not follow the 
instructions in parentheses.  
20
 Group sizes were unequal to a programming error in Qualtrics. 
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“news now” and each message was no longer than 140 characters (see 
Figure 7). The ‘Twitter’ presentation format was used in order to make the 
news report appear more authentic and resemble a breaking news report. The 
third modification was the additional event information presented either side of 
misinformation and the correction was re-written so that it was not congruent 
(although not incongruent) with causal explanation offered by misinformation. 
Statements such as “Three warehouse workers working overtime, have been 
taken to St. Columbus Hospital, due to smoke inhalation” were used in place 
of statements like: “Two firefighters are reported to have been taken to the 
hospital as a result of breathing toxic fumes that built up in the area in which 
they were working”. The reason for this change to the stimuli was to avoid 
participants reasoning that ‘toxic fumes’ would not have been present if oil 
paint and gas cylinders were not involved. Using misinformation congruent 
statements to make up the rest of the scenario could be one reason that some 
studies have found a strong continued reliance on misinformation (e.g. 
Johnson & Seifert, 1994). There was one statement that was congruent with 
the explanation that oil paint and gas cylinders were causally involved in the 
fire (“Thick, oily smoke + sheets of flames hinder firefighters’ efforts, intense 
heat has made the fire difficult to bring under control”). This statement was not 
changed so that there was at least some opportunity for participants to 
develop a model in which the misinformation provided a causal explanation. 
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Figure 6 Schematic diagram depicting experimental design in Experiment 3 
 
Figure 1033 Example Misinformation ‘Tweet’ used in Experiment 3.Figure 1034 Schematic diagram 
depicting experimental design in Experiment 3 
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  In terms of the experimental manipulations, target (mis)information 
(Message 5) stated that carelessly stored oil paint and pressurized gas 
cylinders were present in a storeroom before the fire. This information was 
later corrected (Message 10), for the three conditions featuring a correction 
but remained uncorrected for the no correction group, who provided a 
baseline for the inference test. The no correction group instead saw a control 
statement indicating that warehouse workers taken to hospital had been 
released. The correction + error explanation group learned that the target 
(mis)information had been corrected because an employee had made an 
error and confused soda canisters and coffee cans in the storeroom for paint 
and gas (similar to Bush et al. 1994’s ‘explain quality’ condition). The 
correction + lie explanatory correction group learned that misinformation was 
incorrect because an employee had lied about the presence oil paint and gas 
cylinders in the storeroom (later studies provided a motivation for the lie that 
the employee was unhappy). The remaining (10) messages provided further 
details of the incident and were identical in all four experimental conditions.  
3.5.4. Procedure 
Participants clicked on a link in Amazon Mechanical Turk to enter the 
experimental site. They subsequently: read details about the experiment and 
gave consent to take part, they then received instructions that the study 
Figure 7 Example Misinformation ‘Tweet’ used in Experiment 3   
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explored the factors that affect people’s judgments about news reports and 
that their task was to read a brief report about an investigation into a fire and 
complete a short questionnaire about the report, and then provide 
demographic information. Participants were told they would not be able to 
backtrack and that each message would appear for a minimum of 5 seconds 
before they could move on to the next message. They then completed the first 
instructional attentional check (e.g. Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 
2009), before starting the experiment. Participants (N = 4) who did not 
respond appropriately, indicating that they had not read the instructions 
properly, were not able to complete the study and received a message 
thanking them for their time.  
After completing the first instructional attention check, participants read 
one of four versions of the warehouse fire report (depending on the condition 
they had been allocated to). The 12 messages making up the report were 
presented individually and appeared on the screen for a minimum of 5 
seconds before participants could move on to the next message. Immediately 
after reading the report, participants were taken to the questionnaire 
instruction page that informed participants that they would now see 15 
questions about the report. Questionnaire instructions made it clear to 
participants that they did not have to rely on the material presented in the 
messages to answer inference questions (see Appendix G). The 
questionnaire consisted of 16 questions: 7 inference questions, 7 factual 
recall questions, and 2 questions probing recall of critical information 
presented at Message 10 (see Appendix F). Inference and factual recall 
question blocks were intermixed and presented in a random order except the 
question probing the most likely cause of the fire, which always came last.  
Inference questions probed participants’ understanding of the news 
report (e.g. “Is there any evidence of careless management in relation to this 
fire?”), and included a question querying the most likely cause of the fire. 
Factual recall questions enquired about the literal details of the report (e.g. 
“Which hospital were the workers taken to?”). Two further questions assessed 
recall (“What was the point of the second message from Fire Chief Lucas”) 
and (“Were you aware of any corrections or contradictions in the messages 
  
 
114 
you read’), of the critical information (i.e. Message 10). Participants in all four 
conditions were able to answer the first question from the report that they 
read. The latter question, however, was only relevant to participants in 
conditions featuring a correction. Participants typed a response to each of 16 
questions in a text box, were required to use a minimum of 25 characters, and 
encouraged to answer using full sentences.  
One of the questions included in this block was the second instructional 
attention check which asked participants to indicate approximately how many 
‘Twitter’ messages they thought they had read. In parentheses the question 
then asked participants to respond with ‘more than 40’. If participants chose 
anything other than the response indicated in parentheses this was taken as 
evidence of inattention to instructions. Unlike the first instructional attention 
check participants were not immediately excluded from the study. This 
question was included as a means of excluding participants before analysis21. 
After answering this block of questions, participants were informed they would 
answer 2 more questions on the basis of what they remembered from the 
report. After completing the questionnaire participants were asked to provide 
their sex, age, and highest level of education. 
3.6. Results 
3.6.1. Coding of Responses 
Responses to three types of questions were used in the analysis. 
Participants answered the 7 inference questions on the basis of their 
understanding of the report. Responses to inference questions were coded as 
reference to target (mis)information (i.e. references to information that in most 
conditions was corrected were given a score of 1) if they explicitly stated, or 
strongly implied, that oil paint and gas cylinders caused or contributed to the 
fire and were scored 0 otherwise. This gave a minimum inference score of 0 
and maximum of 7. The factual recall questions could be answered by 
recalling the literal details of the report. Each response was coded as 1 if the 
                                            
21
 Although ultimately it was decided not to exclude these participants since excluding 
them did not change the results.  
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detail was fully or partially recalled and scored 0 if it was not accurately 
recalled. This gave a minimum recall accuracy score of 0 and maximum score 
of 7. Critical information recall scores were computed using the same criteria; 
the maximum individual critical information score was 222. An additional 
measure was computed from the factual recall which asked about the 
contents of the storeroom before the fire. Responses to this question were 
coded to examine the presence of misinformation in participants’ literal recall 
of the event information. Responses indicating that oil paint and gas cylinders 
were in the storeroom before the fire were scored 1 and were otherwise 
scored 0.   
Inter-coder reliability. Responses were coded by a trained coder. A 
second, independent judge then coded 10% of participants’ responses (n = 
36). Inter-rater agreement was 0.88 and Cohen’s Κ = 0.76±0.03, indicating a 
high level of agreement between coders, both of which are higher than the 
benchmark values of 0.7 and 0.6 (Krippendorff, 2012; Landis, & Koch, 1977), 
and there was no systematic bias between raters,    = 2.45, p = .12. 
 
Table 3 Example response coding for inference questions in Experiment 3 
Inference 
Question 
Response Scored 1 Response Scored 0 
How could the 
fire at the 
warehouse 
have been 
avoided? 
The fire at the warehouse 
could have been avoided by 
keeping accelerants and 
explosives such as pressurized 
gas and flammable paints in a 
designated contained area, per 
fire safety code 
Whether or not the fire 
could have been avoided 
would depend on whether 
the facility was compliant 
with safety regulations 
during their inspection. 
                                            
22
 Previous CIE studies refer to this measure as ‘awareness of the 
correction/retraction’. The average of the two ‘awareness’ questions is typically compared for 
conditions featuring a correction to misinformation. This approach ignores that the ‘no 
correction’ condition. Ultimately, only the first question was analysed (“What was the point of 
the second message from Fire Chief Lucas”) in order to compare recall of the message 
presented at the same serial position in each version of the report, irrespective of message 
content.  
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Figure 8 Distribution and probability density of references to target (mis)information by correction information condition in 
Experiment 3. Red points represent mean and 95% confidence interval of the mean. Dashed lines represent condition means 
after excluding participants who did not recall the critical information presented at Message 10. Lines are based on data from 25 
(no correction), 88 (just correction), 71 (correction + error), and 83 (correction + lie) participants, respectively. Brackets show 
significance of Dunnett least-square mean comparisons which control for unequal group sizes. 
 
 
Figure 1203 Proportion of references to target (mis)information by question and correction information conditionFigure 1204 
Distribution and probability density of references to target (mis)information by correction information condition in Experiment 3. 
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3.6.2. Inference Scores 
Figure 8 shows the distributional characteristics of inference scores 
across correction information conditions are shown. The no correction group 
served as an empirical baseline for interpretation of the three groups that 
received a correction to the target (mis)information. The majority of 
participants in correction groups did not refer to misinformation in response to 
any of the inference questions. All three types of correction substantially 
reduced reference to misinformation. All three types of corrections clearly 
reduced the number of references to target (mis)information relative to the 
condition where the target information was uncorrected.  
Previous CIE studies have examined differences in the number of 
references to target (mis)information between conditions using ANOVA. I 
decided that a different analytical approach was more appropriate for the 
following reasons. Inference scores – or the number of references to 
misinformation – are non-negative integer values and therefore constitute 
count data. General linear models (such as OLS regression and factorial 
ANOVA) are often used to analyse count data but may produce biased 
estimates and inferences - particularly when the data are characterised by 
excessive zeroes as is the case with the present data (Atkins & Gallop, 2007; 
Baguley, 2012). Poisson regression models are more appropriate for count 
data because they rely on a Poisson distribution rather than a normal 
distribution as their probability model (Atkins & Gallop, 2007). Zero-inflated 
Poisson (ZIP) regression is an extension that can be used to account for 
excessive zeros (i.e. cases where the participant did not make any 
misinformation references) because it directly models the zeros in the 
structural part of the model. The ZIP model therefore has two parts, a Poisson 
count model, and a logit model for predicting extra zeros. It assumes that 
there are two processes, that a participant has referred to misinformation or 
they have not. If they have referred to misinformation then it is a count 
process. In this case the count process was modelled with a negative 
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binomial model23 (Long, 1997).  
A model comparison approach was used whereby a null model 
(including only the intercept) was compared to a model that included 
correction information as a predictor. The model including correction 
information fit the data significantly better than a null model (i.e. intercept-only 
model),    (3) = 17.14, p = .000724. Dunnett’s multiple comparisons tests of 
the estimated marginal means further confirmed that all three types of 
correction (explanatory and non-explanatory) significantly reduced the number 
of references to target (mis)information (see Table 4 below). The differences 
between the three correction information conditions were not significant. 
These results show that correction information approximately halved the 
number of references to target (mis)information. The majority of the 
participants in the conditions featuring a correction did not refer to 
misinformation in response to any inference questions. Participants who did 
refer to misinformation either generally referred to it once or twice suggesting 
that participants were more likely to refer to misinformation in response to 
some questions than others (see question analysis below).  
 
Table 4 Estimated marginal means by correction information condition in 
Experiment 3 
Correction Information  Estimated marginal mean Std. error Group 
Corr. + Error 0.73 0.12 a 
Just Corr.     0.82 0.12 a 
Corr. + Lie    0.86 0.13 a 
No Corr.       2.25 0.19 b 
 
                                            
23
 Negative binomial models are appropriate when the data are overdispersed (i.e. 
the variance is greater than the mean). 
24
 The chi-square statistic represents the deviance goodness of fit test for Poisson 
regression. Deviance is a measure of how well the model fits the data or how close the model 
predictions are to the observed values. To obtain the chi-square statistic a likelihood ratio test 
comparing a null model to a saturated model is performed.   
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Note: Confidence level used: 0.95. Confidence-level adjustment: Dunnett 
method for 4 estimates. P value adjustment: Dunnett method for 6 tests. 
Significance level used: alpha = 0.05. Group represents significance of 
comparisons. Groups that share the same letter are not significantly different 
from each other and groups with different letters have significantly different 
means. 
Question analysis. The distribution (see Figure 8) of inference scores 
suggested that participants might be mostly referring to misinformation in 
response to a subset of inference questions. In order to further examine how 
participants were responding to inference questions, and whether some 
questions were more likely to elicit references to misinformation than others, 
the proportion of references to misinformation was computed as a function of 
condition and inference question. Figure 9 shows that participants mainly 
referred to misinformation in response to the question about the most likely 
cause of the fire, and to a lesser extent, the question asking how the fire could 
have been prevented. Proportionally, references to misinformation on other 
questions were relatively low for all three conditions featuring a correction. 
This suggests that some ‘types’ of questions are more likely to elicit 
references to misinformation than others which could in turn influence the 
strength and presence on the CIE. Furthermore, this analysis indicates that 
some questions are more diagnostic of a continued influence effect than 
others and the questions selected can modulate the strength of the observed 
effect.  
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Figure 9 Proportion of references to target (mis)information by question and correction information condition in 
Experiment 3    
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Correction acknowledgment. One of key claims from the CIE 
literature is that people often continue to rely on misinformation despite clearly 
understanding and recalling that the misinformation was corrected (e.g. 
Johnson & Seifert, 1994). In order to examine to extent to which this claim 
was true of the current study, the proportion of participants who correctly 
recalled the correction yet still referred to misinformation in response to at 
least one inference question was computed (see Figure 10). Responses were 
categorized as referring to misinformation if there was at least one reference 
to misinformation in response to one of the seven inference questions. A 
small majority of participants (51-53%) accurately recalled the correction and 
did not make any uncontroverted references to misinformation in response to 
any of the inference questions. A substantial minority of participants across all 
three correction information conditions (34-40%) recalled the correction and 
made at least one reference to misinformation on inference questions, and 
therefore exhibited a continuing influence of misinformation. The remaining 
participants (7-14%) did not recall the correction. Thus overall, we observed 
that a substantial proportion (around a third) of participants who received a 
correction referred to misinformation despite acknowledging that the 
information was corrected. 
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Figure 10 Proportion of participants from correction groups who recalled the correction and referred to target 
(mis)information as a function of correction information condition in Experiment 3 
 
Figure 1301 Proportion of references to presence of to oil paint and gas cylinders in storeroom before the fire 
in response to the recall question probing this knowledge in Experiment 3Figure 1302 Proportion of 
participants recalled the correction and referred to target (mis)information by correction information condition 
in Experiment 3 
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3.6.3. Recall Accuracy Scores 
The manipulation of correction information was not expected to have 
any effect on participants’ ability to accurately recall report details. Recall 
accuracy scores are also non-negative integers or count data but were not 
characterized by excessive zeros so a Poisson regression model was fit to the 
data. The model including correction information was not a significantly better 
fit for the data than the null model,    (3) = 2.36, p = .50. This means that the 
conditions’ factual recall did not differ and that the differences between 
conditions observed for inference scores can therefore not be attributed to 
overall differences in factual recall of story information.  
Misinformation mentions in recall.   Responses to the recall question 
probing factual recall of the contents of the storeroom before the fire were 
compared across correction information conditions. The no correction 
Figure 11 Proportion of references to presence of oil paint and gas cylinders 
in storeroom before the fire in response to the recall question probing this 
knowledge in Experiment 3 
 
Figure 1463 Schematic design showing the high-level design and content of 
the ‘crash’ scenario used in Experime t 4Figure 1464 Proportion of 
references to presence of to oil paint and gas cylinders in storeroom before 
the fire in response to the recall question probing this knowledge in 
Experiment 3 
 
Figure 1465 Schematic design showing the high-level design and content of 
the ‘crash’ scenario used in Experiment 4 
 
Figure 1466 Example statement from ‘Crash’ report in Experiment 4Figure 
1467 Schematic design showing the high-level design and content of the 
‘crash’ scenario used in Experi t 4Figure 1468 Proportion of references to 
presence of to oil paint and gas cylinders in storeroom before the fire in 
response to the recall question probing this knowledge in Experiment 3 
 
Figure 1469 Schematic design showing the high-level design and content of 
the ‘crash’ scenario used in Experiment 4Figure 1470 Proportion of 
references to presence of to oil paint and gas cylinders in storeroom before 
the fire in response to the recall question probing this knowledge in 
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condition was not included in this analysis in order to just compare conditions 
featuring a correction.  There was a significant association between correction 
information condition and mention of flammable substances,    (2) = 15.16, p 
< .001. Figure 11 shows the proportion of responses mentioning flammable 
substances in the storeroom by correction information condition. The 
correction + error group were less likely to incorrectly state that gas and oil 
paint had been in the storeroom before the fire than the two other corrected 
groups. This suggests that correction type can influence factual recall while 
having no differential effect on inferential use of misinformation. This may 
have implications for the mechanisms by which the CIE works.  
3.6.4. Critical Information Recall  
Two questions assessed participants’ awareness of, and ability to 
recall, the correction information (presented at Message 10). This measure is 
usually assessed to examine whether there are differences in awareness and 
recall of the correction across conditions featuring a correction. However, this 
approach does not consider whether participants in the control (no correction) 
group could accurately recall the control information shown to them at 
Message 10. In order to make this comparison, only the first question (“What 
was the point of the second message from Fire Chief Lucas”?) was analysed. 
Instead of comparing whether conditions featuring a correction differ with 
respect to awareness and recall of the correction information, the test 
performed examined whether participants in all conditions recalled critical 
information from the same serial position in the story.  
A chi-square test of independence on these data revealed a significant 
association between correction information condition and critical information 
recall,    (3) = 47.94, p < .001. This was primarily due to the low proportion of 
the no correction group (26.3%) who accurately recalled the critical 
information (i.e. that injured firefighters were released from hospital). In 
contrast over half of the participants in the groups featuring a correction 
recalled the critical correction information: correction + error (63.2%), 
correction + lie (64.5%) and correction only (71.6%). The difference in 
conditions may be explained by the difference in the salience of the critical 
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information (i.e. correction of misinformation vs. update about the firefighter’s 
injuries). The test was not significant when looking just at the conditions 
featuring a correction,    (2) = 1.62, p = .44. 
3.7. Summary  
Experiment 3 set out to test whether corrections that explain why 
misinformation is incorrect and how it occurred are more effective at reducing 
reliance on misinformation than corrections which negate misinformation 
(non-explanatory correction). Participants read a fictional report about a 
warehouse fire in which target (mis)information implied that careless storage 
of oil paint and gas cylinders were a likely cause of the fire. Later in the report 
participants in conditions featuring a correction learned that no flammable 
items were present before the fire. The explanatory groups also learned that 
misinformation occurred because of an error (an employee mistook non-
flammable liquids for flammable liquids), or because of a lie (an employee lied 
about the presence of flammable liquids in the storeroom).  
It was predicted that corrections which explained why misinformation 
was incorrect would more effectively reduce reliance on misinformation than 
non-explanatory corrections. There was also a tentative prediction that a lie 
explanation would be more effective than the error explanation. Contrary to 
predictions, there was no evidence that explanatory corrections were more 
effective than a non-explanatory correction at reducing the CIE. Explanatory 
and non-explanatory corrections to misinformation resulted in a comparable 
number of references to misinformation. There was also no difference 
between error and lie explanations in the number of post-correction 
references to misinformation.  
Explanatory and non-explanatory corrections reduced references to 
misinformation by 62% and 68% relative to the no correction condition. These 
results are consistent with previous CIE studies showing that, on average, a 
correction reduces reference to misinformation approximately by half (see 
Table 1 in Chapter 1). Findings suggest that a correction which explained that 
misinformation occurred because of an honest mistake or deception offered 
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no additional advantage in reducing references to misinformation compared to 
a non-explanatory correction. 
Experiment 3’s results are inconsistent with previous findings (Bush et 
al., 1994) showing that explanatory corrections are more effective than non-
explanatory corrections. Prior work found that explanatory corrections 
reduced reliance on misinformation by 14-20% more than corrections which 
negated misinformation. Experiment 3’s results demonstrate that a clear 
correction without an explanation can be just as effective in correcting 
misinformation as including a reason for the misinformation being presented 
initially. This occurred despite the fact that explanatory corrections should 
encourage and require further processing of the correction because there is 
more information to comprehend. It is not entirely clear why this was the case, 
but the fact that there was some information available in the correction 
condition (“no paint and gas had ever been present in the warehouse”), that 
was not available in the explanatory correction messages could have 
rendered all three corrections equally effective.  
Experiment 3’s results did show evidence of a continued influence 
effect of misinformation. The majority of participants in conditions featuring a 
correction made at least reference to misinformation despite an unambiguous 
correction. Furthermore, a sizeable proportion of the correction groups (34-
40%) made at least one reference to misinformation whilst also 
acknowledging that the misinformation had been corrected. This is a novel 
finding and is usually not reported despite being a central claim from the CIE 
literature (e.g. Johnson & Seifert, 1994). Analysis of the references to 
misinformation across individual questions also revealed that participants 
were most likely to refer to the misinformation when asked what the most 
likely cause of the fire was. This strongly suggests that corrected 
misinformation plays a role in participants’ causal understanding of the 
warehouse fire and is consistent with the mental-model updating account of 
the CIE (Johnson & Seifert, 1994; Seifert, 2002). 
One limitation of the present work, and of CIE research in general, is 
that findings are demonstrated for a single story. Those that have compared 
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across scenarios do sometimes find that the strength of the correction differs 
somewhat between scenarios (discussed in more detail in Chapter 1). 
Experiment 3’s results could therefore be scenario specific. The effect (or lack 
thereof) of explanatory and non-explanatory corrections could interact with the 
specific details of the scenario presented to participants. The particular 
scenario used could also moderate the strength of a correction which could in 
turn impact the validity and generalisability of the findings. Experiment 4’s aim 
was therefore to examine whether the effectiveness of explanatory corrections 
extended to different scenarios with the same underlying structure.  
3.8. Experiment 4 
Experiment 4 further explored the effect of explanatory corrections in 
multiple scenarios. In order to address this, Experiment 4 tested the effect of 
explanatory corrections across four different scenarios (reports). If the effect is 
robust it should extend to scenarios that have the same underlying structure 
but different content. In Experiment 4 the explanatory and non-explanatory 
corrections were also more closely matched so that they both had the same 
base correction and that the only difference was whether an explanation was 
provided. The explanatory corrections used in Experiment 3 did not include 
the information that “no paint and gas had ever been present in the 
warehouse”. This was changed in Experiment 4 to ensure that the lack of 
difference between conditions was not due to this discrepancy between the 
base correction information presented in each correction information 
condition. The scenarios used in Experiment 4 also included a statement 
providing information about potential causes of the outcome described in the 
report to allow participants to answer inferential questions, even though the 
misinformation explanation had been invalidated (see Figure 13). Unlike the 
other experiments reported in this thesis, Experiment 4 was conducted in the 
lab. The reason for this was that Experiment 4 employed a Latin-square 
design in which participants took part in all four correction information 
conditions and saw four different scenarios. This meant that the study took 
substantially longer to complete than the previous experiments reported in this 
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thesis. In order to minimise attrition and maximise attentiveness throughout, 
the study was completed in the lab.   
3.9. Method 
3.9.1. Participants  
A power analysis using a medium effect size (ƒ = .25, α = .05, 1-β = 
.95), for the effect of correction information (df = 3, k = 1, number of 
measurements = 425), indicated it would be necessary to collect data from a 
minimum of 36 participants26. In total data were collected from 37 participants 
(21 female, aged 19 to 57, M = 26.92, SD = 9.83) recruited from the City, 
University of London, subject pool (https://city.sona-systems.com/). Twenty-
one participants were paid £8 in return for participation; the remaining 
participants received course credits. Participants took 49 minutes on average 
to complete the study. 
3.9.2. Design  
Experiment 3 used a 4 x 4 Latin square experimental design (Bradley, 
1958). A Latin square is a specific randomized block design which has a 
three-way layout (Kirk, 2013). This design included two blocking variables; 
one assigned to the rows of the square (group: group 1, group 2, group 3, 
group 4) and one to the columns (event narrative: fire, crash, injury, missing 
person), and is represented in Table 5. This meant that the 4 correction 
information conditions could be tested across 4 different scenarios, by 
randomly assigning participants to 1 of 4 possible groups or rows of the 
square. Although a Latin square is similar to a three-way ANOVA, it is more 
parsimonious because it allows the effects of two blocking variables (e.g. 
group and scenario) to be isolated from the effect of correction information 
                                            
25
 Number of measures refers to the number of inference scores that were computed 
for each participant, based on the number of scenarios they read, and is required to compute 
power for a repeated measures ANOVA.  
26
 This sample size was computed to look for the main effect of correction information 
with four measurements reflecting the four different scenarios participants read. The time of 
designing the study I was not aware that there was a method of calculating a sample size for 
Latin-square designs and GPower does not include an option to compute sample sizes based 
on Latin square designs. Therefore, the sample size estimate is possibly incorrect. 
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(i.e. the treatment variable), to achieve greater power to reject the null 
hypothesis (Kirk, 2012). It is recommended that only the main effects from the 
Latin square are estimated. This is due to the fact that the square is in an 
incomplete factorial design and not all of the cells are represented. There 
were 16 cells in total in Experiment 3 (4 x 4 x 4). This design is efficient when 
it is unfeasible to test all possible cells in a three-way factorial design. 
Requiring participants to respond to all 16 versions would be time-consuming 
and impractical, as well as encouraging immediate sequential carryover 
effects (Bradley, 1958). The second blocking variable group was added such 
that each participant only responded once to the 4 different scenarios.  
Table 5 Scenario and Correction Information Implemented in Latin Square 
Group Fire Crash Injury 
Missing 
Person 
1 No Correction Just Correction  
Correction + 
Error  
Correction + 
Lie  
2 Just Correction  
Correction + 
Lie  
No Correction 
Correction + 
Error  
3 
Correction + 
Error  
No Correction 
Correction + 
Lie  
Just Correction  
4 
Correction + 
Lie  
Correction + 
Error  
Just Correction  No Correction 
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Figure 12 Schematic design showing the high-level design and content of the ‘crash’ scenario used in Experiment 4 
 
Figure 1705 Example statement from ‘Crash’ report in Experiment 4Figure 1706 Schematic design showing the high-
level design and content of the ‘crash’ scenario used in Experiment 4 
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3.9.3. Stimuli  
The experimental stimuli consisted of four different scenarios 
containing 12 individually presented messages (see Appendix H for full details 
of the scenarios). The messages were presented in the form of individual 
breaking news statements that appeared to originate from the same fictional 
news source (see Figure 13). The maximum character length per message 
was changed to 250 and the maximum number of words was 35. The 
messages were approximately matched for number of characters and words 
across experimental conditions. The change in presentation format from 
Experiment 3 for individual messages was made in order to allow more 
freedom to increase length of the messages – real ‘Tweets’ were limited to 
140 characters at the time the experiment was run.  All four scenarios were 
constructed so that they had the same underlying structure but appeared as 
superficially distinct stories. Three of the scenarios (i.e. fire, crash, and 
missing person) used in Experiment 4 were based on scenarios used in 
previous CIE studies but were distinct from the original stories (Ecker et al., 
2011b; Ecker et al., 2010; Johnson & Seifert, 1994).  
Several modifications were made to the fire report used in Experiment 
3. First, Message 4 provided general information about potential causes for 
the outcome (e.g. industrial fires are often caused by electrical issues). This 
was new to Experiment 4 and was included in the reports so that participants 
always had some information to answer inferential questions even if the 
posited cause had been corrected (as it was for three of the conditions). This 
message was changed to allow participants the opportunity to generate 
alternative explanations for possible causes of the fire after the misinformation 
Figure 13 Example statement from ‘Crash’ report in Experiment 4 
 
Figure 1947 Distribution and probability density of references to target 
(mis)information by correction information and scenario in Experiment 
4. Red points represent mean and error bars represent 95% 
confidence interval of the meaFigure 1948 Example statement from 
‘Crash’ report in Experiment 4 
 
Figure 1949 Distribution and robability density o  references to target 
(mis)information by correction information and scenario in Experiment 
4. Red points represent mean and error bars represent 95% 
confidence interval of the mean. 
 
 
Figure 1950 Example of the response options for the correction 
recognition test used for the fire scenario in Experiment 5. The 
response options represent those given to participants in the ‘just 
correction’ condition. The top panel (outlined in red) shows the ctual 
correction message participants read in the report and the bottom 
panel is the ‘lure’ messageFigure 1951 Distribution and probability 
density of references to target (mis)information by correction 
information and scenario in Experiment 4. Red points represent m an 
and error bars represent 95% confidence interval of the meaFigure 
1952 Example statement from ‘Crash’ report in Experiment 4 
 
Figure 1953 Distribution and probability density of references to target 
(mis)information by correction information and scenario in Experiment 
4. Red points represent mean and error bars represent 95% 
confidence interval of the me Figure 1954 Exampl  statement from 
‘Crash’ report in Experiment 4 
 
Figure 1955 Distribution and probability density of r ferences to target 
(mis)information by correction information and scenario in Experiment 
4. Red points represent mean and error bars represent 95% 
confidence interval of the mean. 
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was invalidated. Second, the correction message in Experiment 3 offered 
additional information that was not stated in the explanatory correction 
messages (i.e. that no paint or gas had ever been present in the warehouse) 
whereas the explanatory correction messages did not provide this information. 
The explanatory correction messages included the same information as the 
non-explanatory correction, as well as the respective explanation, in order to 
rule out the possibility that the lack of difference between correction 
information conditions in Experiment 3 was due to differences in the 
information included in the correction messages. Third, the ‘Correction + Lie’ 
message was also amended so that the correction message referred to an 
‘unhappy employee’ in order to provide some context for lying about the 
presence of flammable substances in the storeroom. Finally, the additional 
information messages included in the report were amended to better match 
the length of the critical (correction) messages.  
The fourth scenario was a novel report, concerning a person found with 
a head injury, which has not been used in previous studies on the continued 
influence effect. Figure 12 depicts represents the different correction 
information conditions for the ‘crash’ scenario used in Experiment 3 and 
shows how stimuli were presented to participants. Misinformation always 
appeared at Message 5 and provided information about a likely cause of the 
outcome (i.e. how the woman sustained head injuries). The correction (or 
control) information always appeared at Message 10.  
3.9.4. Procedure 
Participants were tested in individual cubicles and completed the 
experiment on a computer. The experiment was implemented via Qualtrics. 
They were informed by the experimenter that they were taking part in a study 
investigating how well people understand and remember information 
presented in news reports, that they would read four different reports and 
answer questions about the reports and were informed about the minimum 
requirements for responses (i.e. minimum of 25 characters). The written 
instructions appeared on the screen whilst participants were verbally 
instructed about the task. Once it was clear that participants understood the 
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task they were allowed to begin the experiment. They first had to click the >> 
button which took them to the first report, after which they responded to 14 
intermixed, and randomly presented, inference and fact recall questions, and 
then 2 critical information recall questions which were always presented in the 
same order. This basic procedure was then repeated three further times until 
participants had read and answered questions about all four reports. 
Participants finally answered a series of debrief questions and were then 
debriefed about the purpose of the experiment, in person. 
3.10. Results 
3.10.1. Coding of Responses  
The main dependent measure extracted from the responses was 
‘reference to target (mis)information’. Responses which explicitly stated, or 
strongly implied, that the target information was causally involved in the event 
were scored 1 and otherwise scored 0 (e.g. that the van crashed because the 
driver was drunk, that the woman was assaulted by the man seen running 
away). Consistent with Experiment 3, the maximum individual inference score 
for each scenario that each participant saw was 7. The same coding criteria 
used in Experiment 3 were applied to code fact recall and critical information 
recall responses. 
Inter-coder reliability. A trained coder coded all inference, fact recall, 
and correction recall question responses; 10% (n = 4, items = 64) of the 
responses were then coded by a second trained coder. Cohen’s K was run to 
determine the level of agreement between the two raters. There was a high 
level of agreement between the two raters,  = 0.83, p < .001, 91.7%.  
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3.10.2. Inference Scores  
Figure 14 shows the distributional characteristics for inference scores 
as a function of correction information and scenario. One assumption of Latin-
square designs is that row, column, and treatment variables do not interact. 
Figure 9 clearly shows that the number of references to target 
(mis)information depended on whether or correction information was 
presented and which report or scenario the correction information appeared 
in. The figure also shows that the means for each scenario were based on a 
very low number of observations and that there were an unequal number of 
observations in each cell of the Latin-square. Correction information was also 
Figure 14 Distribution and probability density of references to target 
(mis)information by correction information and scenario in Experiment 
4. Red points represent mean and error bars represent 95% 
confidence interval of the mean. 
 
 
Figure 2189 Example of the response options for the correction 
recognition test used for the fire scenario in Experiment 5. The 
response options represent those given to participants in the ‘just 
correction’ condition. The top panel (outlined in red) shows the actual 
correction message participants read in the report and the bottom 
panel is the ‘lure’ messageFigure 2190 Distribution and probability 
density of references to target (mis)information by correction 
information and scenario in Experiment 4. Red points represent mean 
a d error bars r resent 95% confidence interval of the mean. 
 
 
Figure 2191 Example of the response options for the correction 
recognition test used for the fire scenario in Experi ent 5. The 
response options represent those given to participants in the ‘just 
correction’ condition. The top panel (outlined in red) shows the actual 
correction message participants read in the report and the bottom 
panel is the ‘lure’ message 
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more effective in some scenarios than in others. The magnitude of the 
difference between corrected and uncorrected groups appears to be 
substantially larger for the crash report than for the fire report, whereas the 
injury report to be somewhere in between the two.  
A Poisson mixed effects model was fit to inference scores in order to 
account for the repeated measures nature of the count data. Participant was 
treated as a random variable allowing intercepts to vary between participants.  
A model which included row (group), column (scenario), and treatment effects 
(correction information), was significantly better than a model which included 
only the intercept,    (9) = 108.21, p < .00127.  
The fact that group was included in the best fitting model supports 
visual inspection of the data indicating that there was an interaction between 
correction information and scenario. The nature of the Latin-square design 
meant that any test of an interaction between correction information and 
scenario would be biased. Follow-up tests of correction information, scenario, 
and group were not performed because the overall differences between levels 
of these factors were not particularly informative. Breaking down inference 
scores by scenario would mean that inferences would be based on a very low 
number of observations and therefore unreliable. It was deemed best to rely 
on visual representation of the data for inference and the results are therefore 
described qualitatively.  
The warehouse fire and injury reports present a classic continued 
influence effect of misinformation, in which participants in correction 
conditions continue to refer to misinformation but not as much as in the 
uncorrected condition. The missing person report seems to show that 
participants did not attend to the misinformation, so did not refer to it even 
when it was not corrected. As such, this does not tell us much about the 
continued influence effect. The crash report, on the other hand, gives a good 
example of a relatively effective correction. Under a third of participants in the 
                                            
27
 Predictors were added incrementally. Correction information was added first, 
scenario second, and group last. Models were then sequentially compared to examine 
whether that predictor improved the model fit. The chi-square values reported here are for the 
comparison of the full model including all of the predictors against the null model where the 
intercept was fixed. 
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correction conditions referred to the misinformation, whereas all participants in 
the uncorrected condition referred to the misinformation.  
3.10.3. Recall Accuracy Scores 
The manipulations of scenario and correction information were not 
expected to influence recall accuracy. A mixed effects Poisson regression 
model was fit to recall accuracy scores. This confirmed that the number of 
accurately recalled details was not predicted by correction information, 
scenario, or group (p’s > .3).  
3.11. Summary 
Experiment 4 was designed to replicate and extend Experiment 3’s 
finding that including an explanation for why misinformation is incorrect is no 
more effective than clearly negating misinformation. Findings were replicated 
for the warehouse fire and head injury reports. Specifically, corrections failed 
to eliminate the influence of misinformation and there was no difference 
between explanatory and non-explanatory corrections when a CIE was 
present. There was little to no evidence of a CIE in the crash report. That is, 
participants produced a substantial number of references to uncorrected 
target (mis)information in response to the crash report, but very few 
participants referred to misinformation after it had been corrected.  
Despite the fact that the reports were intended to have the same 
underlying structure, the uniform pattern of misinformation references in the 
missing person scenario suggests there were unintended differences between 
the reports. The crash report resulted in a substantial number of 
misinformation references in uncorrected conditions but almost none in 
corrected conditions. This contrasts with the warehouse fire and head injury 
reports where the difference between corrected and uncorrected conditions 
was much smaller. This suggests that the scenarios differed in some 
fundamental respect despite being designed to be structurally very similar. 
The difference between scenarios seemed to be related to the ‘base’ 
correction information rather than between the misinformation used in the 
different reports. In other words, correction information had a larger impact in 
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the crash reports than the warehouse fire or head injury report. This suggests 
that the difference between the reports is not related to the causal relevance 
of the misinformation per se, but rather, the scope for the correction 
information to render the misinformation irrelevant. More specifically, the 
crash scenario corrected the inference that the crash was caused by drink-
driving by providing evidence that this could not have been the case (i.e. the 
test confirmed the driver did not have alcohol in his system). In contrast, the 
correction in the warehouse fire report merely stated that the flammable 
substances were never in the warehouse but did not completely rule out 
flammable liquids as a cause of the fire. Similarly, the head injury report 
refutes the idea that the man seeing running away assaulted the woman but 
does not provide evidence that this did not occur (e.g. CCTV footage).  
Experiment 4’s results showed a classic CIE in the warehouse fire and 
head injury scenarios. There was no evidence of a CIE in the crash scenario 
suggesting the CIE is not inevitable. Experiment 4’s results were very similar 
to results previously obtained online providing further proof that cognitively 
demanding memory-based tasks can be conducted online. Experiment 4’s 
results suggested that the CIE occurs when reasoning about some 
descriptions of events but not for others. These results provide preliminary 
evidence that the magnitude of the difference between corrected and 
uncorrected conditions was much larger in the crash report than the fire or 
injury reports. Since it is not possible to test for interactions with Latin-square 
designs, and because there were a low number of observations in each cell of 
the square, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions from Experiment 4’s results.  
3.12. Experiment 5 
Experiment 5 was designed to directly compare a scenario in which the 
CIE was eliminated (crash scenario) and a scenario in which the effect was 
present (warehouse fire scenario), in order to examine whether there was an 
interaction between scenario and correction information. There were two main 
reasons it was important to check whether the differences in the CIE across 
scenarios that was observed in Experiment 4 are robust. First, the sample 
sizes when breaking down the scenarios were very low (between 7 and 13 
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per cell). Second, the Latin-square design used in Experiment 4 meant that it 
was not possible to statistically test for an interaction between scenario and 
correction information condition. The upshot of this is that it was not possible 
to establish with any certainty whether the CIE is observed for some 
scenarios but not others.  Experiment 5 therefore aimed to address 
Experiment 4’s limitations by: 1) increasing the sample size and, 2) using a 
balanced and completely between-subjects design in order to specifically test 
for the interaction between scenario and correction information.  
Experiment 5 was run online and so included several additional 
measures in order to further ensure that participants attended to the task and 
answered questions properly. An additional test examined whether 
participants had encoded the critical information presented at Message 10 
(i.e. the correction or control message). The test was included in addition to 
open-ended critical information recall prompts as a further measure of 
whether participants noted the correction (see Figure 15). The recognition test 
comprised of a two-alternative-forced-choice (2AFC) recognition question 
asking participants to choose which of two statements had appeared in the 
report they had just read in addition to the open-ended critical information 
recall questions. The recognition test used was based on the ‘modified 
recognition test’ developed by McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985)28 . For the 
recognition test used in Experiment 5, choosing the critical ‘lure’ message 
would indicate that a given participant had not properly encoded the 
information and was choosing randomly between the two options. If the 
participant had not encoded the misinformation then they would also be 
unlikely to give reasonable responses to inference questions and were 
therefore excluded. The actual correction and critical ‘lure’ messages were 
designed to be similar enough so as to not make the task easy but distinct 
                                            
28
 The ‘modified test’ was developed in order to challenge the idea that misleading 
information presented at test in the post-event misinformation paradigm modifies memory for 
the original event (Loftus, 1975), overwrites the original ‘correct’ information resulting in the 
‘misinformation effect’. The recognition test typically used in the post-event misinformation 
paradigm includes the original information and the misleading information whereas the 
modified test includes the original information and a novel piece of information. The idea was 
that performance (i.e. correctly choosing the original information) should be equivalent to a 
control group who did not receive misinformation if their memory for the original information is 
not impaired. McCloskey and Zaragoza did not find a misleading information effect using this 
procedure.   
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enough so as the task was not too difficult.  
3.13. Method 
3.13.1. Participants 
A power analysis indicated that a minimum of 110 participants (f = 
0.40, 1- β = 0.95, α = 0.05) would be required in order to detect a main effect 
of correction information (df = 3, k = 8)29.  In total of 163 participants 
completed the experiment via Amazon Mechanical Turk. One participant was 
excluded prior to analysis because they failed a recognition test examining 
memory for the correction message (see Figure 15). Following these 
exclusions, a total of 158 (69 females, aged 21 to 76, M = 39.62, SD = 11.21), 
participants were included in the final analysis. Participants were paid $1.50 
and took 18 minutes on average to complete the experiment. Participants 
were also incentivised with the potential to receive an additional $10 if they 
achieved a high level of accuracy on the questionnaire (N = 2)30.  
3.13.2. Stimuli & Design 
The experimental stimuli were generated via Qualtrics (Qualtrics, 
Provo, UT) and consisted of the warehouse fire and crash reports that were 
used in Experiment 4 (see Fig. 12 for example of experimental manipulation 
of crash report). A 2 (Scenario: Fire, Crash) x 4 (Correction Information: No 
Correction, Correction Only, Correction + Error, Correction + Lie) between-
subjects factorial design was used such that there were 4 versions of the 
warehouse fire 
                                            
29
The effect size for the effect of correction information in Experiment 3 was used to 
estimate the sample size for Experiment 5. The effect size used (  
  = 0.14) was incorrect and 
should have actually been   
  = 0.18. The power calculation was therefore based on the 
wrong effect size and according to GPower the sample size should have actually been N = 
83. However, this number seemed incredibly small and would have resulted in a very low 
number of participants in each condition after exclusions. 
30
 The specifics of what constitutes a high level of accuracy were not described to 
participants. The incentive was intended to generally motivate participants to fully read the 
messages included in the report and respond accurately to all questions.  
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report and 4 versions of the crash report. Each report consisted of 12 
individually presented statements, in which target (mis)information was 
presented at Message 5 and critical (correction) information was presented at 
Message 10. Participants were randomly allocated to one of the 8 
experimental conditions: no correction: warehouse fire (n = 14), crash (n = 
20), correction: fire (n = 17), crash (n = 27), correction + error explanation: 
warehouse fire (n = 21), crash (n = 24), correction + lie explanation: fire (n = 
18), crash (n = 17). The dependent variables of interest were the same as the 
other experiments reported in this chapter. 
3.13.3. Procedure 
Participants clicked on a link in Amazon Mechanical Turk to enter the 
experimental site.  The Amazon Mechanical Turk advertisement also informed 
participants that there they had the opportunity to receive an additional bonus 
of $10 for providing accurate responses. The bonus was included in order to 
incentivize participants to carefully read the statements making up the report 
and to reduce the possibility that any continued influence effect observed was 
not due to misreading or misunderstanding of the messages included in the 
Figure 15 Example of the response options for the correction recognition test 
used for the fire scenario in Experiment 5. The response options represent 
those given to participants in the ‘just correction’ condition. The top panel 
(outlined in red) shows the actual correction message participants read in the 
report and the bottom panel is the ‘lure’ message. 
 
Figure 2431 Distribution and probability density of references to target 
(mis)information by correction information condition in Experiment 4. Red 
points represent mean and error bars represent 95% confidence intervals of 
the mean. Dashed lines represent condition means after excluding 
articipants who did not recall the critical inf rmati n, based on data from 10 
(crash: no corr.), 13 (crash: just corr.), 20 (crash: corr. + error), and 10 (crash: 
corr. + lie), 5, (fire: no corr.), 12 (fire: just corr.), 15 (fire: corr. + error), and 12 
(fire: corr. + lie) participants, respectively.Figure 2432 Example of the 
response options for the correction recognition test used for the fire scenario 
in Experiment 5. The response options represent thos  given to participa ts 
in the ‘just correction’ condition. The top panel (outlined in red) shows the 
actual correction message participants read in the report and the bottom 
panel is the ‘lure’ message 
 
Figure 2433 Distribution and probability density of references to target 
(mis)information by correction information condition in Experiment 4. Red 
points represent mean and error bars represent 95% confidence intervals of 
the mean. Dashed lines represent condition means after excluding 
participants who did not recall the critical information, based on data from 10 
(crash: no corr.), 13 (crash: just corr.), 20 (crash: corr. + error), an  10 (crash: 
corr. + lie), 5, (fire: no corr.), 12 (fire: just corr.), 15 (fire: corr. + error), and 12 
(fire: corr. + lie) participants, respectively.  
 
 
Figure 2434 Proportion of references to target (mis)information by inference 
question and correction information for the crash scenario in Experiment 
5Figure 2435 Distribution and probability density of references to target 
(mis)information by correction information condition in Experiment 4. Red 
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report31. Experiment 5 included a set of instructional attention check questions 
which participants answered immediately after reading the instructions. These 
questions were ultimately not used to exclude participants but gave a sense of 
how well instructions are attended to. Only 98 (62%) of participants that were 
included in the final analysis answered all three questions correctly. 
Ultimately, it was not considered appropriate to exclude these participants 
because many researchers advise against excluding participants who fail 
instruction checks as this can introduce demographic bias in the data 
(Berinsky, Margolis, & Sances, 2014, 2016;  Hauser & Schwarz, 2016).  
Following this, the experimental procedure was much the same as 
Experiment 3: participants read the messages one at a time, answered 
intermixed inference and recall questions, and then answered the two critical 
information recall questions. Experiment 5 also included a test of whether 
participants had encoded the critical information presented at Message 10. 
Participants completed a modified recognition test (described in above). After 
completing the recognition test, participants answered debrief questions and 
were then debriefed about nature of the study. 
3.14. Results  
3.14.1. Coding of Responses  
The coding criteria used for all measures (reference to target 
(mis)information, factual recall accuracy, critical information recall) were 
identical to those used to code the warehouse fire and crash reports in 
Experiment 4. Table 6 provides examples of coding for one of the questions 
following the crash report and one question following the fire report. 
Inter-coder reliability.  Responses were coded by a trained coder. A 
second, independent judge then coded approximately 10% of participants’ 
responses (n = 17). Inter-rater agreement was 0.90 and Cohen’s Κ = 
0.81±0.05, indicating a very high level of agreement between coders, and 
                                            
31
 After reading the instructions, and before starting the experiment, participants 
answered a three-part instructional attention check which can be seen in Fig. 10. A four-
alternative forced choice (4AFC) method was used and response options included the correct 
answer as stated in the instructions and three incorrect answers. 
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there was also no systematic bias between raters,  = 1.33, p = .24. 
Table 6 Example coded responses to inference questions in Experiment 5 
Scenario Question Example of 
Response Coded 
as 1 
Example of 
Response Coded 
as 0 
Crash How could this 
accident have 
been avoided? 
Possibly by the 
driver not 
drinking and 
dulling his 
reflexes. 
It is not known at 
this time, but 
road conditions 
might have 
played a part in 
the crash. 
Warehouse Fire What 
precautions 
could be taken in 
the future to 
ensure this 
doesn’t happen 
again?  
Flammable items 
should be placed 
in a safe storage 
place. 
They need to 
have better 
safety system 
and a more 
effective plan of 
attack. 
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Figure 16 Distribution and probability density of references to target (mis)information by correction information condition in 
Experiment 4. Red points represent mean and error bars represent 95% confidence intervals of the mean. Dashed lines 
represent condition means after excluding participants who did not recall the critical information, based on data from 10 (crash: 
no corr.), 13 (crash: just corr.), 20 (crash: corr. + error), 10 (crash: corr. + lie), 5, (fire: no corr.), 12 (fire: just corr.), 15 (fire: corr. + 
error), and 12 (fire: corr. + lie) participants, respectively.  
 
 
Figure 2671 Proportion of references to target (mis)information by inference question and correction information for the crash 
scenario in Experiment 5Figure 2672 Distribution and probability density of references to target (mis)information by correction 
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3.14.2. Inference Scores 
Figure 16 shows the distributional characteristics of inference scores 
as a function of correction information, separately for the crash and fire 
reports. It is clear from Figure 16 that all three types of correction substantially 
reduced reference to misinformation (almost to zero) for the crash report but 
not for the fire report. Comparatively the proportion reduction in reference to 
misinformation was 90-95% for the crash report and 55-70% for the 
warehouse fire report.  
 Likelihood ratio tests32 indicated that the best fitting model for the data 
was one that included an interaction between correction information and 
scenario,    (3) = 36.02, p < .0001. The letters in the final column of Table 5 
represent the significance of Dunnett’s multiple comparison tests. Groups that 
share the same letter are not significantly different from each other. The table 
shows that all three types of correction reduced the number of references to 
target (mis)information for both the warehouse fire and crash reports. The 
differences between the three types of corrections were not significantly 
different from each other within each scenario. When comparing across 
scenarios, participants produced significantly fewer references to 
misinformation following a correction that explained misinformation as an error 
in the crash than the fire report. The two conditions featuring just a correction 
also differed between the two different reports. The analysis therefore 
confirms the pattern of results that can be seen in the violin plots. 
                                            
32
 Here, a negative binomial model was deemed a best fit for the data because the 
inference score variance was greater than the mean. 
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Table 7 Marginal inference score means and post-hoc comparisons 
Experiment 5 
Correction  
Information 
Scenario 
Estimated marginal 
mean 
Group 
Just Corr.  Crash 0.26 a 
Corr. + Lie Crash 0.29 ab 
Corr. + Error Crash 0.46 abc 
Corr. + Lie Fire 1.17 bcd 
Just Corr.  Fire 1.35 cd 
Corr. + Error Fire 1.76 d 
No Corr. Fire 3.86 e 
No Corr. Crash 4.75 e 
 
Note: Confidence level used: 0.95. Confidence level adjustment: Dunnett 
method for 8 estimates. P value adjustment: Dunnett method for 28 tests. 
Significance level used: alpha = 0.05 are shown in the final column. The 
comparisons that share the same letter group are not significantly different 
from each other. 
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Figure 17 Proportion of references to target (mis)information by inference question and correction 
information for the crash scenario in Experiment 5. 
 
Figure 2894 Proportion of references to target (mis)information by inference question and correction 
information for the fire scenario in Experiment 5Figure 2895 Proportion of references to target 
(mis)information by inference question and correction information for the crash scenario in Experiment 5 
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Figure 18 Proportion of references to target (mis)information by inference question and correction 
information for the fire scenario in Experiment 5. 
 
Figure 3061 Proportion of references to target (mis)information by inference question and correction 
information for the fire scenario in Experiment 5 
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Question analysis. The proportion of references to misinformation 
was examined separately for each question that followed the crash (Figure 
17) and warehouse fire (Figure 18) reports. Figure 17 shows that most 
questions about the crash report did not elicit references to misinformation, 
which is unsurprising given that no CIE was observed for this scenario. Figure 
18, on the other hand, shows that the questions most likely to elicit a 
reference to misinformation asked about the origins of the fire and what 
precautions could be taken to prevent future fires. There were no consistent 
patterns in regards to explanatory and non-explanatory conditions.  
Correction acknowledgement. The proportion of participants who 
referred to misinformation even though they acknowledged that the 
information had been corrected for each is shown in Figure 19. The figure 
shows that the proportion of participants who made at least one 
uncontroverted reference to misinformation whilst also acknowledging that the 
information was corrected was substantially higher for the fire report (60-90%) 
than the crash report (18-25%). This is not surprising given that no continued 
influence effect was observed for the crash report. One participant who read 
the fire report responded that “… Gas and paint cans should be stored in a 
different place and labelled with big letters …” Then in response to the 
question asking about the point of the second message from Fire Chief Lucas 
they said: “The point of the second message from Fire Chief Lucas is to 
explain that the cause of the fire was not from gas cans and paint cans. Fire 
Chief Lucas wanted to clear that statement because any further news will 
continue to use that statement and believe this was the cause when it was a 
different cause to the fire”. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3140 Proportions of participants who recalled or did not recall the 
correction, and either referred or did not refer to target (mis)information, by 
correction information condition and scenario in Experiment 5 
 
Figure 3141 Proportions of participants who recalled or did not recall the 
correction, and either referred or did not refer to target (mis)information, by 
correction information condition and scenario in Experiment 5 
 
Figure 3142 Proportion of references to misinformation on the recall question 
probing recall of target (mis)information as a function of correction information 
condition for the (A) crash scenario, and (B) warehouse fire scenario in 
Experiment 5. Bars for conditions featuring a correction represent responses 
after excluding participants who did not recall the correction.Figure 3143 
Proportions of participants who recalled or did not recall the correction, and 
either referred or did not refer to target (mis)information, by correction 
information condition and scenario in Experiment 5 
 
Figure 3144 Proportions of participants who recalled or did not recall the 
correction, and either referred or did not refer to target (mis)information, by 
correction information condition and scenario in Experiment 5 
 
Figure 3145 Proportions of participants who recalled or did not recall the 
  
 
149 
 
Figure 19 Proportions of participants who recalled or did not recall the correction, and either referred or did 
not refer to target (mis)information, by correction information condition and scenario in Experiment 5. 
 
Figure 3284 Proportion of references to misinformation on the recall question probing recall of target 
(mis)information as a function of correction information condition for the (A) crash scenario, and (B) 
warehouse fire scenario in Experiment 5. Bars for conditions featuring a correction represent responses 
after excluding participants who did not recall the correction.Figure 3285 Proportions of participants who 
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3.14.3. Recall Accuracy Scores 
 A null Poisson regression model was compared to the full Poisson 
regression model including an interaction term for correction information and 
scenario. The full model was not a significantly better fit for the data than the 
null model,    (7) = 84.18, p = .30. This indicates that the number of correctly 
recalled literal details did not differ between conditions 
  
Figure 20 Proportion of references to misinformation on the recall question 
probing recall of target (mis)information as a function of correction 
information condition for the (A) crash scenario, and (B) warehouse fire 
scenario in Experiment 5. Bars for conditions featuring a correction 
represent responses after excluding participants who did not recall the 
correction. 
 
 
Figure 3419 Critical information recall as a function of correction 
information. Shown separately for crash (A) and fire (B) reportsFigure 3420 
Proportion of references to misinformation on the recall question probing 
recall of target (mis)information as a function of correction information 
condition for the (A) crash scenario, and (B) warehouse fire scenario in 
Experiment 5. Bars for conditions featuring a correction represent responses 
after excluding participants who did not recall the correction. 
 
 
Figure 3421 Critical information recall as a function of correction 
information. Shown separately for crash (A) and fire (B) reports in 
Experiment 5 
 
Figure 3422 Critical information recall as a function of correction 
information. Shown separately for crash (A) and fire (B) reportsFigure 3423 
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3.14.4. Critical Information Recall 
Figure 21 shows that critical information recall was poorest for the 
groups who received the control message. This was true of both the crash 
and fire reports. Critical information recall was slightly poorer for participants 
reading the warehouse fire report. There was a significant association 
between correction information and accurate recall of the correction for the 
crash report,   (3) = 93.45, p < .001, when including the no correction 
condition. The association was still significant when excluding the no 
correction   (2) = 19.72, p < .001, suggesting correction recall performance 
was poorer in the two explanatory conditions. In contrast, there was a 
significant association between correction information condition and critical 
information recall when including the no correction condition,   (3) = 85.89, 
p < .001, but this disappeared when excluding the no correction group,   (2) 
= 0.44, p = .80.  
Figure 21 Critical information recall as a function of correction information. 
Shown separately for crash and warehouse fire reports in Experiment 5. 
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3.15. Summary 
Experiment 5’s results provide further evidence that explanatory and 
non-explanatory corrections are equally effective at reducing reliance on 
misinformation. Participants were equally likely to refer to misinformation 
whether they received an explanatory correction or not; this was true of both 
the warehouse fire and crash reports. However, the CIE was substantially 
attenuated – or almost eliminated - in the crash report.  The most probable 
inference score for the crash report was zero suggesting a complete 
correction. Experiment 5’s results therefore showed corrections were far 
more effective at reducing reliance on misinformation for the crash report 
than the warehouse fire report, thereby replicating Experiment 4’s findings. 
These results provide further evidence that the difference between the 
warehouse fire and crash reports lies in the type of ‘base’ correction 
presented to participants. Participants who received the warehouse fire and 
crash reports made an equivalent number of references to target 
(mis)information when this information was uncorrected. However, 
misinformation references were significantly lower when comparing 
differences between correction and correction + error groups across reports.  
The fact that uncorrected groups did not differ but correction groups 
did, suggests that the difference was not related to the type of misinformation 
presented per se, but the way misinformation was corrected. The correction 
in the warehouse fire report negated the presence of flammable liquids in the 
building. However, the correction did not provide any evidence to counter the 
claim that that careless storage of oil paint and compressed gas caused the 
fire, thus leaving open the possibility that the gas cylinders and oil paints 
were somehow responsible for the fire. In contrast, the correction in the 
crash report ruled out the possibility that the driver’s intoxicated state caused 
the van to crash. This is an important distinction between types of correction 
which deserves further investigation. The difference between reports could 
be related to the story content per se. However, this seems unlikely given 
that inference scores were similar in uncorrected conditions, but not the 
corrected conditions. Alternatively, there could be an interaction between 
story content and the characteristics of the correction.  
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Another interesting observation was that there was a discrepancy 
between inference and recall scores for participants who received the error 
correction in the fire story (and which also replicates the pattern of results 
found in Experiment 3). These participants were less likely to refer to oil paint 
and gas cylinders when asked what the contents of the storeroom were 
before the fire than the correction or correction + lie groups. Put another way, 
the correction + error group were more likely to answer this question 
correctly whilst also apparently maintaining the misinformation. One possible 
explanation for the discrepancy between the responses of the correction + 
error group could be that some participants made local but not global 
updates to their model of the event (Albrecht & O’Brien, 1993; McKoon & 
Ratcliff, 1992). The other two types of corrections did not provide information 
which replaced the oil paint and gas cylinders with other (non-flammable) 
materials. The error correction group may have made local change to 
contents of the storeroom whilst maintaining their global model of the event 
in which oil paint and gas cylinders caused the fire. The other two types of 
corrections did not provide information which replaced the oil paint and gas 
cylinders with other (non-flammable) materials so they were unable (or 
unwilling) to make a local or global change.  
3.16. Conclusions 
The aim of the three experiments reported in this chapter was to 
investigate whether providing an explanation where misinformation occurred 
can reduce the CIE. Legal decision-making, continued influence studies, and 
studies on text refutations, suggest that explaining why a given piece of 
information should be disregarded reduces its impact on later judgments and 
reasoning (e.g. Bush et al., 1994; Rapp & Kendeou, 2008; Steblay et al., 
2006). The experiments reported in this chapter tested two types of 
explanatory corrections across multiple scenarios. The explanatory 
correction that appeared in all scenarios either described initial 
misinformation as an (unintentional) error or as an (intentional) deception. It 
was expected that explanatory corrections would be more successful at 
reducing the CIE than non-explanatory corrections. It was also (tentatively) 
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expected that correction which explained misinformation as a lie would be 
more effective than a correction that explained misinformation as an error. 
These findings provide evidence that corrections that explain 
misinformation as an honest mistake, or as a lie, had no more impact than a 
negation of misinformation. This does not mean to say that corrections that 
explain how misinformation occurred are always equivalent to non-
explanatory corrections. The explanations provided in the present set of 
experiments may not be satisfactory explanations for how misinformation 
occurred, and therefore have little impact over and above the correction 
which negated misinformation. Research on what makes a good explanation 
has shown that people prefer simple to more complex explanations 
(Lagnado, 1994; Lombrozo, 2007), and explanations that are broader in 
scope (or account for more information) than narrow scope explanations 
(Read & Marcus-Newhall, 1993).  
It is also worth noting that causal explanations – the explanations 
used in the present set of experiments provided a causal explanation for why 
the interlocutor initially believed misinformation but now does not – are a 
form of social interaction and therefore subject to rules of conversation 
(Hilton, 1990). The social nature of the explanations offered in the present 
set of experiments could have constrained the effectiveness of the 
correction. As such, any pragmatic benefit gained from the explanation of the 
misinformation’s invalidity might be nullified because it creates a whole new 
set of inferences about why an employee lied, or made an error.  
These present findings are inconsistent with Bush et al.’s (1994) 
findings showing that explanatory corrections (which address the 
conversational implications of the contradiction) are more effective at 
reducing continued reliance on misinformation. One reason for the difference 
between the present findings and Bush et al.’s findings could be that 
corrections in their study did not explain the invalidity of misinformation in 
terms of human communication. Human communicators are supposed to 
conform to conversational norms such as providing true and relevant 
information. The fact that the person who initially conveyed the 
misinformation failed to provide true or relevant information could result in 
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people disregarding the explanation and focusing on the negation (i.e. that 
there were no flammable substances in the storeroom). Furthermore, some 
courtroom simulation studies suggest that people are more convinced by 
physical evidence than eyewitness evidence (Skolnick & Shaw, 2001), 
perhaps because people assume that human measuring devices (e.g. 
eyewitness) are inherently less reliable than physical ones (e.g. CCTV; see 
Lagnado et al., 2013). Explanatory corrections may have been more effective 
if the correction involved a physical explanation of why misinformation is 
incorrect – for example, if the correction had stated that oil paint and gas 
cylinders had been moved to a fire-secure room in a different building and 
therefore could not have caused the fire. This would of course need to be 
tested empirically to confirm whether this was the case. 
Although this chapter’s aim was to examine the effectiveness of 
explanatory corrections to misinformation the findings also indicated some 
potential constraints on the CIE. Published research on the CIE has tended 
to demonstrate effects under consideration using one scenario rather than 
comparing across scenarios.33 Experiments 4 and 5 provide preliminary 
evidence that the CIE does not occur when the correction invalidates the 
explanation offered by the misinformation. These findings do not provide 
conclusive evidence that the CIE is constrained in these ways and is a post-
hoc explanation of the findings. However, the findings do highlight the need 
for a more systematic examination of the CIE and the circumstances under 
which it is likely to occur and what types of misinformation, correction, or 
scenario give rise to the effect. These explanations also fit with the mental-
model updating account of the CIE (Gordon et al., 2017; Johnson & Seifert, 
1994; Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 1988). 
Participants were able to abandon their initial incorrect model in favour of the 
correction one when the discrepancy between models was made more 
salient by providing evidence against the misinformation.  
                                            
33
 Earlier research in this field examined misinformation effects across two reports 
and found some small differences in reliance on misinformation as a function of story 
(Johnson & Seifert, 1994; Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 1988) 
  
 
156 
 There are several important implications that can be drawn from the 
experimental results reported in Chapter 3. First, the experiments provide 
additional evidence that similar results using the typical CIE are obtained 
online and in the lab. This suggests that the magnitude of the CIE is not 
increased in more educationally and experientially diverse populations such 
as those recruited through online labour markets. Experiment 4 was 
performed in the lab and produced very similar results to the experiments 
reported in Chapter 2, as well as in this chapter. The results of the present 
set of experiments are also consistent with previous lab-based studies 
(Ecker et al., 2011a; Ecker et al., 2011b; Guillory & Geraci, 2010). The 
second important observation is that the CIE observed here is smaller than in 
previous studies that have used the warehouse fire scenario (e.g. Johnson & 
Seifert, 1994; see also the experiments reported in Chapter 2 which used 
identical stimuli to Johnson & Seifert, 1994). The difference between studies 
could be due to the inherent ambiguity of the erroneous message about the 
contents of the storeroom. The misinformation and correction may raise 
questions about where the information about the oil paint and gas cylinders 
came from. There is also ambiguity about where the paint and gas are if they 
are not in the storeroom. The studies reported in this chapter made it 
unambiguous that there was no paint and gas on the premises, let alone in 
the storeroom.  
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4 The continued influence of implied 
and explicitly stated misinformation 
across multiple scenarios 
4.1. Chapter Overview 
The previous chapter considered different ways in which 
misinformation could be corrected. Findings showed that corrections that 
explained the origins of misinformation as an unintentional error or intentional 
lie were not more effective than corrections that negated misinformation. This 
chapter focuses primarily on the nature of the misinformation itself rather 
than the correction. An additional focus of this chapter is to move from using 
a single scenario with various manipulations, to using multiple scenarios.  
Previous CIE research has consistently shown that causal 
misinformation – information that provides causal structure to a description of 
an event – is difficult to correct (Ecker et al., 2011; 2011a; 2011b; Johnson & 
Seifert, 1994; Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 1988). Findings from a recent CIE 
study suggests that misinformation which explicitly states a cause of an 
adverse outcome is more easily corrected than misinformation that implies 
the cause of an adverse outcome (Rich & Zaragoza, 2016). This finding has 
implications for the ways in which journalists and newsreaders infer causality 
when reporting about unfolding events. Erroneous information reported as 
events are still developing may have more of a continuing impact if it implies 
rather than explicitly states a likely the cause of an event.   
One limitation of previous work showing that implied misinformation is 
more resistant to correction than explicitly stated misinformation is that it has 
only been demonstrated with a single scenario or news story. Chapter 4 
extends existing research by examining the continuing influence of implied 
and explicitly stated misinformation in three different news stories 
(warehouse fire, crash, and head injury), across two experiments. The 
results of the experiments reported in this chapter showed no difference in 
the effectiveness of corrections to implied and explicitly stated 
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misinformation. Results also showed that a correction to misinformation 
almost eliminated reliance on misinformation for the crash scenario but 
resulted in a CIE for the warehouse fire and head injury scenarios. Finally, 
the inclusion of a control condition in which misinformation was only 
mentioned as it was being corrected showed that people refer to 
misinformation even if it does not form the basis of an initial mental model of 
the event.  
4.2. Introduction 
In the rush to break ‘big news’ stories, broadcasters often report 
incomplete, inaccurate, or mistaken information. Significant inaccuracies, 
and misleading or distorted information, must be promptly corrected and an 
apology published where appropriate (Independent Press Standards 
Organisation, 2016). One real-world example of this occurred during the 
coverage of the Westminster terror attack when Channel 4 news named the 
wrong man as the attacker (Sweney, 2017). Channel 4 news quickly rectified 
their mistake and issued a correction during the same news programme. 
Even when a correction is quickly issued, erroneous information (or 
misinformation) may still have had a lasting impact on how people interpret 
events and form impressions. For instance, the correction issued by Channel 
4 news may not have been sufficient to counteract the reputational damage 
caused by naming the man as the attacker.  
The journalistic code of conduct stipulates that the press must be 
careful not to publish inaccurate or misleading information (Independent 
Press Standards Organisation, 2016). In the event that this happens the 
information must be swiftly corrected or otherwise the news organization can 
face possible legal action. In the race to be the first to break a story the drive 
to report available information – even if its accuracy is uncertain – may be 
too tempting. When the likely cause of an unfolding event is unknown 
reporters may imply rather than explicitly state a likely cause in an attempt to 
circumvent legal ramifications.  For example, when accounting for a 
celebrity’s death, a reporter might suggest that the death was drug related by 
mentioning the famous person’s history of drug use, or might directly assert 
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that the cause of death was a suspected overdose (a real example of this is 
depicted in Figure 22).  
Although a fairly trivial example, it is not hard to see how 
misinformation that implies a likely cause of outcome could be problematic 
and lead to causal misunderstandings. There are many cases in which 
rumour and innuendo which implies likely causes of events or outcomes can 
circulate, particularly through social media, potentially affecting people’s 
understanding of what occurred. For instance, Seifert (2002) describes a real 
case in which a news station reported that a family had been found dead in 
their home after having eaten at a Chinese restaurant. The news station 
reported a few days later that the deaths were caused by a faulty furnace. 
The conclusion of the news story was that the Chinese restaurant had 
closed; seemingly because the news story implied a relationship between the 
Chinese restaurant and the deaths. The news story never explicitly stated 
that the Chinese restaurant caused the deaths suggesting that this inference 
would have to be produced by the person hearing or reading the story.  
Figure 22 Example of news headlines that imply (top) and explicitly 
state (bottom) the cause of an adverse outcome 
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Continued influence research has consistently shown that 
misinformation which provides a likely cause of an event is difficult to correct 
(Ecker, Lewandowsky, Cheung, & Maybery, 2015; Ecker et al., 2011a; 
Johnson & Seifert, 1994; Wilkes & Reynolds, 1999). Recent developments 
on this topic suggest that misinformation that implies rather than explicitly 
stating the cause of an adverse outcome might be more difficult to correct. In 
their study, Rich and Zaragoza (2016) examined the effectiveness of 
corrections to implied and explicitly stated misinformation in a scenario 
describing a theft of valuable jewellery from a couple’s home while the 
couple was on vacation. The misinformation initially presented as a likely 
cause of the theft was that the couple’s son had taken the jewellery from the 
house. The misinformation either implied the son’s involvement by stating 
that the couple had asked their son to check in on the house while they were 
away, or explicitly stated that the police suspected the son had taken the 
jewellery from the house. In the implied case participants had to infer that the 
son had stolen the jewellery whereas this information was unambiguously 
provided in the explicit case. Later in the story, participants in the correction 
condition learned that the son had actually been out of town while the theft 
occurred, thereby invalidating the initial misinformation implicating the son’s 
involvement in the theft.  
Surprisingly, Rich and Zaragoza found that participants generated 
more post-correction references to implied misinformation than explicitly 
stated misinformation. The son’s involvement in the crime was also rated as 
more likely when misinformation was implied rather than explicitly stated. 
There was no difference between implied and explicitly stated conditions 
when misinformation remained uncorrected. These findings showed that 
corrections to misinformation that explicitly stated the son’s involvement in 
the crime were more effective than misinformation that implied the son’s 
involvement in the crime. Furthermore, providing an alternative explanation 
informing participants that the actual thief had been caught led to an even 
larger correction effect for both explicit and implied misinformation 
conditions. There was also an interaction between correction and 
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misinformation, in that the effect of correction was larger in the explicit than 
the implied condition.    
Rich and Zaragoza (2016) argued that a possible explanation for the 
findings is that people have to go beyond the available information to infer 
causal relations between story elements in the case where misinformation is 
implied. This in turn results in a more elaborate mental model of the 
described event. There is precedent for this explanation of Rich and 
Zaragoza’s findings. For instance, it is well established that people generate 
causal inferences during narrative comprehension (Graesser, Singer, & 
Trabasso, 1994; Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978; Singer, Graesser, & Trabasso, 
1994; Trabasso & van den Broek, 1985).  
There is also evidence to suggest that readers generate inferences 
between story elements when causal relations between pieces of information 
are not explicitly stated. For example, Pennington and Hastie (1988; Exp 1) 
found that participants ‘falsely’ recognized probe sentences that were 
consistent with a verdict decision they had made on the basis of evidence 
items they had previously seen34. In this study, participants read trial 
materials and a series of sentences that represented evidence items. After 
reading information and evidence about the case, participants decided on a 
verdict and then completed a recognition test. The recognition probes used 
at test consisted of:  target items that were consistent with a guilty or not 
guilty story (i.e. that participants in a previous study had mentioned as part of 
their explanation for their verdict choice), items from both stories, items from 
neither story, and critical lure items that were descriptions of plausible case-
relevant events but had not been included as evidence. The results showed 
that verdict decisions predicted higher hit and false alarm (i.e. rates of 
responding ‘yes’ to non-presented items) for sentences in the stories 
corresponding to participants’ verdict decisions. The rate of falsely 
recognizing critical lure sentences was higher for verdict story consistent 
                                            
34
 The evidence items used for this study were gleaned from a previous study 
(Pennington & Hastie, 1986) in which participants watched a simulated murder trial and 
described their evaluations of the evidence and verdict through a ‘talk-aloud’ procedure. 
Item story membership (guilty vs. not guilty) was determined according to the verdict story it 
originally came from.  
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items than for the alternative verdict story items. These findings suggest that 
people go beyond the available information to infer causal links between 
pieces of story information when they are not explicitly provided.  
Rich and Zaragoza (2016) argued that implied misinformation was 
more resistant to correction than explicitly stated misinformation because 
people construct a more elaborate representation of a described event when 
they have to self-generate causal links between story elements (Duffy, 
Shinjo, & Myers, 1990). Therefore, people have to infer the causal link 
between the misinformation (i.e. the son checking on the house) and the 
outcome (i.e. the jewellery box was missing) which makes it more difficult to 
correct. Consistent with this, Davies (1997; see also Mussweiler & Neumann, 
2000 for a similar finding) found that people were more likely to discount 
discredited explanations when they were externally provided than when they 
were self-generated. Participants were presented with short summaries of 
fictional psychological experiments including methods, procedures, and 
findings. They were either asked to self-generate possible explanations for 
the findings or were provided with an explanation for the findings that had 
been generated by another participant. Participants were then told that the 
experiments were actually fictitious and that the case studies had actually 
been invented to illustrate some important methods and procedures in 
psychology. When asked to estimate the likelihood of the reported outcome if 
the experiment were actually to be carried out, participants who self-
generated explanations for the findings exhibited significantly more belief 
persistence in the discredited findings than participants who received other-
generated explanations. Implied misinformation may therefore be harder to 
correct because self-generated judgments or inferences require elaborate 
internal processing of information and internally generated information is less 
likely to be seen as contaminating (Mussweiler & Neumann, 2000).  
Rich and Zaragoza’s findings may not necessarily result from more 
‘elaborate’ event representations constructed when self-generating causal 
links. It may be the case that the ambiguity of causal misinformation 
presented makes this information more easily accessible or salient. The 
evidence presented seems merely to suggest that inferences made by 
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participants had more of an effect than those externally presented, but this 
could occur for a number of reasons. Implied misinformation might also be 
difficult to correct because of the pragmatic inference people draw about why 
the information was supplied. Evidence for this comes from, Wegner, 
Wenzlaff, Kerker, and Beattie (1981) who gave participants different types of 
newspaper headlines which insinuated (e.g. “P is a criminal?”), or directly 
incriminated an individual. Source credibility affected the persuasiveness of 
directly incriminating assertions but had less of an impact on innuendo. 
Therefore the perceived credibility of sources offering implied and explicitly 
stated misinformation could mediate continued reliance on this information.   
4.3. Experiment 6 
Rich and Zaragoza (2016, p. 9) acknowledged that their findings were 
limited because they were only obtained with a single news story. This 
limitation is important because story content may interact with an individuals’ 
pre-existing knowledge and beliefs moderating the effects of implied and 
explicitly stated misinformation (as discussed in Chapters 1 and 3). For 
instance, Ecker et al. (2014) found that participants’ pre-existing attitudes 
(racial prejudice toward an ethnic minority group) influenced how they used 
race related information – although not processing of a correction. 
Experiment 6’s aim was, therefore, to validate Rich and Zaragoza’s (2016) 
findings via a conceptual replication of the finding with two different 
scenarios.   
The reproducibility of experiments is considered a fundamental tenet of 
the scientific approach. This is particularly the case in psychological science 
which has recently faced a series of failed replications of findings from social 
psychology (e.g. Shanks et al., 2015; Shanks et al., 2013). The failure to 
replicate several findings has sparked controversy, highlighting ‘questionable 
research practices’ and triggering a methodological crisis in psychological 
science (Open Science Collaboration, 2012, 2015; Simons, 2014). The 
validity of claims based on psychological findings therefore hinges on their 
replication.  
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Conceptual replications may be particularly important for making policy 
recommendations because they test the rigour of the underlying hypothesis 
rather simply duplicating the sampling and experimental procedures. 
Conceptual replications have implications for the generalisability of findings 
whilst direct replications arguably test the reliability of the measure employed 
(Makel, Plucker, & Hegarty, 2012). The CIE appears to be a robust effect; 
however, effects of interest are typically only examined in a single scenario 
(as discussed in Chapter 1). Recommendations about the way corrections 
are designed, structured, and applied have been made on the basis of CIE 
research (e.g. Ecker et al., 2014; Lewandowsky et al., 2012), making it all the 
more important to establish the precise conditions under which the CIE 
occurs.  
Experiment 6 used the same ‘breaking news’ format used in Chapter 
3’s experiments. The crash and warehouse fire reports (used in Experiments 
4 and 5) were used in order to test whether explicitly stated misinformation is 
more easily corrected than implied misinformation. If story content is related 
to misinformation type, then these two factors should interact in some 
manner. The structure of the news reports used in Chapters 3 and 4 differs 
from previous CIE studies in two key ways (also discussed in Chapter 3). 
The first was that the statement provided immediately before initial 
misinformation included information about potential causes of the adverse 
outcome. This information was included in order to increase the possibility 
that participants would generate other likely causes of the outcome than the 
one provided in the misinformation. There were two major reasons for 
including this information. First, there is a reasonable pragmatic assumption 
that if you are asked questions about a story you have read, the answers to 
those questions will be in the story. Therefore, people could be mentioning 
the misinformation, knowing that it has been corrected, but because no other 
potential causes have been presented, participants feel they have to say 
something, even if though they know the causal information they have 
provided was corrected. Second, there is a potential that the CIE can be 
partially explained by the availability in memory of the causal explanation 
offered by misinformation (cf. Anderson, New, & Speer, 1985). That is, 
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participants do not encode the story as a causal whole; instead, when asked 
questions, they attempt to retrieve snippets of relevant information. If the only 
potential cause available in memory is the misinformation, and there is no 
causal model, then participants will tend to refer to it. Adding other potential 
causes goes some way towards addressing the issue.   
Second, additional information about the event which was provided 
either side of the target (mis)information and critical correction information 
was not congruent with the explanation offered by the misinformation (i.e. it 
could not be interpreted as either supporting or refuting conclusions drawn 
from initial misinformation). This contrasts with the jewellery theft story used 
in Rich and Zaragoza (2016). The jewellery theft story  included additional 
information that was congruent with the misinformation implying or directly 
stating that the son had stolen the jewellery  (police are still attempting to 
determine whether other valuables are missing from the home, the television 
and home computer, however, had not been disturbed).. Providing additional 
event information that is congruent with the misinformation explanation 
offered (implied or explicitly stated) could result in participants placing more 
weight in the misinformation than the correction. The fact that the additional 
event information included in the present stories was designed not to be 
congruent misinformation could reduce reliance on misinformation relative to 
Rich and Zaragoza’s (2016) results.  
4.4. Method 
4.4.1. Participants 
Due to financial constraints no power calculation was performed to 
estimate the sample size. The aim was instead to recruit 20 participants per 
cell of the experimental design (N = 160). In total 168 (67 females and 101 
males, aged 22 to 70, Mage = 38.18, SD = 11.11) US based participants were 
recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants were paid $1.50 and 
took an average of 18 minutes to complete the experiment. In addition to the 
standard reward, participants were given the opportunity to earn an 
additional $10 based on high accuracy scores across instruction check and 
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fact recall questions35. One-hundred and fifteen (68%) of participants 
answered all three instructional attention check questions correctly. 
4.4.2. Stimuli, Design & Procedure 
The stimuli were generated in Qualtrics (Qualtrics, Provo, UT). 
Participants read one of 8 versions of a fictional news report that either 
described a warehouse fire or a crash, each consisting of 12 discrete 
messages. Figure 23 illustrates how message content was varied across 
experimental conditions, as well as the format used to present messages. 
The effect of correction information (No Correction, Correction), Scenario 
(Warehouse Fire, Crash), and Misinformation Type (Explicitly Stated, 
Implied) on reference to target (mis)information was assessed between 
groups; participants were randomly assigned to one of the 8 experimental 
groups (N = 16-25 in each group). The stimuli were identical to those used in 
Experiment 5 with the addition of the ‘explicitly stated’ misinformation 
conditions. The stimuli have been described in more detail in Chapter 3 so 
only the new conditions are described here (full details in Appendix J).  
In the warehouse fire report the target (mis)information presented 
(Message 5) either implied (Fire Chief Lucas issues statement: “Cans of oil 
paint and pressurized gas cylinders were present in storeroom before fire”) 
or explicitly stated (Fire Chief Lucas issues statement: “Investigation team 
suspect fire caused by carelessly stored flammable liquids. Cans of oil paint 
and pressurised gas cylinders were present in storeroom before fire”) that oil 
paints and gas cylinders were a suspected cause of the fire. Each message 
was presented as the ‘latest news’ in a breaking news format, and was no 
longer than 280 characters. Messages in the same position within the 
sequence were matched for length across scenarios. Messages were 
presented individually for a minimum of 5 seconds; there was no maximum 
reading time. Participants clicked a button to proceed to the next message 
and were unable to return and view previous messages. After reading the 
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 The modified recognition test discussed in Chapter 3 was also included in 
Experiment 6. However, due to a programming error the wrong test was shown to 
participants. Responses to this question could therefore not be used to exclude participants.  
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report, participants completed a 16-part questionnaire consisting of 7 
inference questions, 7 fact recall questions and 2 critical information recall 
questions (these are discussed in detail in Chapter 3; the questions can be 
found in Appendix I).  
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Figure 23 Schematic diagram depicting experimental manipulation of misinformation and correction information for the ‘crash’ 
report in Experiment 6. 
 
Figure 3550 Schematic diagram depicting experimental manipulation of misinformation and correction information for the ‘crash’ 
report in Experiment 6 
 
Figure 3551 Schematic diagram depicting experimental manipulation of misinformation and correction information for the ‘crash’ 
report in Experiment 6 
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4.5. Results 
4.5.1. Coding of Responses  
The criteria for coding responses are identical to those used in Chapter 
3 (and can also be found in Appendix I). Table 8 shows examples of 
responses that was coded as a reference to target (mis)information and an 
example of a response that were not coded as such. References to flammable 
materials in the warehouse fire scenario which did not specifically mention 
storage (e.g. “It could have been avoided by keeping flammable objects or 
items in place”) were not treated as references to misinformation because 
there was no specific mention of gas, paint, liquids, substances, chemicals, or 
the fact they were (allegedly) kept in the storeroom. Similarly, in the crash 
scenario references to driver behaviour that did not mention intoxication or 
drunkenness were not counted as references to misinformation (e.g. “by 
having him be more alert drinking coffee”). The maximum individual score for 
inference questions was 7. Responses to factual questions were scored for 
accuracy; correct or partially correct responses were scored 1 and incorrect 
responses were scored 0; the maximum factual score was 7. Critical 
information recall scores were computed using the same criteria; the 
maximum individual critical information recall score was 2.   
Inter-coder reliability. Responses were coded by a trained coder. A 
second, independent judge then coded 10% of responses from each 
narrative. Inter-rater agreement was 0.95 and Cohen’s Κ = 0.89±0.03, 
indicating a high level of agreement between coders, both of which are higher 
than the benchmark values of 0.7 and 0.6 (Krippendorff, 2012; Landis, & 
Koch, 1977), and there was no systematic bias between raters,    = 1.92, p = 
.17.  
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Table 8 Example of inference response coding in Experiment 6 
Scenario Inference Question 
Example of 
Response Scored 1 
Example of Response 
Scored 0 
Crash 
How could this 
accident have been 
avoided? 
If the driver had not 
been drinking. 
He was in a court battle 
with his ex-wife. 
Warehouse 
Fire 
How could the fire 
at the warehouse 
have been avoided? 
They should store 
flammable 
substances 
separately. 
Pay more attention to the 
signs and smells of a fire. 
Not overworking workers. 
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Figure 24 Distribution and probability density of inference scores as function of correction information, 
misinformation, and Report in Experiment 6. Red dots represent mean and lines error bars represent 95% 
confidence interval. Dashed lines represent means after excluding participants who answered the question 
about the point of the correction or control message correctly 
 
Figure 3581 Distribution and probability density of inference scores as function of correction information, 
misinformation, and Report in Experiment 6. Red dots represent mean and lines error bars represent 95% 
confidence interval. Dashed lines represent means after excluding participants who answered the question 
about the point of the correction or control message correctly 
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4.5.2. Inference Scores 
Figure 24 shows the distributional characteristics and means of 
inference scores across correction information, misinformation type, and 
scenario conditions. There is a clear pattern of results: exposure to a 
correction reduced references to target (mis)information relative to the 
uncorrected groups, irrespective of misinformation type. Figure 24 also shows 
that the distribution of misinformation references was more uniform for 
participants who were presented with a correction in the warehouse fire report 
whereas for the crash report references are skewed toward zero. Most 
importantly, there was no real difference in the number of misinformation 
references generated between the two misinformation type conditions.   
A zero-inflated regression model was fit to the inference score data 
(see Chapter 3 for more extensive rationale for this analytic approach). Table 
9 shows the results of the analysis of deviance test performed to establish the 
presence of interactions and main effects in the data. The analysis revealed a 
significant three-way interaction between correction information, 
misinformation type, and the scenario presented to participants.  
Table 10 shows the marginal means and significance of post-hoc 
comparisons. The table of marginal means shows that correction information 
significantly reduced reference to target (mis)information for both the crash 
and fire reports. There was no difference between implied and explicitly stated 
corrected misinformation conditions. This finding held for both the warehouse 
fire and crash reports. The difference that appeared to drive the significant 
three-way interaction was between explicitly stated, corrected misinformation 
in the fire report, and implied corrected misinformation in the crash report. 
This difference was not predicted, and was not particularly informative with 
respect to replicating the difference between implied and explicitly stated 
misinformation, and is therefore not discussed further.  
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Table 9 Analysis of deviance test on model terms for inference scores in 
Experiment 6 
Term df    p value 
Correction Information 1 27.08 <.001*** 
Misinformation Type 1 2.62 .11 
Scenario 1 0.12 .73 
Correction Information*Scenario 1 0.40 .53 
Correction Information*Misinformation Type 1 2.77 .10 
Scenario *Misinformation Type 1 0.14 .71 
Correction Information* Scenario *Misinformation 
Type 
1 4.24 .04* 
 
Table 10 Marginal inference score means and post-hoc comparisons 
Experiment 6 
Correction 
Information 
Misinformation 
Type 
Scenario 
Estimated 
marginal 
mean 
Group 
Corr.       Implied            Crash   0.26 a 
Corr.       Explicitly Stated Crash   0.55 ab 
Corr.       Explicitly Stated Warehouse Fire    1.45 b 
Corr.              Implied     Warehouse Fire    1.56 ab 
No Corr.    Implied            Warehouse Fire    3.45 c 
No Corr.    Explicitly Stated Fire    4.25 c 
No Corr.    Implied            Crash   4.29 c 
No Corr.    Explicitly Stated Crash   4.36 c 
 
Note: Confidence level used: 0.95. Confidence-level adjustment: sidak 
method for 8 estimates. P value adjustment: Tukey method for comparing a 
family of 8 estimates. Significance level used: alpha = 0.05. Comparisons that 
share the same letter group are not significantly different.  
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Figure 25 Proportions of participants who recalled or did not recall the correction, and either referred or did not refer to 
target (mis)information, by correction information condition and scenario in Experiment 6. 
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Subset-analyses. Inference score analyses were also performed on 
two subsets of the data. The first subset only included participants who 
answered instruction attention check questions correctly (N = 115). This 
analysis was performed in order to examine the results obtained were 
attributable to participant inattention, as measured through their ability to 
correctly answer questions about the instructions. The final model obtained 
from this subset of participants retained the three-way interaction. Analysis of 
deviance tests showed that the three-way interaction was not quite significant, 
p = .06. Breakdown of the interaction through post-hoc tests similarly revealed 
that the differences between condition means were not meaningful with 
respect to replication of the original findings. The second subset included only 
participants who recalled the critical information (N = 100), in order to 
examine whether the results may be affected a failure to encode the critical 
information presented at Message 10 rather than general inattentiveness to 
the task instructions. The final model retained main effects of correction 
information and event report. However, the analysis of deviance tests 
indicated that only the main effect of correction information was significant, p 
< .001. 
Correction acknowledgment. The proportion of participants who 
referred to misinformation even though they acknowledged that the 
information had been corrected for each is shown in Figure 25. The figure 
shows that the proportion of participants who made at least one 
uncontroverted reference to misinformation whilst also acknowledging that the 
information was corrected was substantially higher for the warehouse fire 
report (56-68%) than the crash report (16-14%). This was presumably 
because so few people referred to the misinformation in the crash report.  
This replicates findings reported in Chapter 3.  
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4.5.3. Recall Accuracy Scores 
A zero-inflated regression model was fit to the recall accuracy scores to 
examine whether condition affected the number of details that were accurately 
recalled from the report. The results of the analysis of deviance test for recall 
scores can be found in Table 11. There was a significant effect of scenario on 
the number of accurate details recalled. When averaging across correction 
information and misinformation conditions participants recalled more accurate 
details from the crash (M = 5.52, SD = 1.55) and warehouse fire (M = 4.72, 
SD = 1.80), reports. The p-value for the three-way interaction term was 
significant (p = .046); the interaction was not broken down further36. 
Table 11 Analysis of deviance test on model terms for recall scores in 
Experiment 6 
                                            
36
 A stepwise approach comparing the AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) of each 
model confirmed that report was the only factor that should be included in the final model.  
Term df    p-value 
Correction Information  1 1.198  .16 
Misinformation Type 1 4.76 .03* 
Scenario 1 0.02 .89 
Correction Information*Scenario 1 0.19 .67 
Correction Information*Misinformation Type 1 0.32 .57 
Scenario*Misinformation Type 1 0.03 .86 
Correction Information*Scenario*Misinformation Type 1 3.97 .05* 
Note: *. Effect is significant at the 0.05 level    
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4.5.4. Critical Information Recall  
Figure 26 shows the proportion of participants who accurately recalled 
critical information (either the correction or control message shown at 
Message 10). A chi-square test of independence on the crash report data 
revealed a significant association between condition and critical information 
recall,     (3) = 40.83, p < .001, and the warehouse fire report,    (3) = 22.47, 
p < .001. Participants who read the crash report were more likely to recall 
critical information when they received a correction (Explicitly Stated = 22.2%, 
Implied = 18.9%) than when misinformation was uncorrected (Explicitly Stated 
= 4.44%, Implied = 7.78%). The proportion of participants who read the 
warehouse fire report and correctly recalled the critical information was also 
higher when they received a correction (Explicitly Stated = 24.40%, Implied = 
20.51%). The fact that participants were more likely to recall the correction 
Figure 26 Proportion correctly recalling critical information (presented 
at Message) in Experiment 6 
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than the control critical information suggests that this information was more 
salient and therefore more available in memory. However, this could not be 
further confirmed by additional tests looking only at correction conditions as 
the data violated the chi-square assumptions (i.e. more than 20% of the cells 
had expected counts of less than 5).  
4.6. Summary 
Experiment 6 was designed to examine whether misinformation that 
implies a likely cause of an adverse outcome is more resistant to correction 
than explicitly stated misinformation in two scenarios. Corrections to 
misinformation were directly compared in a scenario where the CIE was 
previously eliminated (crash scenario) and one in which the CIE was present 
(warehouse fire scenario; see Experiment 4 and 5’s results). This comparison 
made was in order to examine whether there was an interaction between 
correction information, misinformation type, and scenario.  
Findings showed no evidence that implied misinformation was more 
resistant to correction than explicitly stated misinformation. That is, 
participants produced a similar number of post-correction references to 
implied and explicitly stated misinformation. These results are inconsistent 
with previous findings showing that implied misinformation is more resistant to 
correction than explicitly stated misinformation (Rich & Zaragoza, 2016). One 
possible reason Rich and Zaragoza’s findings were not replicated could be 
the low sample size in Experiment 6 relative to prior work. Even after 
excluding participants who did not recall the correction there were at least 40 
participants in each experimental condition whereas group sizes in the 
present experiment ranged from 16-2537. Although the experiment was not 
designed to be underpowered, financial constraints at the time the experiment 
was conducted limited the number of participants it was possible to recruit for 
the study. Another possible reason for the lack of replication could be that the 
implied versus explicitly stated manipulation was too subtle to exert any 
influence. Although the wording of misinformation used in the ‘explicitly stated’ 
misinformation condition was almost identical to that of prior work (i.e. “Police 
                                            
37
 Group sizes were unequal due to an allocation error in Qualtrics.  
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suspect that …”), participants may not have interpreted this as an explicit 
statement of the likely cause of the outcome.   
Experiment 6’s results also showed further evidence that corrections 
almost eliminated reliance on misinformation for the crash report but not for 
the warehouse fire report. As noted in Chapter 3, this finding provides some 
possible constraints on the situations in which the CIE occurs. More 
specifically, the finding suggests that corrections which fully invalidate 
misinformation by completely ruling out its role in the outcome of the event do 
successfully eliminate reliance on misinformation. In contrast, corrections 
which leave some room for misinformation to be true result in a continuing 
influence of misinformation.   
4.7. Experiment 7 
Experiment 7 was designed address the limitations of Experiment 6 by 
increasing the sample size and using a different scenario in which the 
misinformation manipulation was more palpable (i.e. “Woman assaulted” 
rather than “Police suspect woman was assaulted”). It was also desirable to 
compare implied and explicitly stated misinformation in a scenario which had 
previously elicited the CIE (see Experiment 4’s results).  
Experiment 7 also included a novel control condition in which the 
correction is presented but the misinformation is not (this control condition 
was also included Experiments 2A and 2B reported in Chapter 2 of this 
thesis). This condition was included in order to further establish the extent to 
which misinformation is referred to simply because it has been mentioned or 
because it forms part of an initially constructed, coherent mental-model. 
Results presented in Chapter 2 showed that this control condition results in a 
similar number of references to misinformation as a condition in which 
misinformation is first presented and then corrected later. Therefore an 
additional aim of Experiment 7 was to replicate this with one of the new 
scenarios developed for this experimental programme.  
The method, directional hypotheses, and analysis plan (including planned 
analyses, data stopping rule, and exclusion criteria) were pre-registered prior 
to data collection; this information can be found at: https://osf.io/ep2rs/. 
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Experiment 7 aimed to test the following hypotheses: A) a correction will 
reduce, but not eliminate, references to target (mis)information compared to 
no correction, B) implied misinformation will lead to a reduced effect of 
correction, and C) presenting a correction without initial misinformation will 
result in continued reliance on misinformation38.  
4.8. Method 
4.8.1. Participants 
                                            
38
 We also took this opportunity to include the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) which 
is a task designed to measure an individual’s tendency to an incorrect but instinctive 
response and further reflect in order to find the correct answer (Frederick, 2005). The CRT 
has been correlated with judgmental biases (heuristics) (Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011). 
Analysis of the relationship between continued reliance on misinformation and cognitive 
reflection was exploratory. Previous CIE research has found that performance on the CIE 
does not correlate with personality measures reflecting the extent to which individuals are 
inclined to towards effortful cognitive activities (Rich, 2016). There was no evidence that CRT 
scores predicted continued reliance on misinformation so the results are not discussed further 
here.  
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A power analysis using a medium effect size for the main effect of 
correction information suggested that a minimum of 210 participants would be 
required to achieve high statistical power (ƒ = .25, α = .05, 1-β = .95). The 
‘stopping rule’ was pre-registered (https://osf.io/ep2rs/) in order to constrain 
researcher degrees of freedom. The aim was over-recruit in order to replace 
participants that did not comply with the instructions (N=260). In total 268 U.S. 
based participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk. The target 
sample size was slightly exceeded because Amazon Mechanical Turk had 
been contaminated with a high number of responses from bots from or from 
another unidentified source, at the time of data collection. A reasonably high 
number of participants (N=20) were excluded prior to analysis because their 
responses were nonsensical, not relevant to the question (e.g. "Many 
countries around the world are installing closed-circuit television (CCTV) 
surveillance camera systems as an additional tool in fighting crime and 
making their streets safe. Based on many studies, the very presence of 
camera surveillance systems has discouraged criminals, thus preventing 
crimes from happening”) because they repeated the information in the 
question, or because they exceeded the time restriction of 60 minutes. 
Following exclusions, there were 248 (96 female and 152 male, Mage = 35.58, 
SD = 11.09) participants. Participants were paid $1.80 and took 17 minutes 
on average to complete the study.  
Figure 27 Explicitly stated (top) and implied (bottom) target 
(mis)information for the head injury scenario in Experiment 7 
 
 
Figure 3612 Explicitly stated (top) and implied (bottom) target 
(mis)information for the head injury scenario in Experiment 7 
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4.8.2. Stimuli, Design & Procedure 
The stimuli used in Experiment 7 were almost identical to those used 
for the head injury scenario in Experiment 4 (see Appendix I). The only 
exception was that the present study included two different types of 
misinformation: one which implied that a woman found unconscious in the 
street had been attacked by a man seen running away and the other in which 
this information was explicitly stated. Figure 27 shows the wording and 
presentation format of the implied and explicitly stated ‘breaking news’ 
statements used in Experiment 7. One group of participants also received a 
control message at the same point others read target (mis)information. The 
control message was as follows: “Detective Symons makes statement: “We 
ask the public to stay away from the scene while we investigate.” The critical 
(correction) information presented at Message 10 stated: Det. Symons revises 
earlier statement: “A man seen running away was not involved in the incident. 
Injuries could not have come from physical assault”, instead of referring to the 
‘the man’. The wording was changed in order to avoid participants thinking 
they had missed earlier information.  
The effect of correction information (No Correction, Correction), and 
Misinformation Type (Explicitly Stated, Implied) on reference to target 
(mis)information was assessed between groups (k = 4). The present study 
also included an additional control condition in which misinformation was only 
mentioned as it was being corrected. Participants were therefore randomly 
allocated to one of 5 experimental conditions39: 1) Implied misinformation + 
No Correction, 2) Explicitly Stated misinformation + No Correction, 3) Implied 
misinformation + Correction, 4) Explicitly Stated misinformation + Correction, 
5) No misinformation + Correction. The two ‘no correction’ conditions served 
as an empirical baseline to establish the effectiveness of a correction. The ‘no 
misinformation + correction’ control condition made it possible to establish 
whether some of the CIE can be explained by the availability of the causal 
explanation posited by the misinformation.   
                                            
39
 N = 49-52 in each group 
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The experimental procedure was much the same as Experiment 6: 
participants read the report, answered intermixed inference and factual recall 
questions, and then answered critical information question. There were two 
small differences to the procedure in Experiment 6. First, the instructional 
attention check included at the beginning of the study required participants to 
answer all three questions correctly before proceeding to the study (as 
suggested by Crump et al. 2013). Second, the modified recognition test was 
not included after answering the questionnaire. Instead, participants 
completed the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) after they answered the critical 
information recall questions.  
4.9. Results 
4.9.1. Coding of Responses 
The criteria for coding responses were identical to those used in 
Chapter 3 (and can also be found in Appendix H), and so are not fully 
reiterated here. Table 12 shows examples of responses that were coded as a 
reference to target (mis)information and an example of a response that was 
not coded as such. The maximum individual score for inference questions 
was 7. Responses to factual questions were scored for accuracy; correct or 
partially correct responses were scored 1 and incorrect responses were 
scored 0; the maximum factual score was 7. Critical information recall scores 
were computed using the same criteria; the maximum individual critical 
information recall score was 240. 
 
Table 12 Example of inference response coding in Experiment 7 
Inference 
Question 
Example of Response Scored 1 
Example of 
Response 
Scored 0 
                                            
40
 Due to time and resource constraints it was not possible to perform inter-coder 
reliability analysis for Experiment 7. This will be done at a later stage.  
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What do you think 
is a likely 
explanation for 
what happened to 
the injured 
woman? 
A person followed her after she left her 
assignment, followed her to this location 
and then, thinking that he was in a secluded 
location, hit her on the head from behind.  
Perhaps he stole her handbag or committed 
another form of assault before leaving, but 
from the screams and the attention of the 
locals he probably fled. 
It sounded to me 
like she was in 
some sort 
accident possibly 
a motor vehicle 
one. 
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Figure 28 Distribution and probability density of inference scores as function of correction information and misinformation type 
in Experiment 7. Red dots represent mean and lines error bars represent 95% confidence interval. Dashed lines represent 
means after excluding participants who answered the question about the point of the correction or control message correctly 
 
Figure 3613 Distribution and probability density of inference scores as function of correction information and misinformation 
type in Experiment 7. Red dots represent mean and lines error bars represent 95% confidence interval. Dashed lines represent 
means after excluding participants who answered the question about the point of the correction or control message correctly 
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4.9.2. Inference Scores 
Figure 28 shows the distributional characteristics of inference scores 
across misinformation and correction information conditions. The mean 
number of references to target (mis)information are also shown here. The 
pattern of results is consistent with previous findings reported in this chapter: 
the number of post-correction target (mis)information references produced 
were equivalent for both implied and explicitly stated misinformation. The 
number of references to implied and explicitly stated target (mis)information 
produced in the uncorrected conditions were roughly similar. Figure 28 also 
shows that the number of references to target (mis)information were reduced 
– but not eliminated completely - for the groups who received a correction. 
Interestingly, participants for whom misinformation was only mentioned during 
the correction still referred to the misinformation despite the fact that it was 
only mentioned in the correction.  
 A zero-inflated regression model was fit to inference scores with 
misinformation and correction information group as the predictor. An analysis 
of deviance test on inference scores showed that misinformation and 
correction information condition significantly predicted the number of 
references to misinformation produced,    (4) = 30.93, p < .001. Table 13 
shows the marginal means and post-hoc comparisons with tukey adjustment 
for multiple comparisons. The table shows that the corrections to both implied 
and explicitly stated misinformation significantly reduced the number of 
references to target (mis)information compared to uncorrected misinformation. 
The differences between implied and explicitly stated misinformation did not 
differ between uncorrected or corrected conditions. The condition featuring no 
initial misinformation and a correction significantly differed from the 
uncorrected conditions but not from corrected conditions.  
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Table 13 Marginal inference score means and post-hoc comparisons 
Experiment 7 
Misinformation Type 
Correction 
Information 
Estimated marginal 
means 
Group 
Implied No Correction 2.81 b 
Explicitly Stated No Correction 3.23 b 
Implied Correction 1.30 a 
Explicitly Stated Correction 1.29 a 
No Misinformation Correction 0.76 a 
 
Note: Confidence level used: 0.95. Confidence-level adjustment: sidak 
method for 8 estimates. P value adjustment: Tukey method for comparing a 
family of 8 estimates significance level used: alpha = 0.05. Comparisons that 
share the same letter group are not significantly different.  
 
Question analysis. The proportion of references to target 
(mis)information was examined separately for each inference question and 
condition. Figure 29 shows that participants were most likely to refer to the 
misinformation in response to the questions that asked who, if anyone, was 
responsible for the woman’s injuries and what the most likely explanation for 
the woman’s injuries was. There did not appear to be any tangible pattern of 
responding with respect to type of misinformation presented (i.e. implied or 
explicitly stated). Interestingly, participants were more likely to refer to 
misinformation when asked what a likely explanation for the women’s injuries 
was than they were when asked what the most likely cause of the woman’s 
injuries was. 
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Figure 29 Proportion of references to target (mis)information by inference question and condition in Experiment 7 
 
 
Figure 3644 Proportion of references to target (mis)information by inference question and condition in Experiment 7 
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Figure 30 Proportions of participants from the correction groups who recalled or did not recall the correction, 
and either referred or did not refer to target (mis)information, by misinformation type in Experiment 7.  
 
 
Figure 3675 Proportions of participants who recalled or did not recall the correction, and either referred or 
did not refer to target (mis)information, by misinformation type in Experiment 7 
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Correction acknowledgment. The proportion of participants who 
referred to misinformation even though they acknowledged that the 
information had been corrected is shown for each condition in Figure 30. The 
figure shows that the proportion of participants who made at least one 
reference to misinformation whilst also acknowledging that misinformation 
was corrected was higher for the group who received a correction to implied 
misinformation (64%) than for explicitly stated misinformation (45%). This 
somewhat contradicts the inference scores which show no difference between 
the conditions in terms of the average number of misinformation references 
produced.  One participant who acknowledged the correction and referred to 
the misinformation in response to the inference questions wrote “Even though 
there was a man deemed not responsible that ran away from the incident, I 
still think he was the one responsible”. The same participant later wrote that 
“He stated that the man that was seen running away from the incident was not 
involved” in response to question asking what the implication of the second 
report from Detective Symons was. It is not entirely clear why participants who 
received explicitly stated misinformation were more likely to refer to 
misinformation whilst also acknowledging that it was corrected. This could be 
due to the salience, and therefore availability of this information in memory, 
when answering inference questions.  
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4.9.3. Recall Accuracy Scores 
The Poisson regression model fit to recall accuracy scores indicated 
combination of misinformation and correction information did not predict the 
number of details that were accurately recalled from the report,    (4) = 0.90, 
p = .92. 
4.9.4. Critical Information Recall 
A chi-square test of independence on these data revealed a significant 
association between condition and critical information recall,     (4) = 114.53, 
p < .001. This was primarily due to the low proportion of the no correction 
group (Implied = 17.3%, Explicitly Stated = 20.8%) who accurately recalled 
the critical information (i.e. that police had cordoned off the area and were 
appealing for witnesses). In contrast over half of the participants in the groups 
featuring a correction recalled the critical correction information: implied + 
Figure 31 Proportion correctly recalling critical information (presented 
at Message 10) in Experiment 7. 
 
Figure 3706 Critical information recall as a function of correction 
information. Shown separately for crash (A) and fire (B) reports in 
Experiment 5 
 
Figure 3707 Critical information recall as a function of correction 
information. Shown separately for crash (A) and fire (B) reports in 
Experiment 5 
 
Figure 3708 Critical information recall as a function of correction 
information. Shown separately for crash (A) and fire (B) reports in 
Experiment 5 
 
Figure 3709 Critical information recall as a function of correction 
infor ation. Shown separately for crash (A) and fire (B) reportsFigure 
3710 Proportion correctly recalling critical information (presented at 
Message 10) in Experiment 7 
 
Figure 3711 Critical information recall as a function of correction 
information. Shown separately for crash (A) and fire (B) reports in 
Experiment 5 
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correction (94%), explicit + correction (83.6%) and no misinformation + 
correction (81.6%). The difference in conditions may be explained by the 
difference in the salience of the critical information (i.e. correction of 
misinformation vs. inconsequential update from police). The test was not 
significant when looking just at the conditions featuring a correction,    (2) = 
3.73, p = .15. 
4.10. Summary 
Experiment 7 was designed to test the effectiveness of corrections to 
misinformation that implies or explicitly states the likely cause of an adverse 
outcome. Experiment 7 differed from Experiment 6 in that it tested the 
effectiveness of corrections in a different scenario in which explicitly stated 
misinformation was more obvious (i.e. “Woman assaulted, man seen running 
away” vs. “Man seen running away”). The number of participants recruited in 
Experiment 7 was also doubled to increase statistical power, and there was 
also a more balanced allocation to groups. An additional control condition in 
which misinformation was not initially presented and was only referred to 
whilst being corrected, was also included.  
Experiment 7’s results provide further evidence that misinformation 
implying or explicitly stating a likely cause of an adverse outcome are equally 
resistant to correction. The number of post-correction references to target 
(mis)information did not significantly differ between the implied and explicitly 
stated misinformation conditions. The uncorrected misinformation conditions 
also showed no difference between implied and explicitly stated 
misinformation. Interestingly, the condition in which misinformation was only 
presented as part of the correction was not significantly lower than the two 
conditions featuring a correction. This may suggest that a large part of the CIE 
occurs because of the availability of the causal explanation offered by 
misinformation rather than a preference for a coherent mental model. This 
result is also consistent with Experiment 2A and 2B’s results showing that 
presenting misinformation only as part of the correction did not significantly 
reduce reference to misinformation from the conditions featuring both 
misinformation and its correction.  
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4.11. Conclusion 
The two experiments reported in this chapter were designed to 
examine whether misinformation which implies a likely cause of an adverse 
outcome is more resistant to correction than misinformation which explicitly 
states a likely cause. An additional consideration was the generalisability of 
this effect to different scenarios. One limitation of previous CIE studies is that 
they typically employ one scenario to test effects of interest. One of the 
scenarios used in the present study was a modified version of the warehouse 
fire scenario used in previous research (Guillory & Geraci, 2010; Johnson & 
Seifert, 1994; Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 1988). The other two scenarios (crash 
and head injury) were newly developed for the purposes of this experimental 
programme.  
The results of experiments reported in this chapter provide evidence 
that implied and explicitly stated misinformation are equally resistant to 
correction when a CIE is present. There was no difference in the number of 
misinformation references produced following a correction to implied or 
explicitly stated misinformation in three different scenarios. These findings are 
inconsistent with previous studies showing that implied misinformation is more 
resistant to correction than explicitly stated misinformation (Rich & Zaragoza, 
2016).  
Although Experiment 6 found a significant interaction between 
correction information, misinformation type, and scenario, the interaction was 
driven by an uninformative difference between conditions; specifically, the 
number of references to corrected implied and explicitly stated target 
(mis)information significantly differed between the warehouse fire and crash 
reports. Participants in conditions featuring a correction referred to target 
(mis)information significantly less than uncorrected groups, regardless of 
whether misinformation was implied or explicitly stated, or the scenario that 
participants read. Experiment 7’s results similarly showed that the number of 
post-correction target (mis)information references produced did not differ 
between implied and explicitly stated conditions. Uncorrected implied and 
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explicitly misinformation conditions, also produced a similar number of 
references to target (mis)information.  
 One potential explanation for the lack of replication in Experiment 6 
was eliminated by increasing the sample size in Experiment 7. The lack of 
replication in Experiment 6 did not appear to be the result of the subtleness of 
the explicitly stated misinformation either. Explicitly stated misinformation in 
Experiment 7 made the report of the woman being assaulted abundantly 
clear.  
Another possible explanation for the lack of replication could be due to 
the fact that the scenarios used in Experiments 6 and 7 (and in Chapter 3) 
were specifically designed such that additional event information, that was 
presented either side of misinformation and of the correction, was not 
congruent with the misinformation. Previous studies that have used the 
warehouse fire scenario have included information that is congruent with the 
causal explanation offered by misinformation. For example, the warehouse 
fire scenario includes reports that that there were ‘explosions’ and that 
‘firefighters had inhaled toxic fumes’, which can be interpreted as effects of 
burning gas cylinders and oil paint.  This information could therefore be 
interpreted as evidence that the misinformation is in fact true, and that the 
correction is in fact false. The jewellery theft scenario used in Rich and 
Zaragoza (2016) included additional information that was congruent with the 
misinformation explanation. For instance, participants were told that items 
such as the TV were not missing from the house. Knowing that these items 
were not stolen increases the possibility that the culprit was only interested in 
jewellery. This in turn makes it more likely that the person who stole the 
jewellery knew where it was located.  
The reports used in Experiments 6 and 7 only included one piece of 
information that could be interpreted as congruent with the explanation offered 
by misinformation. Namely, that ‘thick and oily smoke had hindered 
firefighters’ efforts’, that the driver of the van that crashed was ‘a recent 
divorcee who had a prolonged legal battle with his ex-wife’, or that ‘An initial 
medical report suggests head injuries are consistent with impact from a blow 
to the head’. The inclusion of these ‘additional information’ statements may 
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only slightly increase the possibility that the misinformation caused the 
outcome. One reason that there was no difference between implied and 
explicitly stated misinformation conditions could be that the stimuli used did 
not allow participants to construct a particularly elaborate mental model of the 
event. If participants did not construct particularly elaborate mental event 
models in the first place then whether misinformation implied or explicitly 
stated a likely cause of the fire might not make much of a difference to 
generating misinformation consistent causal inferences.  
After considering the different possibilities it is still not entirely clear 
why the difference between implied and explicitly stated misinformation was 
not replicated. In order to further investigate this, it would be necessary to test 
different scenarios that vary in terms of their structure. Perhaps one way of 
doing this would be to experimentally manipulate whether the report includes 
additional information that is congruent, incongruent, or neutral with respect to 
the explanation offered by misinformation. Experiments 6 and 7’s results may 
suggest that story structure, rather than story content per se, interact with the 
effectiveness of corrections to implied or explicitly stated misinformation. 
However, to verify this idea it would need to be tested experimentally. 
In addition to the main findings, Experiment 6’s results also showed 
further evidence that the CIE was substantially attenuated in the crash report 
compared to the warehouse fire and head injury reports. More than half of the 
participants who read the warehouse fire (56-68%) and head injury (45-64%) 
reports referred to corrected misinformation at least whereas only a small 
proportion of participants who read the crash report did so (14-16%). These 
results are consistent with the experimental results reported in Chapter 3 of 
this thesis. One possible explanation for this difference could be related to the 
degree of inference required for a given scenario, which was not 
experimentally manipulated here. As has been noted previously, the 
correction used in some scenarios (e.g. warehouse fire, head injury) leaves 
open the possibility that the explanation offered by misinformation might be in 
some way true, whereas the correction in the crash scenario rules out the 
explanation offered by misinformation. The latter case reduces the degree of 
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inference required to understand what has happened whereas the former 
cases require a higher degree of inference.  
To conclude, the present set of experiments showed no evidence that 
corrections to explicitly stated misinformation are more effective than 
corrections to implied misinformation. The fact that this result was not 
replicated across three different scenarios suggests that is not due to the 
scenarios used. Future studies should also measure participants’ recall of 
target (mis)information to establish how well this information is preserved in 
memory as participants may not have been able to recall the details that 
distinguish misinformation conditions. Despite these limitations, the present 
study’s results highlight the importance of testing the boundary conditions of 
the CIE by replicating previous findings with different scenarios. Furthermore, 
these results provide further evidence that the CIE is not guaranteed to 
emerge under all circumstances which provides some possible constraints on 
the generalisability of continued influence findings. 
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5 General Discussion 
5.1. Thesis Aims 
Existing research on the continued influence effect (CIE) of 
misinformation has established that the CIE can be observed under some 
circumstances, but not whether it would always be expected. A review of CIE 
studies suggests that methodological factors may affect the extent to which a 
correction reduces reliance on misinformation independently of experimental 
manipulations. In particular, the limited number of scenarios used in CIE 
studies, variability in sample sizes, and the student population typically used 
in CIE studies, could have an impact on the validity and reliability findings 
obtained using the CIE approach. The latter can pose significant challenges to 
understanding the prevalence of the CIE as a phenomenon in the world. This 
thesis’ primary aim was to advance understanding of the continued influence 
effect, and the conditions under which it occurs, and to overcome existing 
methodological problems of validity and reliability allowing for more effective 
testing of the CIE in the future. This was achieved through a series of 
methodological steps. The first step was to develop and validate a 
methodology that allows for web-based testing of the CIE to facilitate and 
streamline data collection from larger and more representative samples. The 
second step was to use this methodology to examine the prevalence of the 
CIE across different scenarios, in more realistic settings (i.e. report of a 
potential assault or motor accident), and with larger samples. This 
methodology was then used to investigate the robustness of two claims from 
the CIE literature, and also whether continued reliance on misinformation 
extends to a novel control condition in which misinformation is only mentioned 
in the correction. 
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The first claim from the CIE literature examined was that corrections which 
explain how misinformation occurred (e.g. from unintentional error or 
intentional lie) can help people understand the contradiction between 
misinformation and the correction, and reduce continued reliance on 
misinformation (as suggested by Bush, Johnson, & Seifert, 1994; Johnson & 
Seifert, 1994; Seifert, 2002). Corrections that explain where misinformation 
originated (and is therefore erroneous) can be likened to real-world situations 
in which jurors are asked to ignore inadmissible information because it is 
unreliable, a scientific article is retracted because data has been fabricated, or 
information in the news is corrected because initial information was relayed in 
error. The second claim investigated was that misinformation, which implies a 
likely cause of an adverse outcome, is more resistant to correction than 
misinformation explicitly stating a likely cause (Rich & Zaragoza, 2016). 
Misinformation that implies a likely cause of an adverse outcome may be 
likened to situations in which the media or politicians insinuate or use 
innuendo based on false or inaccurate information. The robustness of these 
claims was examined to establish the circumstances under which the CIE is 
likely to occur. 
5.2. Chapter Summaries 
5.2.1. Chapter 1 
Chapter 1 reviewed existing CIE research, showing that people often 
continue to rely on misinformation despite clear and credible corrections 
(Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Seifert, 2002; 2014). The review showed that 
corrections usually halve the number of times people refer to misinformation 
in comparison to a situation in which misinformation remains uncorrected (e.g. 
Ecker et al., 2010; Ecker et al., 2011b). However, corrections rarely eliminate 
reliance on misinformation completely when using the CIE approach. This 
basic finding has been replicated for different scenarios (e.g. warehouse fire, 
plane crash, jewellery theft), types of correction (Bush, Johnson, & Seifert, 
1994; Guillory & Geraci, 2013), and of misinformation (Ecker, Lewandowsky, 
& Apai, 2011; Rich & Zaragoza, 2016). The CIE has been explained either as 
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a failure to appropriately update a mental-model of an event (e.g. Johnson & 
Seifert, 1994), or as a failure to engage strategic memory processes during 
retrieval of the correction (e.g. Ecker et al., 2011b).  The precise mechanism 
by which the CIE occurs remains unresolved in the literature.  
Several factors have been shown to moderate the CIE. For instance, 
corrections are more effective when they provide an alternative causal 
explanation (Ecker et al., 2010; Ecker et al., 2011a; Johnson & Seifert, 1994; 
Rich & Zaragoza, 2016), are preceded by pre-exposure warnings about the 
persistence of misinformation (Ecker et al., 2010), originate from a highly 
trustworthy source (Guillory & Geraci, 2013), and address the conversational 
implications of contradictory statements (Bush et al., 1994). Although these 
factors have been shown to substantially reduce the CIE, even  combination 
of strategies (e.g. pre-exposure warnings and alternative explanation) has 
failed to eliminate continued reliance on misinformation completely (Ecker et 
al., 2010).  
Despite consensus on the basic finding, there has been considerable 
variability in the magnitude of the reduction in reliance on misinformation 
produced by a correction (see Table 1 in Chapter 1). This suggests that there 
are factors that affect the magnitude of the CIE over and above the specific 
variables being experimentally manipulated. This has implications for the 
validity reliability, and generalisability of findings obtained via the CIE 
methodology.  
One factor that potentially moderates the presence and magnitude of 
CIE the scenario used. Studies on the CIE have focused on a limited number 
of scenarios and effects are rarely examined across different scenarios. It is 
not clear whether these scenarios are representative of the variety of 
situations in which correction misinformation might be encountered, or 
whether they are primarily used because they reliably produce the CIE. This 
raises questions about the representativeness and ecological validity of the 
scenarios used in CIE studies. By extension, the limited number of scenarios 
may be indicative a ‘file drawer’ problem; some scenarios just do not elicit the 
CIE and are therefore never published (Ioannidis et al., 2014; Rosenthal, 
 201 
     
1979; Spellman, 2012).  Such a ‘file drawer’ problem could lead to a 
misrepresentation of the set of circumstances that bring about the CIE as well 
as the mechanism/s by which it occurs.  
Another factor that could affect the validity and generalisability of 
results is that CIE studies have mainly been conducted in the lab with 
university students. University students are not representative of the general 
adult population as their demographics are inherently biased with respect to 
age, experience, intellectual ability, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status. 
Focusing attention on population with narrow demographics may undermine 
the generalisability of results to more diverse populations but also lead to 
misestimating the prevalence of the CIE as a phenomenon in the world. More 
pointedly, recruiting through university subject pools often entails small 
samples sizes which can result in low statistical power. This may be 
particularly the case for the independent group experimental designs that are 
often necessary in CIE studies. Low power can result in reduced chance of 
detecting a true effect, but also reduces the likelihood that a statistically 
significant result is a true effect (Button et al., 2013; Ioannidis, 2005; 
Ioannidis, Munafo, Fusar-Poli, Nosek, & David, 2014). Accordingly, some of 
the variability observed in CIE findings (i.e. correction either reduces but does 
not eliminate or does not reduce reliance on misinformation) could be 
explained by the low sample sizes in some studies.  
5.2.2. Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 reported four experiments examining the feasibility of 
collecting data on the CIE online and comparing open-ended and closed-
ended inference measures. To compare online results to those obtained a 
lab-based experiment, experimental manipulations were tested using the 
exact same warehouse fire scenario used in Johnson and Seifert (1994; Exp 
3A). Experiments 1A and 1B also employed a common CIE experimental 
design (Ecker et al., 2010; Ecker et al., 2011a; Johnson & Seifert, 1994; Rich 
& Zaragoza, 2016), in which the number of references to target 
(mis)information produced when misinformation was corrected, corrected and 
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an alternative explanation provided, or remained uncorrected, were 
compared. Experiments 2A and 2B used a similar design but substituted the 
alternative explanation condition for a novel control condition in which 
misinformation was only mentioned as part of the correction.  
Findings of all four experiments showed that both open and closed 
elicitation procedures resulted in a clear CIE. Participants continued to refer to 
the misinformation despite a clear correction even though a majority recalled 
the correction. These findings provide clear evidence that both open-ended 
and closed-ended questions can be used in online experiments. Overall, there 
was limited evidence for an effect of correction for open-ended questions but 
substantial evidence for an effect of a correction using closed-ended question. 
The effect of a correction on misinformation references was relatively small for 
open-ended questions when using the warehouse fire scenario. Effects could 
therefore be hard to consistently detect using small sample sizes, which may 
explain variability in the CIE findings. It may also be the case that response 
format can exaggerate or minimise the difference between corrected and 
uncorrected groups. These findings provide further evidence for the variability 
of a correction’s effectiveness across studies and emphasise the influence 
sample size on detection of effects. They also highlight the need for a more 
systematic investigation of the CIE and suggest different measures can affect 
the strength of a correction in reducing the CIE.  
Experiments 2A and 2B’s findings showed that participants continued 
to use misinformation to answer inference questions, whether the 
misinformation was only mentioned in the correction, or was presented early 
in a series of statements and corrected later. Theoretically, this suggests that 
the CIE may not (always) arise from participants’ reluctance to part with an 
existing mental model without an alternative explanation (Ecker et al., 2010; 
Ecker et al., 2011a; Johnson & Seifert, 1994; Rich & Zaragoza, 2016). Rather, 
this finding suggests that participants search their memory for possible 
causes when asked inferential questions but fail to retrieve the information 
correcting the misinformation or disregard it. More generally, these findings 
have implications for web-based cognitive psychology experiments using 
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open-ended questions to elicit responses. Participants recruited via Amazon 
Mechanical Turk provided high-quality data in response to open-ended 
questions.  
5.2.3. Chapter 3 
The second set of experiments, reported in Chapter 3, were designed 
to examine whether corrections that explained why misinformation occurred 
more successfully reduced the CIE than corrections which negate 
misinformation (as found by Bush et al., 1994). Johnson and Seifert (1994; 
see also Seifert, 2002) proposed that corrections which explain where 
misinformation originated from (i.e. honest mistake, deceit) – and therefore 
address the conversation implications of the contradiction - might be more 
effective than corrections which negate misinformation and only address 
literal implications. Accordingly, two types of explanation were examined in 
Chapter 3: one in which the correction explained that misinformation occurred 
because of a lie and one in which misinformation occurred because of an 
error. There was a tentative prediction that due to our adroit detection of and 
general disbelief in lies that a correction which explained misinformation as a 
lie would be more effective than the error counterpart at reducing 
misinformation reliance.  Experiment 3 tested the effect of explanatory 
corrections in a modified version of the warehouse fire scenario, in which 
additional information either side of the misinformation was not biased in 
favour the causal explanation offered by the misinformation. Experiments 4 
and 5 moved to examining the effect explanatory corrections more broadly 
across different scenarios that upheld the same underlying scenario structure.   
Chapter 3’s findings showed that explanatory corrections did not 
reduce the number of misinformation references below a non-explanatory 
correction.  Explanatory corrections were therefore no more effective than a 
negation of earlier misinformation. There was also no evidence that a 
correction which explained misinformation as a lie was any more effective at 
reducing the CIE than a correction that explained misinformation as an error. 
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All three types of correction resulted in comparable levels of continued 
reliance on misinformation - and reduced, but did not eliminate, the CIE.  
These findings are inconsistent with previous work showing that 
corrections that account for conversational implications of the contradiction 
were more effective at reducing use of misinformation than corrections that 
account only for logic (Bush et al., 1994). The use of novel and carefully 
constructed scenarios in Experiments 4 and 5 provided further evidence that 
explanatory and non-explanatory corrections did not differ. The difference 
between past and present findings could be due to the scenario structure, low 
sample size, or possibly the ambiguousness of the correction used in prior 
work.  
Another possible explanation could be that explanatory corrections 
which describe the origins of misinformation as an honest mistake or a lie are 
distrusted because these explanations generate further pragmatic inferences 
about why the misinformation was introduced. In such an example, a 
participant might ask themselves why no one checked to see what the person 
said was accurate or genuine. This might limit the effectiveness of an 
explanatory correction to the level of a negation. Experiments 4 and 5 also 
provided evidence that the CIE occurs for some scenarios but not for others. 
The CIE was eliminated in the crash scenario, in which the correction made it 
explicitly clear the likely cause offered by misinformation could not have 
brought about the outcome (i.e. a test showed the driver had not been 
drinking).   
5.2.4. Chapter 4 
The final two experiments, reported in Chapter 4, were designed to 
examine the claim that misinformation, which implies a likely cause of an 
adverse outcome, is more resistant to correction than explicitly stated 
misinformation (as demonstrated by Rich and Zaragoza, 2016). These 
experiments addressed limitations of prior work by examining the effect of 
implied versus explicitly stated causal misinformation, across three scenarios 
that were developed for this programme of research.  
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Findings showed no evidence that corrections to implied 
misinformation were less effective than those that corrected explicitly stated 
misinformation. This was true of all the three scenarios examined in Chapter 
4. These findings are inconsistent with previous studies showing that implied 
misinformation is more resistant to correction than explicitly stated 
misinformation (Rich & Zaragoza, 2016). One potential explanation for the 
lack of replication in Experiment 6 was lack of power to detect an effect due to 
small sample size. This explanation in was ruled out in Experiment 7 wherein 
the number of participants assigned to each condition was doubled. Structural 
differences in the scenarios used in previous and the present work may also 
explain why the difference between implied and explicitly stated 
misinformation did not replicate. However, additional experiments would be 
required to confirm this empirically.  
Experiment 6 also showed further evidence that the CIE was 
substantially attenuated for the crash scenario. One possible explanation for 
why the CIE occurs in some scenarios but not others could be related to the 
degree of inference required for a given scenario, which was not 
experimentally manipulated in this thesis. In addition to this, Experiment 7’s 
results provided further evidence that the CIE is partly driven by the 
availability of the causal explanation offered by misinformation. Participants 
for whom misinformation was only mentioned during its correction referred to 
misinformation almost as often as a group who received misinformation first 
and the correction later. This is an important finding as it suggests that the 
CIE may in part be driven by the availability of the causal explanation offered 
by misinformation, rather than a mental-model updating failure.  
5.2.5. Conclusions 
I proposed that the specific scenario in which misinformation appears, 
and variability in sample sizes across studies, and restricted demographic, 
moderate whether the CIE occurs, and the strength of the correction in 
reducing the CIE. My findings show that the CIE is by no means guaranteed 
to arise under all circumstances. I have also tentatively argued that the 
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presence of the CIE could depend on the degree of inference required in each 
scenario. More precisely, that the CIE is substantially attenuated when the 
correction provides evidence ruling out the explanation offered by 
misinformation. Providing evidence that rules out the explanation offered by 
misinformation reduces the amount of inference required to resolve the 
contradiction between misinformation and its correction. Corrections that rule 
out the explanation offered by misinformation are likely to interact with other 
elements of the presented scenario. I have argued that the CIE may be 
partially explained by the availability of the causal explanation when 
answering inference questions rather than a reluctance to give up ones 
mental-model without an alternative explanation. Finally, I conclude that the 
conditions that give rise to the CIE are ill-specified, and that focussing on a 
limited number of scenarios, that are unrepresentative of the types of 
situations in which misinformation naturally occurs, limits the validity and 
reliability of CIE findings.  
5.3. Limitations and Future Research 
Given the pervasiveness and potential impact of misinformation in 
society, and the potential for CIE research to be used in policy 
recommendations, further investigation using different variants of the CIE 
paradigm is crucial for understanding reasoning and judgements about 
misinformation outside of the lab (or online testing environment). There were 
three main findings from my research. First, I showed that corrections which 
explain how misinformation has occurred (i.e. from deceit or an honest 
mistake) reduce continued reliance on misinformation. Second, I provided 
evidence against the claim that misinformation which implies a likely cause of 
an adverse outcome is more impervious to correction than explicitly stated 
causal misinformation. Third, I found that the CIE does not occur in situations 
in which misinformation is sufficiently invalidated.  Finally, I showed that the 
CIE may be partially driven by the availability of the causal explanation offered 
by misinformation. These findings show that the CIE is not guaranteed to 
occur and raises important questions about the specific set of circumstances 
that bring about the CIE. Misinformation, and corrections, can manifest in a 
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variety of ways and the types of situations misinformation can appear in vary 
widely. My research highlights the need for a more systematic approach to 
investigation of the CIE and shows that there is much more that can be done 
in this field of research.  
Another area that warrants further research is the different types of 
explanation for how misinformation occurred and why it is erroneous. My 
research has focused on two types of explanations for how misinformation 
originated: from dishonesty or an honest mistake. There are many ways that 
misinformation can be disseminated as well as explanations for how it 
occurred that rely on the intentionality distinction. For instance, misinformation 
can be initially disseminated accidentally – such as from fact checking errors 
in breaking news stories. Misinformation can be disseminated be more 
deliberately as a means of persuading people of a viewpoint. For instance, 
misinformation can originate from a misapplication of statistics, such as 
occurred in the Vote Leave’s EU referendum campaign. Future research 
should examine whether explanatory corrections that appeal to accidental 
versus deliberate reasons for dissemination of misinformation are always 
equally effective.  
There may be further differences in the types of explanation people find 
acceptable or ‘good’ explanations for where, how, or why misinformation 
occurred. For instance, research on evaluating explanations has shown that 
simpler explanations are often judged as better and more likely to be true, but 
that more complex explanations are preferred if they are more probable than 
simpler explanations (Lagnado, 1994; Lombrozo, 2007). Furthermore, Hilton 
(1990) has also argued that explanations are constrained by the rules of 
conversation (cf. Grice, 1975), and therefore must identify the factor that 
makes the difference between the target event (misinformation) and a 
counterfactual contrast case. There are several factors that could therefore 
moderate acceptance of an explanatory correction to misinformation that are 
worthy of further investigation.  
Future research should also focus on whether the correction provides 
concrete evidence to discredit misinformation and render it irrelevant. My 
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research provides preliminary evidence that corrections which provide 
evidence to counter the causal explanation offered by the misinformation (e.g. 
by providing a physical test showing that the crash was not caused by the 
driver being drunk), substantially attenuate the CIE. Previous work looking at 
correcting inaccurate information has shown that detailed refutations (e.g. by 
highlighting misrepresentation of scientific findings, and so on) affect the 
likelihood of a correction being accepted (Swire et al., 2017). To date, 
research on the CIE has not investigated the extent to which providing 
evidence to refute the hypothesis posited by the misinformation moderates 
the effectiveness of a correction. For instance, empirical studies on legal 
decision-making suggest that people value direct evidence – such as 
eyewitness testimony and confessions – over circumstantial evidence like 
DNA evidence or fingerprints (see Heller, 2006 for review of studies on how 
mock jurors evaluate direct and circumstantial evidence). Investigating the 
ways in which different types of evidence presented for the correction 
influence the CIE, may be particularly important in courtrooms where jurors 
may be faced with counter-evidence, or in situations in which scientific 
evidence is used to counter misinformation about an issue.  
The relationship between scenario structure, content, and the magnitude 
of the CIE, also warrants further exploration. My research has shown that 
some CIE findings do not extend to different scenarios (Bush et al., 1994; 
Rich & Zaragoza, 2016). One explanation for why previous findings were not 
replicated in the scenarios developed for this programme of research, could 
be that the congruency of additional event information with the causal 
explanation offered by misinformation was reduced relative to prior studies. 
Some scenarios may require a higher degree of inference to establish a 
causal explanation for the outcome described. This was not experimentally 
manipulated in the experiments reported in this thesis but is a worthy avenue 
of further investigation. Scenario factors such as structure, temporal 
sequencing, content, ambiguousness, or description of spatial elements, and 
prior knowledge or experience of the situations similar to the scenario, could 
be systematically varied to establish their impact on the CIE. This in turn may 
help establish the precise mechanisms that bring about the CIE. 
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Finally, the roles of incentivisation and the valence of the outcome 
described in the scenario may also moderate the CIE, and therefore deserve 
further investigation. Studies on the CIE typically use neutral scenarios in 
which there is no inherent reason to believe the correction over the 
misinformation presented. In the real-world people are often incentivised to 
believe certain things over others: either because we are motivated to confirm 
our pre-existing beliefs (or prejudices) or because our social status/job is 
preserving a particular belief. One reason that people continue to rely on 
misinformation in CIE studies could be that people are simply motivated to 
believe (or respond with) the less cognitively demanding piece of information, 
if there is no incentive to believe the correction over the misinformation. 
However, if there are personal repercussions involved in the continued use of 
misinformation then people might be less inclined to do so. This could be 
experimentally implemented by creating a situation in which continued use of 
misinformation comes with a monetary or social cost – such as in 
experimental game theory studies. 
Regarding the valence of the described outcome, it may seem trivial to 
point out that all CIE studies have used scenarios with negative outcomes. 
Prior work on the CIE has examined how the valence of misinformation (i.e. 
positive, negative, or neutral) affects its continuing impact on reasoning and 
found that negatively valenced information is more likely to be used to answer 
inferential questions than positively valenced, or neutral, misinformation 
(Guillory & Geraci, 2016). Misinformation may therefore have less of an 
impact in scenarios with positive outcomes and this may have implications for 
the types of situations that the CIE is likely to occur.  
5.4. Theoretical Insights and Implications 
The findings reported in this thesis provide insight into the theoretical 
foundations of the CIE. Theoretically, the present work raises questions about 
whether observing the CIE in experimental settings reflects a mental-model 
updating failure, strategic memory process failure, pragmatic demand, or 
simple recall (or perhaps something else entirely). The patterns of findings 
imply that the CIE is less frequent, smaller in magnitude, and more fragile 
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than generally assumed. This is because there are several factors which are 
not usually discussed in the CIE literature (e.g. the scenario of context that 
misinformation appears in, the ambiguity of the scenario, and the scope of the 
correction to invalidate the misinformation), but which nonetheless can affect 
whether and how the CIE occurs.  
5.4.1. Mechanistic accounts 
The findings reported in this thesis have implications for the 
mechanisms by which the CIE occurs. In particular, this thesis has 
implications for the idea that the CIE is driven by a failure, or unwillingness, to 
update a mental-model of an event unless an alternative is provided 
(Johnson-Laird, 1980; Johnson & Seifert, 1994; Seifert, 2002). First, my 
findings suggest that a coherent but incorrect model can be abandoned in 
favour a correct but incoherent model when the correction provides evidence 
to refute the explanation offered by misinformation. Therefore, it does not 
matter if a correction creates a gap in the model so long as it sufficiently 
invalidates the explanation offered by the misinformation (e.g. a test showed 
the driver had no alcohol in his system vs. no oil paint and gas cylinders ever 
in the warehouse).   
These findings could, however, still be interpreted as facilitating 
mental-model updating of an event. For instance, Putnam, Wahlheim and 
Jacoby (2014) have argued that factors which enhance detection of a conflict 
between competing event interpretations enable updating. Similarly, Kendeou, 
Walsh, Smith, and O’Brien (2014) have proposed that for effective knowledge 
revision to occur both invalidated and correction event interpretations must be 
activated. Empirical evidence for this comes from Ecker et al. (2017) who 
found that explicitly repeating the misinformation during correction was more 
effective at reducing misinformation reliance than avoiding repetition of the 
misinformation or explaining why misinformation was incorrect without 
repeating it. Findings from experiments reported in this thesis that used the 
crash scenario are concordant with this explanation. More specifically, stating 
that ‘a test showed the driver had no alcohol in his system’ could arguably 
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make the conflict between the competing interpretations of the event more 
apparent.  
The results of experiments reported in this thesis also suggest that the 
CIE does not always arise from a failure to update one’s mental model of an 
event. More specifically, the results obtained by introducing of a novel control 
condition suggest that – at least under some circumstances - the CIE may 
occur because participants search their memory for possible causes when 
asked inferential questions but fail to retrieve the information correcting the 
misinformation. The finding that participants still referred to misinformation 
even when it was only mentioned during the correction suggest that it is the 
availability of the causal explanation offered by misinformation rather than its 
role in the mental-model which drives some instances of the CIE.  
This finding could be interpreted as supporting a retrieval-failure 
account of the CIE. More specifically, when strategic memory processes are 
not engaged (either through lack of motivation or because of some detriment), 
participants may fail to retrieve the source and validity of the correction, and 
therefore rely on the explanation which was automatically activated by the 
inference question. If automatic processes are employed the “negation tag” 
linked to misinformation (e.g. a man seen running away did NOT assault the 
woman), may be lost because strategic processes are necessary to retrieve 
the source and veracity of the information. The findings are also consistent 
with research suggesting that belief perseverance – the tendency to cling to 
newly created beliefs when they are discredited – is mediated by the 
availability of causal arguments supporting initial beliefs (cf. Anderson et al. 
1985).  
The fact that the findings reported in this thesis, as well as in the CIE 
literature more generally, can be readily interpreted as supporting either the 
retrieval failure or mental-model updating accounts emphasises the need for a 
more systematic approach to studying the CIE. Furthermore, because there 
are significant issues surrounding the limited use of scenarios, different 
mechanisms may bring about the CIE depending on the specifics of the 
experimental method and scenario presented to participants. This highlights 
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the need to carefully examine whether specifics of the scenario moderate the 
CIE.  
5.4.2. Demand effects 
 An alternative – and perhaps more prosaic - interpretation of CIE 
findings, posits that the CIE reflects a demand effect of the methodology itself. 
Such an interpretation would see that a participant who exhibits the CIE may 
ask themselves why the report (or the experimenter) only provided one 
potential cause, which was then refuted, and then asked to answer a series of 
questions which seemingly require the corrected cause to be answered. The 
problem could also lie in the Gricean pragmatics of the experimental situation 
whereby participants contemplate why the experimenter would present 
information about a potential cause, say that it was not true, and then ask 
questions about the potential cause information. Thus, participants in CIE 
studies use the causal information presented in the story because it is the 
only relevant information available. Support for the idea that the CIE arises 
from a pragmatic demand in experimental settings comes from the fact that 
some participants did mention potential alternative causes when potential 
cause  information was provided immediately before the misinformation 
statement (e.g. stating that the woman’s head injuries were sustained when a 
car hit her rather than from an assault).  
Assumptions about the “communicative intention” of the information 
provided by the experimenter can inform how participants determine the 
relevance of the information provided to them. These assumptions can result 
in what appear to be judgemental errors that do not conform to the normative 
model the experimenter has in mind which only considers the literal meaning 
of the statement and not the communicative intention (Bless et al., 1993). If 
the CIE is the result of pragmatic demand in research settings, then findings 
obtained through this methodology are of limited value for understanding the 
cognitive mechanisms involved in processing corrections to misinformation. 
Furthermore, findings obtained through this methodology may be 
uninformative with respect to developing counter-misinformation strategies.  
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5.4.3. Gricean pragmatics of contradictory statements 
The findings also have implications for the Gricean pragmatics (Grice, 
1975) of presenting contradictory information. Seifert (2002; see also Johnson 
& Seifert, 1994) argued that corrections pose a problem for comprehension 
because people expect human generated information to be relevant and 
truthful. Prior CIE work suggests that corrections which explain how 
misinformation occurred reduce the CIE more than corrections which address 
only the literal implications of the contradiction (Bush et al., 1994). The results 
of the experiments reported in this thesis do not support this distinction. In 
fact, corrections which addressed the literal implications of the contradiction 
were as effective as those that addressed the pragmatic implications (i.e. by 
explaining that misinformation originated from an error or a lie). Furthermore, 
the correction information (without the lie or error explanation) included in the 
crash scenario addressed only the literal content of the contradiction by 
providing evidence that the driver had not been drinking, yet this correction 
almost eliminated the CIE. These findings suggest that Gricean pragmatics 
may only play a minor role in comprehending contradictions – or at least that 
the pragmatic inferences people make when faced with a contradiction are 
complex and not well understood.  
5.4.4. Formal approaches to modelling the CIE 
The CIE represents a descriptive model of how people process 
corrections to misinformation which is often assumed to depend on having a 
coherent, causally related account in which a single or minimal correction has 
a significant impact on the construal of meaning (Johnson & Seifert, 1994). 
The continued reliance on misinformation after a correction is often depicted 
as a bias – or systematic deviation from a normative standard - and therefore 
irrational (e.g. Lewandowsky et al., 2012). This perspective assumes two 
things; first, that the optimal solution is always to disregard initially prior 
information in favour of new information, and second that the ‘true’ value of 
the correction is known.  
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To date, the literature on the CIE has provided no normative account of 
how people should “optimally” process corrections to misinformation. The lack 
of formulism is important because there may be situations in which continued 
reliance on misinformation is rational given the sparsity of information and 
inherent uncertainty of the situation at hand. In uncertain situations with 
sparse information, people may use cues, such as source credibility/reliability, 
to assess the validity of misinformation and its correction, and decide how 
much to incorporate these pieces of information into their beliefs. Indeed, 
research on the CIE suggests that the reliability - or credibility - of the sources 
providing the correction moderates the continued impact of misinformation 
(Guillory & Geraci, 2010; 2013).  
One common normative standard of inference is Bayesian belief 
revision. Bayes’ Theorem provides a normative rule for updating beliefs 
considering new evidence and is therefore valuable for studying human 
reasoning. Normative predictions derived from Bayes’ Theorem can be 
compared to participant’s responses in experiments. Bayesian probability has 
been used to study various aspects of human reasoning. For instance, 
Bayesian probability has been used to study judgement (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1983), conditional reasoning (Oaksford & Chater, 2003, 2007; 
Over, 2009), argumentation (Hahn & Oaksford, 2007), as well as other areas 
of cognition (Chater, Oaksford, Hahn, & Heit, 2010).  
The Bayesian network (BN) framework, in particular, is ideal for 
examining whether the CIE is rational in some circumstances, because it 
provides the means to test people’s causal models of scenarios - including 
their models of the reliability and credibility of the sources providing 
information - and compare inferences to a normative standard (Fenton, Neil, & 
Lagnado, 2013; Lagnado, Fenton, & Neil, 2013; Pearl, 1988, 2001). Bayesian 
networks (BN) use graph structures to represent the probabilistic relationships 
between hypotheses and evidence (including reliability), using conditional 
probabilities to represent the strength of relations, and show what inferences 
are rationally permitted from a given model of the available information. The 
BN approach has been used to model inferences about the convincingness of 
 215 
     
arguments from experts in terms of their access to (expertise), and capacity to 
convey (trustworthiness), accurate information (Harris, Hahn, Madsen, & Hsu, 
2016), and shown that participants’ quantitative judgements are broadly 
consistent with Bayesian model predictions.  
As noted in the previous section, factors such as congruency of 
additional information with the misinformation explanation, and the reliability 
(or credibility) of sources providing the misinformation or the correction, are 
potential moderators of the CIE. The BN framework could be used to test 
some basic elements of the CIE, such as a source who initially presents 
information but then later contradicts themselves, to examine what inferences 
are rationally permitted for a given causal model of available information.  
A basic model of the CIE that incorporates the reliability of sources 
would include a hypothesis (e.g. carelessly stored flammable liquids caused 
the fire), which is confirmed by the source of misinformation, but then 
contradicted by the same source later. This could be used to examine how 
much the reliability of a single source who contradicts themselves should be 
penalised for the contradiction, and how much to update belief in the 
hypothesis when this occurs. This could be compared to a situation in which 
the misinformation and correction (contradiction) come from different sources 
to examine participant’s judgements about the probability of the hypothesis 
given the contradictory reports. Comparing actual judgements to predictions 
from a Bayesian model might reveal whether there are situations in which 
retaining belief in misinformation after a correction is rational. Formally 
modelling the causal relations between information included in a scenario 
would make it possible to test participants’ causal models of scenarios. This 
would therefore provide better understanding the cognitive mechanisms 
involved in the CIE, and the strategies that might be useful for improving 
reasoning about misinformation.   
5.5. Practical Implications 
Throughout this thesis I have shown that the CIE occurs despite clear 
corrections that explain how misinformation originated, and irrespective of 
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whether misinformation implies or explicitly states a likely cause of the 
adverse outcome described in the scenario. Through this research I have also 
shown that the CIE is not guaranteed to arise under all circumstances and is 
substantially attenuated when a correction provided information that 
invalidates the causal explanation offered by the misinformation. In addition to 
this, by introducing a novel control condition in which misinformation is only 
presented as part of a correction, I showed that at least part of the CIE can be 
explained by the availability of causal explanations when answering causal 
inference questions.  
These findings have important implications in the domains such as the 
media, science, law, healthcare, education, and politics. Explanations are 
intended to clarify the causes, context, and consequences of the set of facts 
they describe. Experts usually make use of explanations when attempting to 
argue the case for or against a set of facts. Explaining that a piece of 
erroneous information originated from a deception or honest mistake may 
have little impact in reducing misinformation reliance over and above simply 
stating that the information is incorrect, as observed in Chapter 3.  
Furthermore, news reports, or blogs, that make use of innuendo and 
speculation when the full facts are unknown, may be as difficult to correct as 
erroneous information that is directly asserts a cause of an outcome, as 
evidenced in Chapter 4. Furthermore, the findings reported in this thesis 
suggest that the extent to which people continue to rely on misinformation 
might depend on the degree of inference required by the correction, as shown 
in Chapters 3 and 4. This suggests that, where possible, corrections to 
misinformation should make use of clear and incontrovertible evidence that 
sufficiently invalidates erroneous information rather simply negating it. Finally, 
the mere mention of misinformation during its correction could be sufficient to 
instigate continued reliance on misinformation, if this explanation for an event 
is available during retrieval, as evidenced in Chapters 2 and 4. This finding 
suggests that the mere mention of misinformation in a correction could be 
sufficient to trigger a continued reliance on misinformation even if people were 
not initially exposed to misinformation.   
 217 
     
There are also important practical implications in terms of terms of using 
the CIE make policy recommendations (e.g. Lewandowsky et al., 2012). 
There is still a lack of resolution about the precise set of circumstances that 
bring about the CIE. Furthermore, it is unclear whether observing the CIE is 
limited to artificial scenarios that do not reflect how people encounter 
misinformation the real world. Thus, it is still unclear whether it is possible to 
use findings from CIE studies to infer anything about the prevalence of the 
CIE in society. This means that researchers should be careful about making 
policy recommendations from the findings that could be easily influenced by 
the type of task and stimuli used in experiments.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
Table A.1. Experimental Stimuli used in Experiments 1A, 1B, 2A, and 2B 
Message # Content 
Message 1 Jan. 25th 8:58 p.m. Alarm call received from premises 
of a wholesale stationery warehouse. Premises 
consist of offices, display room, and storage hall. 
Message 2 A serious fire was reported in the storage hall, already 
out of control and requiring instant response. Fire 
engine dispatched at 9:00 p.m. 
Message 3 The alarm was raised by the night security guard, who 
had smelled smoke and gone to investigate. 
Message 4 Jan. 26th 4:00 a.m. Attending fire captain suggests 
that the fire was started by a short circuit in the wiring 
of a closet off the main storage hall. Police now 
investigating. 
Message 5 The fire officer had recorded several fire code 
violations on the premises at a surprise inspection two 
months earlier. 
Message 6 [Target 
(Mis)information] 
4:30 a.m. Message received from Police Investigator 
Lucas saying that they have reports that cans of oil 
paint and pressurized gas cylinders had been present 
in the closet before the fire. 
Message 6 [Control – No 
Misinformation]41 
4:30 a.m. Message received from Police Investigator 
Lucas saying that they have that they have urged local 
residents to keep their windows and doors shut. 
Message 7 The display room was reported to contain display 
cases, catalogues, and the sales staffs' desks. It was 
only staffed from 11 a.m. to 2 p.m., due to diminishing 
sales. 
Message 8 Firefighters attending the scene report thick, oily 
smoke and sheets of flames hampering their efforts, 
and an intense heat that made the fire particularly 
difficult to bring under control.  
Message 9 It has been learned that a number of explosions 
occurred during the blaze, which endangered 
firefighters in the vicinity. No fatalities were reported. 
 
                                            
41
 This condition only appeared in Experiments 2A and 2B. 
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Message 10 Two firefighters are reported to have been taken to the 
hospital as a result of breathing toxic fumes that built 
up in the area in which they were working. 
 
Message 11 A small fire had been discovered on the same 
premises, six months previously. It had been 
successfully tackled by the workers themselves. 
Message 12 10:00 a.m. The owner of the affected premises 
estimates that total damage will amount to hundreds of 
thousands of dollars, although the premises were 
insured. 
Message 13 [No 
Correction] 
10:40 a.m. A second message received from Police 
Investigator Lucas regarding the investigation into the 
fire. It stated that the two firefighters taken to the 
hospital had been released. 
 
Message 13 [Correction & 
Alternative Explanation 
Conditions] 
10:40 a.m. A second message received from Police 
Investigator Lucas regarding the investigation into the 
fire. It stated that the closet reportedly containing cans 
of oil paint and gas cylinders had actually been empty 
before the fire. 
 
Message 13 [No 
Misinformation/Correction 
Condition]42 
10:40 a.m. A second message received from Police 
Investigator Lucas regarding the investigation into the 
fire. It stated that a closet reportedly containing cans of 
oil paint and gas cylinders had actually been empty 
before the fire.  
 
Message 14 [No 
Correction/Correction/No 
Misinformation] 
The shipping supervisor has disclosed that the storage 
hall contained bales of paper; mailing and legal-size 
envelopes; scissors, pencils, and other school 
supplies; and a large number of photocopying 
machines. 
 
Message 14 [Alternative 
Explanation]43 
11:08 a.m. Firefighters have found evidence of 
gasoline-soaked rags near where the bales of paper 
had been stored in the storage hall, as well as several 
emptied steel drums of suspicious nature. The owner 
denies any knowledge of these materials. 
Message 15 11:30 a.m. Attending fire captain reports that the fire is 
now out and that the storage hall has been completely 
gutted. 
  
                                            
42
 This condition only appeared in Experiments 2A and 2B. 
43
 This condition only appeared in Experiments 1A and 1B. 
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Appendix B 
Questions and used in Experiments 1A, 1B, 2A, and 2B and response options 
used in Experiments 1A and 2B 
 
Inference Questions 
  
1. Why did the fire spread so quickly? 
a. Burning paint may have spilled over a large area      
b. Flammable materials could have been deliberately soaked in 
gasoline 
c. There could have been large amounts of paper throughout 
the building    
d. The kitchen door may have been left open 
 
2. What was the possible cause of the fumes?  
a. Oil-based paint 
b. Gasoline    
c. Paper and cardboard 
d. Cooking oil 
 
3. What aspect of the fire might the police want to continue 
investigating? 
a. Dangerously flammable materials were stored carelessly 
b. The presence of items of a suspicious nature 
c. Unaddressed fire code violations  
d. Fire not adequately prevented by open fire door 
 
4. What could have caused the explosions?  
a. Fire came in contact with compressed gas cylinders 
b. Steel drums filled with liquid accelerants   
c. Volatile compounds in photocopiers caught on fire 
d. Cooking equipment caught on fire 
 
5. Where was the probable location of the explosions? 
a. The storage closet. 
b. The storage hall   
c. The display room.   
d. The kitchen  
 
6. What was the most likely overall cause of the fire? 
a. Flammable liquids and gases not stored properly 
b. Someone deliberately set fire to the property   
c. The owner had allowed paper and cardboard to be left lying 
around 
d. The cooker in the kitchen was left on 
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Factual Questions 
 
1. Where on the premises was the fire located? 
a. In a closet off the main storage hall  
b. In the storage hall  
c. In the owner’s office 
d. In a supply room next to the storage hall   
 
2. What features of the fire were noted by the security guard? 
a. The smell of smoke  
b. The smell of gasoline 
c. The triggering of the alarm system 
d. The sight of flames through the window 
 
3. What business was the firm in? 
a. Wholesale stationery  
b. Toy manufacturer  
c. Electrical supplies producer  
d. Book printing services 
 
4. What was present in the closet before the fire? 
a. Cans of oil paint and pressurised gas cylinders 
b. The storage closet was empty before the fire 
c. Printer cartridges and toners  
d. The worker’s uniforms 
 
5. What was the cost of the damage done? 
a. Hundreds of thousands of dollars 
b. Millions of dollars 
c. Hundreds of dollars 
d. Tens of thousands of dollars 
 
6. When was the fire eventually put out? 
a. 11.30 a.m. 
b. 11.08 a.m. 
c. 6.30 a.m. 
d. 12.00 p.m. 
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Appendix C 
Table C.1. Coding criteria for warehouse fire story open-ended inference 
questions in Experiments 1A, 1B, 2A, and 2B 
No. Question Example response to receive score of 1 
on reference to target (mis)information 
measure 
1 Why did the fire spread so 
quickly? 
The fire spread due to oil in storage. 
2 What was the possible cause of 
the fumes?       
 
Oil cans and gas explosions 
3 What aspect of the fire might the 
police want to continue 
investigating? 
 
Why the cylinders were there 
4 What could have caused the 
explosions? 
Pressurised containers of aerosols. 
5 Where was the probable location 
of the explosions? 
In the closet and possibly in the offices 
6 What was the most likely overall 
cause of the fire? 
Carelessness with stocking flammable 
liquids and paper near an electrical supply. 
 
 
 
Table C.2. Coding criteria for factual recall questions in 1A, 1B, 2A, and 2B 
 
No. Question Correct Answer 
1 Where on the premises 
was the fire located? 
In a closet off the main storage hall  
 
2 What features of the fire 
were noted by the 
security guard? 
 
The smell of smoke  
 
3 What business was the 
firm in? 
Wholesale stationery  
 
4 What was present in the 
closet before the fire? 
Cans of oil paint and pressurised gas cylinders [No 
Correction Condition]. 
The storage closet was empty before the fire. 
[Correction and No Misinformation/Correction 
Condition] 
5 What was the cost of the 
damage done? 
Hundreds of thousands of dollars 
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6 When was the fire 
eventually put out? 
11.30 a.m.  
 
 
Table C.3. Coding criteria for critical information recall questions 1A, 1B, 2A, 
and 2B 
 
Question Example response to receive score 
of 1  
What was the point of the second 
message from Fire Chief Lucas? 
Yes, the news reports were unclear 
about whether or not there were 
inflammable substances. 
Were you aware of any corrections or 
contradictions in the messages that you 
read? 
Yes, I was aware of the correction by 
the officer. 
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Appendix D 
In order to make comparisons between conditions, responses to the question 
probing recall of critical information that appeared at Message 13 (i.e., either a 
correction or control message) were analysed. This analysis differed from the 
preregistered confirmatory analysis. The second question was only relevant to 
the conditions featuring initial misinformation and its correction so was not 
analysed. Chi-square tests tested dependence between correction information 
condition and recall of critical information. 
 
Effect of correction information condition on critical information recall 
responses (Experiment 1A) 
 Relative frequencies did not significantly differ,    (2) = 3.12, p = .21. 
Accurate recall of critical information occurred at rate of 50% for the no 
correction group, 48% for the correction group, and 28% for the alternative 
explanation group.  
 
Effect of correction information condition on critical information recall 
responses (Experiment 1B) 
Relative frequencies did not significantly differ,    (2) = 0.67, p = .72. 
Accurate recall of critical information occurred at rate of 33% for the no 
correction group, 36% for the correction group, and 25% for the alternative 
explanation group.  
 
Effect of correction information condition on critical information recall 
responses (Experiment 2A) 
Relative frequencies were significantly different,    (2) = 13.73, p = 
.001. The no correction group recalled critical information at a rate of 56%, the 
correction group accurately recalled critical information at a rate of 42% and 
the no misinformation group at a rate of 21%.  
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Effect of correction information condition on critical information recall 
responses (Experiment 2B) 
Relative critical information recall frequencies were significantly 
different,    (2) = 21.09, p < .001. The no correction group recalled critical 
information at a rate of 50%, the correction group accurately recalled critical 
information at a rate of 66% and the no misinformation group at a rate of 22%. 
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Appendix E 
Table E.1. Experimental Stimuli used in Experiment 3 
Message #  Content 
Message 1 Large blaze reported at wholesale stationery 
warehouse in Fern Hill industrial park. The fire broke 
out around 9pm.  
 
Message 2 The alarm was first raised by night security guard 
who smelled smoke and went to investigate.  
 
Message 3 More than 60 firefighters are battling to contain the 
huge blaze. Workers at nearby warehouses are 
being evacuated.  
 
Message 4 Three warehouse workers, suffering from smoke 
inhalation, have been taken to St Columbus 
Hospital. 
Message 5 [Target 
(Mis)information; All 
Conditions] 
 
Fire Chief Lucas issues statement: “Cans of oil paint 
and pressurized gas cylinders were present in the 
storeroom before the fire.” 
Message 6 
 
Witness Greg Burns said “A large number of 
emergency services arrived very quickly, so it was 
clearly a major fire.” 
Message 7 The fire officer reported several fire code violations 
had been recorded on the premises at surprise 
inspection two months earlier.  
 
Message 8 [Causal Detail] Thick, oily smoke & sheets of flames hinder fire-
fighters efforts, intense heat has made the fire 
difficult to bring under control. 
Message 9 Firefighters are using an aerial ladder platform in 
their attempts to extinguish the flames.  
 
Message 10 [Control - No 
Correction] 
Update from Fire Chief Lucas: “The warehouse 
employees taken to hospital have been released.”  
 
Message 10 [Just 
Correction] 
Correction from Fire Chief Lucas: “No cans of oil 
paint and pressurized gas cylinders had ever been 
present in the warehouse.” 
Message 10 [Correction + 
Error Explanation] 
Correction from Fire Chief Lucas: “An employee 
confused soda-stream canisters & coffee cans in the 
storeroom, for paint & gas cylinders” 
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Message 10 [Correction + 
Lie Explanation] 
Correction from Fire Chief Lucas: “An employee 
admitted to lying about presence of paint and gas in 
the storeroom.”  
 
Message 11 The fire was finally brought under control around 
12pm. 
Message 12 An attending fire captain reports that the fire is now 
out and that the storage hall has been completely 
gutted.  
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Appendix F 
Table F.1. Inference questions and response coding criteria in Experiment 3 
No. Question Example response to receive score of 1 on 
false information measure 
1 What evidence of careless 
management is there in 
relation to this fire? 
The rumors of dangerous materials could be 
evidence of careless management. 
2 How could the fire at the 
warehouse have been 
avoided? 
The fire could have been avoided if the 
surprise inspection had led to not storing the oil 
paint and the pressurized gas cylinders 
together in a dangerous manner. 
3 What precautions could be 
taken in the future to ensure 
this doesn’t happen again? 
Maybe don't use oil paint. And separate the 
paint from the pressurized gas cylinders. 
 
4 What aspect of the fire 
should the police focus on in 
their investigation? 
I think they should focus if there were any 
hazardous material stored in the warehouse. 
5 Does any aspect of the fire 
deserve further investigation? 
Presence of flammable material and root cause 
of the fire 
6 Do you think any workers 
should be disciplined for their 
role in the fire? 
If a manager or superior instructed anyone to 
store flammable materials in a way that caused 
the blaze they should be disciplined.   
7 What was the most likely 
cause of the fire? [cause 
question] 
 
The cause of the fire was likely the oil and 
pressurized cans in the storage. 
 244 
 
Table F.2. Coding criteria for factual recall questions in Experiment 3 
 
Table F.3. Coding criteria for critical information recall questions 
No. Question Correct Answer 
1 Where was the 
warehouse located? 
Fern Hill Industrial Park 
2 What features of the fire 
were noted by the 
security guard 
The smell of smoke 
3 Approximately how 
many firefighters battled 
to contain the fire? 
60 firefighters 
4 Which hospital were the 
workers taken to? 
St Columbus 
5 What was present in the 
storeroom before the 
fire? 
[Condition dependent: No correction = Cans of oil 
paint and gas cylinders, Correction / Correction + 
Lie Explanation = Nothing / Do not know, Correction 
+ Error Explanation = Soda-canisters and coffee 
cans 
6 What did firefighters use 
to try and extinguish the 
flames? 
Aerial ladder platform. 
7 At what time was the 
fire eventually brought 
under control?  
 
4am. 
 
 
Question Example response to receive score of 1  
What was the point of the second 
message from Fire Chief Lucas? 
Yes, the news reports were unclear about 
whether or not there were inflammable 
substances. 
Were you aware of any corrections or 
contradictions in the messages that you 
read? 
Yes, I was aware of the correction by the 
officer. 
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Appendix G 
Instructions presented before answering inference and fact questions in 
Experiment 3 
The same instructions were used in Experiments 4, 5, 6, and 7 except that the 
word was changed to reflect the particular scenario.  
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Appendix H 
Table H.1. Warehouse Fire Stimuli used in Experiments 4 and 5 
Message # Content 
Message 1 Large blaze reported at wholesale 
stationery warehouse in Fern Hill 
industrial park. The fire broke out around 
9pm.  
 
Message 2 Night security guard, who smelled 
smoke and went to investigate, first 
raised the alarm.  
 
Message 3   
 
More than 60 firefighters are battling to 
contain the huge blaze. Fire dept. 
investigators trying to establish cause of 
the blaze. Nearby residential building 
evacuated over fears of damage due to 
fire. 
Message 4 [Potential Cause 
Information] 
Recent report from fire department 
indicates most industrial fires are due to 
equipment & machinery, flammable 
substances, hot work, & electrical 
hazards. 
Message 5 [Target (Mis)information] Fire Chief Lucas issues statement: 
“Cans of oil paint and pressurized gas 
cylinders were present in storeroom 
before fire.”  
 
Message 6 Three warehouse workers working 
overtime have been taken to St 
Columbus Hospital, due to smoke 
inhalation. 
Message 7 Warehouse fire safety officer reports 
surprise inspection at the premises two 
months earlier. Full report has not been 
published yet. 
Message 8 [Causal Detail] Thick, oily smoke + sheets of flames 
hinder firefighters’ efforts; intense heat 
has made the fire difficult to bring under 
control. 
Message 9 Firefighters have been using an aerial 
ladder platform in their attempts to 
extinguish the flames. The owner is 
concerned about damage to stock. 
Shocked neighbours posted videos 
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online. 
Message 10 [No Correction] Update from Chief Lucas: “The 
warehouse employees taken to hospital 
were treated for smoke inhalation and 
have now been released. Temporary 
accommodation is available for 
evacuated residents.”  
 
Message 10 [Correction] Correction from Chief Lucas: “No 
flammable items actually in storeroom. 
No paint or gas had ever been present 
in the warehouse. We apologise for the 
earlier error.”   
 
Message 10 [Correction + Error 
Explanation] 
Correction from Chief Lucas: “No 
flammable items actually in storeroom. 
No paint or gas had ever been present 
in the warehouse. An employee 
confused soda canisters and coffee 
cans for paint and gas.”   
Message 10 [Correction + Lie 
Explanation] 
Correction from Chief Lucas: “No 
flammable items actually in storeroom. 
No paint or gas had ever been present 
in the warehouse. Unhappy employee 
admitted lying about presence of paint & 
gas in storeroom.” 
 
Message 11 The fire was finally brought under control 
around 4am early the following morning. 
A couple of firefighters were seen high-
fiving each other. 
Message 12 Warehouse fire is now out and the 
storage hall has been completely gutted. 
Owner expects substantial fire damage 
costs. 
 
Table H.2. Crash stimuli used in Experiments 4 and 5 
5 Message # 6 Content 
Message 1 7 Serious accident involving van 
reported on Spring St. around 4pm 
today. Van was carrying 12 people, 
including the driver. 
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Message 2 8 Passing driver reported the accident 
after noticing the van had crashed into a 
steep embankment & rolled on its side. 
Message 3 9 A rescue crew was immediately 
dispatched to the scene upon report of 
the accident, arriving at the scene within 
10 minutes. Police are interviewing 
those involved in the crash. 
Message 4 [Potential Cause 
Information] 
10 Road safety experts say that vehicle 
type, driver behaviour, road and 
environmental conditions can all cause 
a vehicle to roll over. 
Message 5 [Target (Mis)information]  11 Chief Inspector Brown reports: 
“Driver drank at least one bottle of beer 
during a stop at a service station.” 
Message 6 12 Serious damage caused to side of 
the van. Three passengers incurred 
injuries and have been airlifted to 
hospital. 
Message 7 13 The charter van company released a 
statement that the vehicle had passed a 
recent inspection with minor faults. 
Message 8 [Causal Detail] 14 The driver of the van, a recent 
divorcee, had been involved in a 
prolonged legal battle with his ex-wife. 
Message 9 15 Rescue workers are using special 
cutting equipment to free two of the 
passengers. Passengers who have 
been freed from the van appear visibly 
distressed. 
Message 10 [No Correction] 16 Update from Insp. Brown: “The two 
passengers airlifted to hospital have 
been stabilized and will be kept in for 
observation. Traffic through Spring St 
has been temporarily diverted.” 
Message 10 [Correction] 17 Clarification from Insp. Brown: 
“Driver did not drink beer at service 
station. Tests show he had no alcohol in 
his system. We apologise for the earlier 
inaccuracy.” 
Message 10 [Correction + Error 
Explanation] 
18 Clarification from Insp. Brown: 
“Driver did not drink beer at service 
station. Tests show he had no alcohol in 
his system. The bottle he was seen 
drinking actually contained non-alcoholic 
ginger beer.” 
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Message 10 [Correction + Lie 
Explanation] 
19 Clarification from Insp. Brown: 
“Driver was not drinking alcohol. Tests 
show driver had no alcohol in his 
system. Passenger who made allegation 
admitted lying because of earlier 
argument with driver.”   
Message 11 Van was transporting passengers back 
home from the Beat Bunker music 
festival when the crash occurred.   
20  
Message 12 21 Passengers have now been 
discharged from hospital. Police will 
continue investigating the accident. 
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Table H.3. Injury Stimuli used in Experiment 4 
Message # 22 Content 
Message 1 23 At about 8.30pm last night officers 
responded to call regarding an injured 
woman lying in a street in downtown San 
Luis. 
Message 2 24 A resident heard shouts and looked 
out his window to see a woman 
collapsed; emergency services were 
called immediately. 
Message 3 25 Officers arriving on the scene, found 
the middle-aged woman, unresponsive, 
with a head injury. Police are working to 
determine to circumstances surrounding 
her injuries. 
Message 4 [Potential Cause 
Information] 
26 Officer says that common reasons for 
head injuries are blows to the head 
sustained by falling, physical assault, or 
motor vehicle accidents. 
Message 5 [Target (Mis) information]  Detective Symons makes statement: 
“Cries were heard and a man was seen 
running away from the scene.”  
27  
Message 6 28 Paramedics treated the injured woman 
on the scene. She was then rushed to 
hospital where she received further 
treatment. 
Message 7 29 Police have been examining CCTV 
camera footage within a mile radius of the 
incident. Obstructions mean footage is 
inconclusive. 
Message 8 [Causal Detail] An initial medical report suggests head 
injuries are consistent with impact from a 
blow to the head. 
30  
Message 9 31 The area on Maddox St where the 
incident occurred has been cordoned off 
whilst the police continue their 
investigation. Police have appealed for 
witnesses or anyone with information to 
come forward. 
Message 10 [No Correction] 32 Update from Det. Symons: “Injured 
woman has been identified and we have 
been in contact with her family. Please 
respect cordon boundaries while 
investigation in continuing.” 
 251 
 
Message 10 [Correction] 33 Det. Symons revises earlier 
statement: “Man seen running away not 
involved in incident. Injuries could not 
have come from physical assault. We are 
sorry for our earlier mistake.” 
Message 10 [Correction + Error 
Explanation] 
Det. Symons revises earlier statement: 
“Man seen running away not involved in 
incident. Injuries could not have come 
from physical assault. Man was in fact 
running to call an ambulance.”  
34  
Message 10 [Correction + Lie 
Explanation] 
35 Det. Symons revises earlier 
statement: “Man seen running away not 
involved in incident. Injuries could not 
have come from physical assault.  
Notorious attention seeker lied about 
seeing man running away.” 
Message 11 36 Injured woman is believed to be a 
housekeeper who had been working in 
the area, and was returning to her car 
parked on the street. 
Message 12 Injured woman has been stabilized but 
has a fractured skull. She is not yet in a fit 
state to be interviewed. 
37  
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Table H.4. Missing person stimuli used in Experiment 4 
Message # 38 Content 
Message 1 39 Edge Park police are looking for 19-
year old, Joe Pryce, missing since 
Wednesday morning. 
Message 2 40 Joe missed work and failed to pick up 
his girlfriend from her soccer practice, 
after which his parents reported him 
missing. 
Message 3 41 Police sent out a search team after 
completion of a risk assessment. Police 
are interviewing Joe’s colleagues at 
Butler’s pharmacy. 
Message 4 [Potential Cause 
Information] 
42 Edge Park has seen several 
disappearances in recent years; reasons 
range from financial difficulties to 
adventure hiking, and mental health 
issues. 
Message 5 [Target (Mis) information]  43 Lieutenant Lopez releases report: 
“Joe’s car was seen leaving town through 
toll road.”  
Message 6 44 Donna Pryce, Joe’s mother, heard Joe 
leave for work early that morning but 
didn’t notice anything unusual. 
Message 7 45 Joe’s parents first used the ‘Find My 
Friends’ app to check his last location. He 
last checked in at work on Tuesday PM. 
Message 8 [Causal Detail] 46 Joe has been known to frequent Lake 
Fairmount and other off-road locations, 
from time to time.  
Message 9 47 Police are also checking for any 
activity on Joe’s phone, bank and social 
media accounts. Joe’s family and friends 
have launched social media appeal for 
help locating him. 
Message 10 [No Correction] 48 Update from Lt. Lopez: “K9 and 
helicopter search and rescue teams have 
been deployed. We ask anyone 
independently searching to allow our 
personnel to conduct their search efforts.” 
Message 10 [Correction] 49 Lt. Lopez withdraws initial report: 
“Joe’s car did not leave town: It had been 
in auto repair shop since before he went 
missing. We regret our earlier error.” 
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Message 10 [Correction + Error 
Explanation] 
50 Lt. Lopez withdraws initial report: 
“Joe’s car did not leave town: It had been 
in auto repair shop since before he went 
missing. Car color was misidentified in 
low light.”  
Message 10 [Correction + Lie 
Explanation] 
51 Lt. Lopez withdraws initial report: 
“Joe’s car did not leave town: It had been 
in auto repair shop since before he went 
missing. Alleged witness admitted lying to 
police in hope of getting reward.” 
Message 11 52 Joe is described as white male, 5 
‘11’’with brown hair & blue eyes. He was 
wearing black jacket and blue jeans, 
when he was last seen. 
Message 12 53 Joe’s parents are holding a press 
conference. Police spokesperson thanked 
media, and members of public for 
assistance.  
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Appendix I 
Coding criteria for the warehouse fire scenario questions are identical to 
Experiment 3 and are therefore not reported again here. 
Table I.1. Inference questions and response coding criteria for crash scenario 
in Experiments 4 and 5 
No. Question Example response to receive 
score of 1 on target 
(mis)information measure 
1 What evidence is there of negligent 
driving in relation to this accident? 
 
The driver had been drinking alcohol 
whilst driving.  
2 How could this accident have been 
avoided? 
Probably if the driver had not been 
drinking alcohol whilst driving.   
3 Were any of the people in the vehicle 
particularly responsible for the crash? 
Probably the driver since he was 
drinking during the service stop.   
4 What measures could the charter van 
company take prevent future 
accidents? 
Make sure they vet their drivers 
better so they don’t hire drunks.   
5 What aspects of the accident should 
further investigations be focused on? 
Finding out whether there was any 
alcohol on the bus. 
6 For what reasons might the passengers 
want to take legal action against the 
charter van company? 
 
Because the driver had been 
drinking and he should not have 
been.  
7 What do you think the most likely cause 
of the crash was? [cause question] 
Careless driving because the driver 
was drunk.   
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Table I.2. Factual recall questions and response coding for crash scenario in 
Experiments 4 and 5 
No. Question Correct Answer 
1 How many people was the 
van carrying? 
Twelve 
2 Where did the accident 
occur? 
Spring Street 
3 What did the van crash 
into? 
A steep embankment  
4 What method of transport 
was used to take three of 
the passengers to the 
hospital? 
They were airlifted 
5 What was the driver 
drinking during the service 
stop? 
[Condition dependent] No correction =Alcohol, 
Explanatory Correction (Error) = Non-alcoholic 
beer, Correction only / Explanatory correction 
(Lie) = Unknown / Not alcohol 
6 What event was the van 
transporting people from? 
Beat Bunker  
7 What was the van driver’s 
marital status?  
Recent divorcee 
 
Table H.3. Critical information recall questions and response coding criteria 
for crash scenario in Experiments 4 and 5 
No. Question Example response to receive score of 
1  
1 What was the purpose of the 
second statement from Inspector 
Brown? 
To tell everyone that the driver was not 
drinking alcohol. 
2 Were you aware of any 
modifications or amendments to the 
messages you read?  
Yes, the passenger’s statement was 
found not to be true because there was 
no alcohol in the bottle.  
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Table I.4. Inference questions and response coding criteria for injury scenario 
used in Experiment 4 
No. Question Example response to receive score of 
1 on target (mis)information measure 
1 How might the CCTV camera 
footage help the police in their 
investigation? 
They would have evidence that the man 
seen running away assaulted the man  
2 Who, if anyone, do you think is 
responsible for the woman’s 
injuries? 
The man seen running away hit him 
[with something], then hid it in his house.   
3 Why do you think the woman was 
unresponsive? 
She was knocked unconscious by the 
woman seen running away  
4 What do you think is a likely 
explanation for what happened to 
the injured woman? 
She was assaulted by the man who was 
seen running away  
5 What potential leads do the police 
have in establishing what happened 
to the woman? 
Well someone ran away from the 
woman – suggests he was probably 
assaulted 
6 Why do you think the woman was 
unable to recall what happened to 
her? 
Because the man seen running away hit 
her around the head with something or 
punched her.  
7 What was the most likely cause of 
the woman’s injuries? [cause 
question] 
 
She was assaulted by someone.   
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Table I.5. Factual recall questions and response coding criteria for injury 
scenario used in Experiment 4 
No. Question Correct Answer 
1 What time did officers initially 
respond to the call? 
Around 8.30pm 
2 Roughly how old was the 
injured woman? 
Middle-aged 
3 What did the injured woman 
receive treatment for? 
A head injury / fractured skull 
4 What was the name of the 
street the police cordoned 
off? 
Maddox Street 
5 How were the woman’s 
injuries sustained? 
[Condition dependent: No correction = Assault, 
Correction conditions = Unclear / Not assault / 
A fall]   
6 What was the injured 
woman’s profession? 
Housekeeper  
7 What head injury did the 
woman sustain? 
Fractured skull 
 
Table I.6. Critical information recall questions and response coding for injury 
scenario used in Experiment 4 
Question Example response to 
receive score of 1  
What was the implication of Detective Symons second 
report? 
Evidence was 
inconsistent with assault 
What facts about the incident did the police change their 
minds about, based on information they discovered later? 
That the woman was 
assaulted. 
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Table I.7. Inference questions and response coding criteria for missing 
scenario used in Experiment 4 
No. Question Example response to receive score of 
1 on target (mis)information measure 
1 What reasons are there for the 
police to be concerned about Joe’s 
disappearance? 
 
Yes, someone saw his car leaving town, 
and he likes to do off-road hiking so he 
might have had an accident. 
2 What leads might the police have in 
locating Joe? 
Someone spotted his car leaving town 
3 Where do you think Joe is? He went off somewhere in his car – 
probably went hiking or swimming in the 
lake 
4 Precisely how might the traffic 
camera footage relate to Joe’s 
disappearance?  
The footage showed that Joe left Edge 
Park and went somewhere out of town  
5 What do you think the risk 
assessment conducted by the police 
might have shown? 
That Joe was experiencing some 
difficulties and may have driven off 
somewhere  
6 Which aspects of Joe’s 
disappearance do 
you believe deserve further 
investigation? 
 
Probably the fact that his car was seen 
leaving town. They should cast their 
search net wider.  
7 What do you think the most likely 
reason for Joe’s disappearance is? 
[cause question] 
 
He drove off somewhere in his car and 
got injured or something.  
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Table I.8. Factual recall questions and response coding criteria for missing 
person scenario used in Experiment 4 
No. Question Correction Answer 
1 How old is Joe? 19 
2 Where does Joe work? Butler’s pharmacy 
3 What was the name of Joe’s 
mother? 
Donna Pryce  
4 What form of technology did Joe’s 
parents use to find out his last 
location? 
‘Find My Friends’ App 
5 What evidence did the police find 
in relation to the disappearance?  
[Condition dependent] No correction = 
Someone saw his car leaving town, All 
correction conditions = Nothing  
6 Where did Joe’s family and friends 
launch an appeal for help locating 
him? 
Social media  
7 What was Joe wearing when he 
was last seen? 
Black jacket and blue jeans 
 
  
Table I.8. Critical information recall questions and response coding criteria for 
missing person report used in Experiment 4 
No. Question Example response to receive score 
of 1  
1 What details did Lt. Lopez’ second 
report provide? 
Lopez said that the cameras showed 
the witness was wrong about Joe’s car  
2 Did you notice any inconsistencies 
between the messages that you 
read? 
There was a witness who apparently 
saw Joe’s car but then it turned out they 
were wrong.   
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Appendix J 
Experiment 6 used the warehouse fire and crash scenarios. These were 
almost identical to previous experiments except that two different types of 
misinformation were presented to different groups of participants. Only the 
messages from the new misinformation conditions are reported here to avoid 
repetition.  
 
Table J.1. Explicitly stated target (mis)information for warehouse fire and 
crash scenarios in Experiment 6 
Warehouse Fire Crash 
Fire Chief Lucas issues statement: 
“Investigation team suspect fire caused by 
carelessly stored flammable liquids. Cans of 
oil paint and pressurized gas cylinders were 
present in storeroom before fire.” 
Chief Inspector Brown reports: 
“Investigatory team suspect drunk 
driver caused crash. Driver drank at 
least one bottle of beer during a stop 
at a service station.” 
 
 
 
